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Name: Simeon Tsetim Iber
Title: A Study of the Principle of Subsidiarity in Catholic Social Thought:
Implications for Social Justice and Civil Society in Nigeria

Abstract
This dissertation examined the centrality of the principle of subsidiarity in
Catholic social teaching, in bringing about social and moral reconstruction of society and
in particular the Nigerian social context. The origin of this principle has been traced to
the natural human inclination to build a healthy relationship between the individual and
society, such that, the society will provide generous help and support to individuals to
help themselves. Subsidiarity is a way of organizing individuals and social groups in
community to help each other in pursuing their interests with common goals, the ultimate
purpose being to assist one another and uphold the common good.
The vision of the common good sees in the human person the personal dignity
proper to one’s nature, but directed essentially to others in society. Hence, the common
good and the good of the individual do not oppose one another, but the good of the
individual whose nature is personal has a dignity proper to itself, but nonetheless is social
in character, that is, it is directed to the well-being of others. Thus, the common good is
realized through the participation and contribution of the individual to others in society.
In this way, the relationship between the individual and the social group remains a
question for everybody in a given social context.
The study carried out a critical analysis of the Nigerian society and discovered
that lack of development at the grassroots, corruption, bribery, ethnic conflicts, failure of
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leadership, and failure of the rule of law have eaten deep into the fabric of the nation. The
study recommended that in order to support individuals and social groups to help each
other, the practice of social justice is a necessary component to the common good. Social
justice will ensure the building of trust across ethnic lines, protect minority tribes from
being taken over by larger tribes, promote grassroots participation of the masses by
encouraging self-help tribal, community, kinship, religious, and non-governmental
associations as agents of positive social change. Moreover, tribal customs and practices
that are unjust may and must be re-evaluated in the light of the Gospel message of Jesus
who came to serve and not to be served.
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Preface
This study is timely for appraising the Nigerian social context on three levels.
First, the need to re-evaluate traditional cultural norms and practices in the light of
Christian faith is essential. Thus, the practice of inculturation in the context of Catholic
social teaching will ensure that positive practices in the culture like community living
that ensures respect for human dignity, individuals, social groups, ethnic groups and the
rule of law are promoted. At the same time, cultural and social practices which encourage
ethnic marginalization, corruption, nepotism, and social unrest may and must be rooted
out as they serve as barriers to social justice and the common good.
Second, the failure of purposeful leadership in Nigeria must be viewed against the
tendency to engage in authoritarian rule as a major part of patriarchal cultural practices.
The positive challenge which subsidiarity brings to bear on the Nigerian socio-cultural
and political scene is to promote decentralization, power sharing, accountability, and
open government. The lack of these important virtues has been the bane of leadership in
the nation.
Third, the social and cultural challenges affecting the nation have caught up with
the Church in some areas like lack of accountability, lack of dialogical and open
leadership, clericalism, and some form of authoritarian rule. Thus, the challenge for the
Church in Nigeria is to be able to speak with a moral and ethical authority that is not
suspect because of its tendency to moral bankruptcy. The way forward is through the
principle of subsidiarity which will ensure that the relative credibility which the Church
still enjoys in proclaiming the Kingdom message of Jesus Christ and the practice of some
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aspects of the social Gospel among the grassroots where the majority of the people reside
will provide the major needed hope and help for Nigerians to help themselves at the
family, clan, tribal, Church, community, local government, state, and national levels
without jeopardizing the common good of all Nigerians.
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GENERAL INTRODUCTION
A Theological Inquiry of the Principle of Subsidiary Function in
Catholic Social Thought

1.

Background of the Study
The aim of this dissertation is to study the centrality of the principle of

subsidiarity in the social and moral reconstruction of the world and in particular the
Nigerian context, a principle articulated formally by Pius XI in the social encyclical,
Quadragesimo Anno (QA), 1931. This task will involve examining the principle from
various perspectives: theological, philosophical, social, political, and economic, in order
to identify the scope and limits of the principle and to establish the proper perspective in
which it was first used by Pius XI. It will also involve an examination of the historical
and social context of the drafting of the encyclical, with particular emphasis on why the
pope thought it was necessary to embark on a social and moral transformation.
The study will pay attention to what it judges to be of enduring value in this
encyclical; in particular, the concept of social justice will be examined in relation to civil
society and the common good of humanity. The contribution of Nell-Breuning in
articulating the position of Pius XI will be examined in detail. The development of the
principle in subsequent social encyclicals and its usage will also receive some attention.
Finally, the study will apply the theoretical framework of subsidiarity to the Nigerian
social context with a view to promoting social justice as an integral part of the common
good. Some concrete issues involved in the applicability of subsidiarity both in the
Church and society will be examined and some proposals will be recommended.
1

2
The question has been raised today by some scholars as to why the principle of
subsidiarity is still enjoying some relevance in the contemporary world. There are several
opinions on the relevance of the principle today, especially in terms of its concrete
applications among social groups. In the report prepared for the steering committee on
local and regional authorities in Europe, for example, after reflecting on the relative
success of the principle today in view of its distant past, the report affirmed that the
concept of subsidiarity in Europe is both topical and ambiguous at the same time. This is
because the principle is “well-suited to a world experiencing not only an economic crisis,
but also a crisis of values marked by ‘new’ ideas and a degree of legal vagueness.”1 This
is the basis on which the report seeks an understanding of the principle that is devoid of
its “legal vagueness,” by advocating a pragmatic approach and focusing on the political
character of the principle as a pivotal point for the sharing of power between the different
levels of government. Thus, the well known contemporary nuance of the political
character of the principle is that of the 1992 “Maastricht Treaty,” in terms of social and
economic policy among members of the European Union. In article G of the European
Union Charter, the principle is formally introduced by modifying the “Treaty of Rome”
and adding article 3b.2 This study will go beyond this political view of subsidiarity to
examine the social and ethical conceptions of the principle beyond the European Union.

1

Local and Regional Authorities in Europe, No. 55. Definition and Limits of the Principle of Subsidiarity
(Strasbourg Cedex: Council of Europe Press, 1994), p. 7.
2
Monitoring European Integration, No. 4. Making Sense of Subsidiarity: How Much Centralization for
Europe? (London: Center for Economic Policy Research, 1993), pp. 19-20.
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2.

Purpose of the Study
The task of this dissertation is to seek an understanding and application of the

principle of subsidiarity beyond the European Union. While not disputing the social,
political and economic contexts of the depression in Europe and America, and the
implications surrounding the initial coinage and usage of the principle,3 its articulation by
Pius XI in the context of the social teaching of the Church has universal significance
beyond Europe and America, embracing Africa and Asia. The question may be asked,
what is the basis for taking such a position? The answer lies precisely in the central idea
of Catholic social teaching which is the bonum commune. The vision of the common
good sees in the human person the personal dignity proper to one’s nature, but directed
essentially to others in the society. Hence, the common good and the good of the
individual do not oppose one another, but the good of the individual whose nature is
personal has a dignity proper to itself, but nonetheless is social in character, that is, it is
directed to the well-being of others.
Thus, the common good is realized through the participation and contribution of
the individual to others in society. In this way, the relationship between the individual to
the social group remains a question for everybody in a given social context. Here one
realizes that the principle of subsidiarity has universal relevance and is not restricted to a
unique particular social arrangement of nations in Europe or America, but is proper to the
dignity of the human person wherever he or she resides on earth.

3

Wilfred Parsons, “The Pope and the Depression,” America 47 (1932): 37-39 for a concise historical
perspective on how Pius XI was critical of “rugged individualism” which was identified by him as the
central cause of the economic and social depression of the 1930s in America and Europe.
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Nell-Breuning has offered a classical understanding of the relationship of the
individual to society and vice versa that respects both the principle of subsidiarity and the
common good, which is true of all human beings, and is central to Catholic social
teaching which will serve as a major guide to this study.
The relationship of individual and society is more exactly determined by the
principle of subsidiarity: society should be helpful to its members especially its
ultimate members, the individuals, that is, it should promote their own activity,
not suppress or absorb their individual life. This gravissimum principium works in
two ways: on the one hand it opposes collectivist, especially totalitarian,
tendencies, and on this side it must continue to be applied in present-day society;
on the other hand – whence its name: subsidium afferre – it demands from social
groups that they give their members generous help, especially help to self-help.4
In the classic text above, one finds a clear affirmation of the universal enduring value
contained in Catholic social teaching, which was articulated as the principle of
subsidiarity. This study will attempt to evaluate the principle and apply it to the Nigerian
social and historical reality, keeping in mind the fundamental understanding of
subsidiarity both as a challenge toward totalitarian tendencies and as help from below
geared toward the grassroots. The Nigerian society with its multiethnic, multicultural, and
multi-religious makeup is comprised of many networks of mediating institutions such as
the family, churches, non-governmental organizations, market associations, the press, and
labor unions that have kept the people’s hope alive for a bright future in the midst of
government corruption and misrule.
Thus, this dissertation will be significantly unique in the sense that it will engage,
in a systematic manner, the integration of a central religious and ethical idea, namely the

4

Oswald von Nell-Breuning, “Social Movements,” Encyclopedia of Theology: The Concise Sacramentum
Mundi, (ed.), Karl Rahner (New York: The Seabury Press, 1974), pp. 1604-1605.
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principle of subsidiarity, as a tool that will help address the root cause of the Nigerian
question along with local structures of governance and some principles of the classical
liberal tradition. This tradition is guided by core principles such as the protection of rights
through the rule of law, the recognition of human rights and dignity, and the promotion of
responsible freedom in political, economic, cultural, and social life.

3.

Thesis Statement
The argument of this dissertation is that any meaningful attempt to promote social

justice and civil society in Nigeria should begin from the beginning. This means
understanding the principle of subsidiarity in the proper context in which it was used by
Pius XI in Catholic social teaching as “help to self-help” which Nigerians and Nigeria
need much for promoting the bonum commune which is at the heart of Catholic social
thought.
Consequently, the thesis of this dissertation is: Ever acting out of social charity,
how can one structure multicultural groups with an interlocking relationship in society, so
as to engage in social and ethical reconstruction with a view to maximize liberty and still
pursue a common good ordered toward the achievement of social justice?
This study affirms that the answer to this question demands a holistic study of the
principle of subsidiarity, hence the necessity of this dissertation.
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4.

Method and Organization
The general approach of this study is to raise fundamental questions within a

given context and to proceed with an exposition in order to arrive at some understanding
of the questions raised. Since the study is concerned with the relationship existing
between the individual and social groups in society and how they can best achieve social
justice within a given structural framework toward their common good, the Catholic
social encyclicals and Biblical texts will serve as primary sources, while other secondary
sources, mostly perspectives on the social encyclicals, will be reviewed and analyzed.
The dissertation will begin with the discussion of the meaning of the principle of
subsidiarity. The first chapter will explain the concept of subsidiarity as it has been
understood in history from different perspectives. The classic sense in which the unicity
of substantial forms was articulated in Thomistic philosophy and theology and how these
have become normative for interpreting subsidiarity in Catholic social thought are
examined. Thus, the metaphysics of subsidiarity and its organological vision is discussed.
Lastly, an African local structure of governance is reviewed in terms of kinship, family,
ethnic group, and the individual and community relationships.
The second chapter will study the principle of subsidiarity from the perspective of
the Catholic social encyclicals. The focus of the study will be to examine particular areas
in these documents which have direct relevance to subsidiarity and other related issues
that might enhance its understanding. This study will begin this review with the social
encyclical of Leo XIII, Rerum Novarum (RN) 1891, where the background work for the
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eventual articulation of subsidiarity can be traced leading up to John Paul II, Centesimus
Annus (CA) 1991, covering a hundred years of Catholic social thought.
The third chapter will study the concept of social justice as a regulating principle
of society from a theological perspective. The study will broadly examine the biblical
meaning of social justice from both the Old Testament and New Testament perspectives
without engaging in the details of literary criticism. The philosophy of social justice as an
integral part of justice drawing from the useful insights of St. Thomas Aquinas will be
examined. This study will trace the context in which the term “social justice” was
formally introduced in the papal social encyclical of Pius XI entitled Quadragesimo Anno
(QA) 1931. Lastly, the relationship between social justice, society, and the common good
is discussed. The aim here is to envision the social context for promoting social justice in
a multiethnic and multicultural pluralistic society and to set forth the essential issues that
might form the agenda for building community through healthy participation of persons
who imbibe the virtue of social justice as central to the common good.
The fourth chapter will engage in a critical and analytical history of the Nigerian
social context since the amalgamation of 1914 to the present. In so doing, one will look at
past mistakes and major efforts toward nationhood within a federal structure by various
military regimes and civilian governments since Nigeria’s independence in 1960 as well
as present challenges and threats to nationhood. The study will examine the Nigerian civil
society with a view to building healthy partnerships between the State and nongovernmental sector. The chapter will propose an alternative vision for the Nigerian State
in the light of some key principles of Catholic social thought already discussed in
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previous chapters. Essentially, the correlation between subsidiarity and the pursuit of a
federal governmental structure that respects the complex relationship which exists
between local and central administrative units as constitutive parts of the whole is
advanced. The goal is to promote grassroots participation and partnership among and
between local associations and the government.
The fifth chapter will examine some of the concrete issues involved in the
applicability of subsidiarity both in society and the Church. The aim is to indicate some
of the unanswered questions that will require further reflection, meditation, and practice
to help determine how best they will help persons in community to help themselves and
uphold the common good. These issues include, among other things, the structural
organization of the Church, pastoral implications, ecumenical dialogue, canonical
challenges, and the social reality of the Church and society. Finally, the study will
conclude with a general synthesis of the major insights one has discovered that will
promote social justice and civil society in Nigeria within the framework of the principle
of subsidiary function.

CHAPTER ONE
The Meaning and Bases for Subsidiarity:
An Organological Principle

Introduction
This chapter will provide an understanding of the meaning and bases for
subsidiarity as an organological principle from various perspectives, namely:
philosophical, theological, social, cultural, ethical, and political. These perspectives will
be presented as an integral and dynamic system. The aim of seeking to understand the
different but unifying ways in which the principle of subsidiarity has been articulated
down through the ages is to lay a solid foundation for addressing the thesis and constant
question before anyone who is dedicated to the doctrine of subsidiarity. Ever acting out
of social charity, how can one structure interlocking groups in society, so as to engage in
social and moral reconstruction with a view to maximize liberty and still pursue a
common good ordered toward the achievement of social justice? The answer to this
question will demand a holistic concept of the principle of subsidiarity as a conditio sine
qua non, to comprehend the classic sense in which the unicity of substantial forms was
articulated in Thomistic philosophy and theology and how these have become normative
for interpreting the principle of subsidiarity in Catholic social thought.
The approach will examine how the term subsidiarity was first coined and the
implications arising from its subsequent usage, especially in Catholic social teaching.
This inquiry will necessarily involve a metaphysical look at the structure of subsidiarity
that has served as a paradigmatic basis for the interpretation and application of the
principle. Next, this research will focus on the organological vision of subsidiarity,
because it has served as the ground for the articulation of subsidiarity from different
points of view. The discussion of the metaphysics and organological vision of
9
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subsidiarity will imply that the central point of convergence for any concrete theoretical
framework for subsidiarity would necessarily begin with the relationship between human
persons in community. Lastly, some articulation of the Tiv traditional views of kinship,
the individual, family, ethnic group, and community will help one to understand the basis
for the articulation and relevance of the organological vision of subsidiarity as a
stabilizing principle in an African context.
In general, the principle of subsidiarity in Catholic social teaching is formally
traced back to Pius XI in his celebrated social encyclical Quadragesimo Anno (QA1)
1931. What gave explicit rise to this ethical and theological principle? What was the
philosophical world view out of which QA pulled and articulated this principle? These
questions are raised because of their centrality in locating and reconstructing the
structures of thought which gave birth to subsidiarity. In a sense, one is not concerned at
this stage with the personal ideologies of those who played a major role in the writing of
the encyclical QA.2 Clearly St. Thomas Aquinas provided the foundational philosophical,
ethical, and theological bases for the doctrine of subsidiarity as it appeared in QA. This
means that the political, economic, sociological, cultural, historical, and legal dimensions
of the principle are ramifications of the philosophy, ethics, and theology which actually
undergirded the doctrine of subsidiarity. Therefore, it is to this Thomistic metaphysics
that one should go to uncover the ideas which so interlock among themselves to generate
the principle of subsidiarity. Initially an analysis of subsidiarity is necessary.
1

Pius XI, Quadragesimo Anno in Catholic Social Thought: The Documentary Heritage, (eds.), David J.
O’Brien and Thomas A. Shannon (Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 1992), pp. 42-79. Note that all
quotations from the social encyclicals will come from this book unless otherwise stated and that this
particular papal social encyclical will henceforth be referred to as QA.
2
Oswald von Nell-Breuning, Reorganization of Social Economy: The Social Encyclical Developed and
Explained, trans. Bernard W. Dempsey (Milwaukee/New York: The Bruce Publishing Company, 1936), p.
203. This is perhaps the best work available in English which explains the encyclical QA. I will make an
extensive use of the social encyclicals in the next chapter.

11
1.1.

The Term Subsidiarity
The main internal lead pointing to subsidiarity in QA is a solitary note which

referred to two texts in St. Thomas Aquinas’ two Summas.3 Also, R. E. Mulcahy
continued on this vague note when he wrote about the term subsidiarity that: “. . . this
doctrine, though not by name, was taught in the earlier encyclicals of Leo XIII,
Immortale Dei (ID) and Rerum Novarum (RN), and is contained in the writings of St.
Thomas Aquinas about the nature of law and the state.”4 Thus, had this clarification been
offered by Pius XI, it would have made superfluous our inquiry, but since this was not the
case, the relevance of our reconstruction cannot be overemphasized.
Since QA was derived from RN, it may be helpful to trace the actual words in
which Leo XIII provided the thought in papal social encyclicals for Pius XI to formally
coin the term subsidiarity. Leo XIII, while writing on the idea that civil government
should not take over the family except where: “. . . a family finds itself in great difficulty,
utterly friendless, and without prospect for help, it is right that extreme necessity be met
by public aid; for each family is a part of the commonwealth . . . But the rulers of the
State must go no further: nature bids them stop here.”5 Leo XIII then states that “Paternal
authority can neither be abolished by the State nor absorbed; for it has the same source as
human life itself;”6 Leo XIII quotes from St. Thomas Aquinas’ statement, “. . . the child
3

QA Par. 47, p. 78. These references are found in St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, 3, 71,
trans. Vernon J. Bourke (New York: Image Books, 1956), pp. 238-239; and St. Thomas Aquinas, The
Summa Theologica, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province (New York: Benziger Brothers,
1947), I, q. 65, a.2, c. Note that all quotations from St. Thomas Aquinas will come from these texts unless
otherwise stated. In both notes, Pius XI took for granted that those who read the encyclical should be able
to notice the obvious connection between subsidiarity as a term and the sources out of which emerged the
doctrine of the principle of subsidiarity. The research will show that such a link was not as obvious as it
seemed and that further clarification was needed to articulate the proper foundational basis for the term.
4
R. E. Mulcahy, “Subsidiarity,” New Catholic Encyclopedia, vol. 13, (ed.), William J. McDonald et. al.
(New York: McGraw Hill Book Company, 1967), p. 762.
5
RN Par. 11, pp. 18-19.
6
Ibid.
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belongs to the father (parents). . . ”7 The purpose of Leo XIII is to protect the right of the
human person (whether such a person is a child or an adult) from being taken over by the
State. Thus, Leo XIII upheld the natural right of the parents to look after their child, a
duty which a higher collectivity like the State need not embark on when responsible
parents are there to take up such a task. One can notice here, in Leo XIII, how the
obvious connection between the quote from Aquinas and subsidiarity is somewhat vague.
How can one make this link much more nuanced? Perhaps, some understanding of the
foundational ground for subsidiarity might provide a step in the right direction.
The clearest understanding of the root meaning of the term subsidiarity, which
was discovered in the process of this study, is that provided in Andrew’s Latin
Dictionary, cited by Benjamin Llamzon.
The root meaning of subsidium: the troops stationed in reserve in the third
line of battle (behind the principes); subsidium dicebatur quando milites
subsidebant in extrema acie labentique aciei succurebant. Hence the
essential idea of an auxiliary force and the synonym suppetiae.8
According to the above Latin meaning of the term, the function of the principle of
subsidiarity is similar to that of reserve troops in time of war or rescue mission; in other
words, it has to come to the rescue, to help out where regular troops are inadequate.
The Oxford English Dictionary, paraphrasing Pope Pius XI in QA 80 describes
subsidiarity as: “. . . the quality of being subsidiary; the principle that a central authority
should have a subsidiary function, performing only tasks which cannot be performed
effectively at a more immediate or local level.”9

7

Ibid. cf., St. Thomas Aquinas, The Summa Theologica, II-II, q. 10, a. 12.
Benjamin S. Llamson, “Subsidiarity: The Term, Its Metaphysics and Use,” Aquinas 21(1978): 48;
Andrew’s Latin Dictionary (New York, 1907), n.p.
9
The Oxford English Dictionary, 2 ed. vol. XVIII, (eds.), J. A. Simpson and E. S. C. Weiner (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1989), p. 59.
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Similarly, Manno’s working definition of subsidiarity further articulates the
meaning of the term in this way:
Subsidiarity refers to a way of organizing and ordering groups to pursue
common purposes and objectives. The etymology of the word includes
notions of support, aid and help in standing up. The term, then, points to a
particular manner of organizing communities to assist each other in the
task of standing up and pursuing common goals. To accept this principle is
to imply something inherently good about groups organizing around
interests and helping each other seek common ends, the ultimate end being
to put things right and help everyone stand on their feet.10
Manno’s understanding of subsidiarity specifically reveals it as a principle of justice by
which individuals and groups formulate and pursue true social order: “. . . even though
groups have varying interests, subsidiarity implies that common ends are not antithetical
to the pursuit of particular interests. In fact, the common good is defined through the
interaction of these varying interests conducting themselves with an eye to social
charity.”11
Mulcahy further upholds an understanding of the term subsidiarity, which seeks to
link the different spheres of society by insisting that one must look to the nature of the
state and society:
Man is a social person, who achieves his perfection only in society. The
state exists to help the persons who live within the society. This is the
meaning of the Latin word, subsidium, aid, help. Normally, this aid is
indirect by the care of the complex of conditions that enable the
subordinate societies and the individuals to care for their own needs.12
This was the sense in which Pius XI formulated the subsidiarii officii principum, the
principle according to which the State must fulfill a subsidiary function with respect to
10

Bruno V. Manno, “Subsidiarity and Pluralism: A Social Philosophical Perspective,” Toward Vatican III:
The Work That Needs To Be Done, (eds.), David Tracy, Hans Kung & Johann B. Metz (New York:
Seabury Press, 1978), p. 320.
11
Ibid.
12
See Mulcahy, “Subsidiarity,” p. 762.
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the family and organically developed socio-ethical life. Thus, the complex of conditions
in a given society is geared toward the common good of all members of the society. The
present research will show the many conditions necessary to enable the individual to
achieve his or her social and economic welfare. At present, the term subsidiarity is
understood as dealing broadly with the “. . . limits of the right and duty of the public
authority to intervene in social and economic affairs.”13
Daniel Wincott14 has also offered an understanding of the term subsidiarity in the
context of Catholic social thought that takes into consideration the limited role of
government; the place of private institutions; and society as an organism comprising a
hierarchy of organs. In so doing, Wincott highlights the major themes which surround a
holistic understanding of subsidiarity as a term in this way.
The purpose of subsidiarity in Catholic Social Theory was on the one hand
to limit the role of government as a whole in order to vindicate and protect
the place of private institutions including the Church itself, while, on the
other hand, justifying some role for government. This notion of
subsidiarity was enmeshed in an understanding of society as an organism
characterized by a hierarchy of organs. Subsequently, subsidiarity has
been used as a quasi constitutional concept in some federal or federal-type
political systems to provide a rationale for the allocation of powers
between various levels of government. Wherever possible powers are
given to the least aggregated level of government; only when a particular
task cannot be undertaken adequately by a ‘low’ level of government will
it be handed ‘up’ to a higher level.15
Both Leo XIII and Pius XI quoted St. Thomas Aquinas as the basis for the term
subsidiarity. This research indicates that the term subsidiarity has always been linked to
an organic structure within the human community, and that subsidiarity values both
individual liberty and community. It supports the growth and development of human
13

Ibid.
Daniel Wincott, “Subsidiarity,” Oxford Concise Dictionary of Politics, (ed.), Iain McLean (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 482.
15
Ibid.
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identity and community through the effort of groups that are free of domination,
compulsion, invasion, and intrusion by large outside forces. What was missing in the
position of both Leo XIII and Pius XI was the fact that they presumed an obvious link in
their readers between the metaphysical framework in Aquinas which gave birth to this
term and its subsequent articulation as a papal term in the social encyclicals. The next
section will unearth the metaphysics in Aquinas from which the term subsidiarity was
derived.

1.2.

The Metaphysics of Subsidiarity16
In taking a metaphysical position as basis for subsidiarity in Aquinas, one is

aware of attacks from linguistic positivists, especially on the issue of God and similar
questions. This approach should not be perceived as a return to and glorification of PreKantian dogmatism. This investigation is based on two related principles: an
understanding of Aquinas which rejects essentialistic parts coined out of any type of
purely conceptual arguments; a reflective Thomism with its roots firmly established in
the existential judgment which is directly related to the act of being itself - esse as
absolutely a priori to essence and everything else in existence. These philosophical
claims transcend both the perceived rigidity of Kant on metaphysics to contentless
concepts, and the demand of the Positivists that meaning and understanding be limited
simply to empirical phenomena. The examination of some key Thomistic positions17 will

16

See Llamson. 44-62. This study was an important attempt to articulate the metaphysics of subsidiarity
from a philosophical perspective. One will draw some insights from the arguments made here and sharpen
them toward establishing the foundational basis for subsidiarity as an ethical and theological principle in
human history.
17
St. Thomas Aquinas, The Summa Theologica, I, a. qq. 103-119; Paul J. Glenn, A Tour of the Summa
(Rockford, Illinois: Tan Books and Publishers, 1978), pp. 84-96.
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clarify further why it is appropriate to use Aquinas’s metaphysics as a basis for
subsidiarity.
First, one begins with the position that God is First Cause. God is the wise and
provident governor of all creation which He governs with Divine goodness. Second, the
Divine governor provides order and harmony to the plurality of beings in the universe.
Third, the Divine governor has created the human person with the aim that human beings
pursue their ultimate end in a self-directed way. Fourth, with the Divine primary
causality, the human person freely actualizes himself as secondary causality
(concurrence). In this conjoined causality, the secondary causality itself remains intact
and is never lost. Fifth, God as divine goodness, orderer, and governor sometimes
intervenes to produce effects which are at once called for but are for the moment beyond
the capacity of the lesser causalities. Thus, preservation or conservation is fundamental to
the divine governor. These positions are so interlocked in Aquinas that they are to be
understood in concert rather than separately. In what way do these positions
simultaneously provide the basis for subsidiarity?
The act of being – esse - is that by which any lesser creature, by itself only
potential to existence, exists. It is not possible for any secondary creature to be the origin
of this esse, because that would posses the quality of a purely potential being actualizing
itself. God is the only Being, Ipsum Esse, that causes the existence of other beings and
that sustains their activities. It follows then that in the Divine simplicity, causality is
identical to wisdom, providence, and government. This means that “God preserves all
creatures . . . by positive sustaining power; that is, God conserves all creatures directly.
But He does not conserve all things immediately, that is, without using any creatural
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means or medium.”18 This means further that God guides all created beings toward divine
goodness according to their mode of being. God is then in created beings just as the “. . .
archer is present in the arrow. . . ” that flies from the bow toward an appointed target.19
So, while God is present in the human person as energizing his act of selecting his target,
God is in no way responsible for the sinful acts of the human being. One notes
particularly how Aquinas was able to resolve this paradox in the analogy of the limping
man. The power of locomotion is meant to cause the man to walk, not to limp. The limp
is due rather to the “crooked limb.”20 In the same way, human beings exist and carry out
their free choice which is sustained by divine causality. But the acts proper are imputable
to the human agents. The pertinent point is that the Divine governor, in directing created
beings to their ultimate end unequivocally respects their own natures. In particular, God
wills the human being to be “master of his own destiny.” This is precisely the focal point
where subsidiarity emerges in Aquinas.
The best thing in any government is to provide for the things governed
according to their own mode, for the justice of a regime consists in this.
Therefore, as it would be contrary to the rational character of a human
regime for men to be prevented by the governor from acting in accord
with their own duties except, perhaps, on occasion, due to the need of the
moment so, too, would it be contrary to the rational character of the divine
regime to refuse permission for created things to act according to the mode
of their nature.21
What is the point of making the analogy that human government reflects Divine
government? It seems reasonable to say that Aquinas made room for diversity of opinions
in human society as it is reflected in the universe; one can then begin to see why the idea

18

St. Thomas Aquinas, The Summa Theologica, I, q. 103, art. 6; cf. Paul J. Glenn, A Tour of the Summa, p.
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of subsidiarity was considered to be intrinsic to wise and just governance. Special
consideration was given to the role of the administrators, who act as facilitators by
maintaining a healthy balance between the ruled and the ruler:
Besides, in things ruled by human providence, it is to be observed that
someone is placed at the head who has charge of the general matters of
great importance, and by himself devises what arrangements to make with
regard to them; while he himself does not devise the order of minor affairs
but leaves this to others lower than himself. Now this is owing to a defect
on his part, in as much as he is ignorant of the conditions of particular
matters of less importance, or is himself incompetent to decide the order
of everything because of the labor and delay required for the purpose.22
Aquinas opines that creaturely causality remains intact and active, not outside the Divine
government but in view of it, and within it. Also, the independence of the individuals
within human society is promoted within the ultimately sustaining perspective of society
and the guidance of its ruler who necessarily work hand in hand in the exercise of
individual causality. The central role of the ruler, then, is to assemble individuals with
different talents and to seek their cooperation with the main aim of building the common
good of the society. Aquinas makes this point very clear.
Furthermore, he will have to gather together the men who must be
appointed to suitable places according to their respective occupations.
Finally, he must provide for each one what is necessary for his particular
condition and state in life; otherwise, the kingdom or state could never
endure. These are, then, briefly, the duties that pertain to the office of king
in founding a city or kingdom, as divined from a comparison with the
creation of the world.23

22

Ibid., 3, 76.
St. Thomas Aquinas, De Regime Principum, rev. ed. & trans. Gerald B. Phelan (London/New York:
Sheed & Ward, 1938), I, 12.
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An important analogy that Aquinas used in emphasizing how unity in diversity can be
maintained in a given State or kingdom further exemplifies the significance of
subsidiarity. It is the analogy of the parts and whole of a living body:
The fact that all parts of the universe are directed to the perfection of the
whole is not in contradiction with the foregoing conclusion, since all the
parts are directed to the perfection of the whole, insofar as one part serves
another. Thus in the human body, it is clear that the lungs belong to the
body’s perfection in that they serve the heart; and thence there is no
contradiction in the lungs being for the sake of the heart and for the sake
of the whole animal. In like manner, that other natures are omitted for the
sake of intellectual ones is not contrary to their being for the perfection of
the universe; for without the things required for the perfection of the
intellectual substance, the universe would not be complete.24
There seems to be a major connection here between Book XIX of St. Augustine’s City of
God and Thomas Aquinas’s De Regime Principum25 in the understanding associated with
order and peace. According to Augustine, order is intrinsic to the good of the society in
the sense that it provides the opportunity for the allocation of roles according to the
proper position of each thing. Peace, which is the “tranquillity of order,” is the peaceful
order which exists among the things themselves- their cooperation, harmony, support,
mutual enrichment, accessibility, shared responsibility, shared benefits and burdens.
The peace of the body . . . is a tempering of the component parts in duly
ordered proportion, the peace of the irrational soul is a duly ordered repose
of the appetites; the peace of the rational soul is the duly ordered
agreement of cognition and action. The peace of body and soul is the duly
ordered life and health of a living creature; peace between mortal man and
God is an ordered obedience, in faith, in subjection to an everlasting law;
peace between men is an ordered agreement of mind with mind; the peace
of a home is the ordered agreement among those who live together about
giving and obeying orders; the peace of the Heavenly City is a perfectly
24
25

Summa Contra Gentiles, 3, 113.
De Regime Principum, I, 3; 9; 4.
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ordered and perfectly harmonious fellowship in the enjoyment of God, and
a mutual fellowship in God; the peace of the whole universe is the
tranquillity of order . . . 26
What is emerging from this study is the multiplicity and plurality of existential levels
among creatures. At the same time, these creatures are somehow bonded in such a
manner toward the achievement of a common finality. The universe then is the composite
of a natural pluriverse, arranged and organized according to the Divine governor’s
disposition and willingness to allow for the proper enhancement of the various beings,
each according to their nature. One can deduce from this analysis the metaphysical basis
for the doctrine of subsidiarity on four grounds:
1.

Since God does not do away with secondary causality from creatures in

their pluriform actions and activities in the world, States or governors, as they carry out
their civic responsibilities, should not overrun individual enterprise, overtly or covertly
through the use of deputies, or by the imposition of a hidden ideology or agenda.
2.

Moreover, it is pertinent that the different roles, hobbies, and trades of the

citizens in a State be the products of individual initiative from below, not of assignation
from the top, no matter how cleverly hidden to appear otherwise. This is the true sense in
which individual causality is retained and promoted. Thus, it is only in emergency
situations and for a limited time and with a concrete aim and goal that the individual
causality could be overruled. Even here, such an intervention must be for the sole purpose
of protecting the common good.
3.

Accordingly, God’s intent is that thinking beings should be able to direct

themselves to their end, struggling in their diversity toward a common ground. The
creator gives human beings the will to decide whether to move ultimately in the direction
of the governor.
26
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4.

Since, at the core of their being, humans enjoy the capacity and freedom to

choose how to go about attaining their ultimate end, humans are able to claim inalienable
rights in society. No society can interfere on this deeper level of their existence. This
means that though humans are in the State, it is impossible for the State to assimilate
them totally as in Dostoevsky’s Grand Inquisitor or Hobbes’s Leviathan.27 Ontologically,
human beings are prior to the State with a freedom that is before and beyond the power of
the State; the individual has no less than a divine mandate, at this level of one’s existence,
to fulfill himself through his initiative. Thus, his or her participation in society should be
through the exercise of his inalienable capacity to choose. At this point, one encounters
the deepest and profound realization that human beings are in partnership with the State
as its building blocks. They should not just be seen as parts of the whole, but their
transcendent capacity to choose remains intact before the Divine governor, and a fortiori
before any human governor.

1.2.1. Challenges to the Metaphysics of Subsidiarity
Some challenges emerge in this inquiry about the metaphysics of subsidiarity in
two ways. The first issue has to do with relationality in a substantial form. Whereas
traditional Thomistic thought emphasizes unity of form and substance, it tends to
minimize the interrelation of substances. In what respect can a holistic notion of
substantial forms go beyond making wholes more than the sum of their parts and endow
them with new characteristics, properties, and behaviors which cannot be found in the
isolated parts? The second issue is closely related to the first one: it has to do with the
27
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nature of the parts of a given system or substance and in their relation to the whole.
Thomas affirmed that the substantial form informed prime matter directly and that in an
organism no more than one substantial form emerged:
. . . for there are not different substantial forms in one and the same thing .
. . Since, if the first form were to make the being a substance, the
following forms would be accruing to that which already is actually a
definite something hoc aliquid, and subsisting in nature; thus, the later
forms would not make a definite something, but would be in the subject
which is a definite something as accidental forms.28
Perhaps, some understanding of substantial forms as organisms, which inform the matter
of an organism as parts of the substance, rather than accidents in the process, might offer
some perspective toward a holistic presentation of the degrees of subsidiarity. One may
then discover that some subsidiary forms might be more independent, others more
interdependent of the larger whole than others, some less independent than others. Could
the understanding of substantial form as organism in terms of relationality and levels of
subsidiary functions offer some insights to the principle of subsidiarity? The next section
will address this question and similar issues as one considers the organological vision of
subsidiarity.

1.3.

The Organological Vision of Subsidiarity
The term “organological vision” is not found in any of the major reference works

today. But one does find the term “organology:” “. . . the study of the organs of animals
and plants,”29 and so the term “organological:” means “of or relating to organology” and
is used as the adjective of organology. Thus, the term “organological vision” is derived

28
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from the understanding of “. . . organism: as an organic structure, something felt to
resemble a living plant or animal”30 in the following ways:
-an entity having existence independent of or more fundamental than its
elements and having distinct members or parts whose relations and powers
or properties are determined by their function in the whole (the nation is
not merely the sum of individual citizens at any given time, but it is a
living organism, a mystical body . . . of which the individual is an
ephemeral part-Joseph Rossi);
-a being in which every part is at once a means and an end to every other,
something arising and developing in an organic manner (whether the
whole of reality is an organism or a machine-Weston LaBarre);
-an individual constituted to carry on the activities of life by means of
parts or organs more or less separate in function but mutually dependent: a
living being/system.31
Thus Ad Leys, who used the term “organological vision” in relation to subsidiarity and
from whom I have borrowed the term, understood it in terms of the “concept” of the
society: “The organological vision of society understands society (and other forms of
associations) as one whole, as a unity. This vision rejects the idea that such an association
would be a solitary reality and that associations are based purely on agreements.”32 In this
study one would use the term “organological vision” both in the sense understood by
Leys as a vision of society and association embracing an innate relationship between the
30
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parts and the whole, as a unity, and in the sense articulated in Webster’s International
Dictionary as a living being or system where the parts and the whole have different
functions but are mutually dependent on each other.
Leys tells the fable of Menenius Agrippa, the Roman senator, who tried to quiet
the uprising of the people in order to place them once more under the guidance of the
Senate. Tradition has it that this fable helped to restore peace in Rome and provided a
reasonable forum for the Senate to operate while at the same time providing checks and
balances for the protection of the people against the abuse of power. The fable is that:
Long ago the human body was not yet one whole reality, but each part had
its own life, its own will, and its own thoughts. One day the members
asked themselves why they were so busy the whole day long. They
concluded that the reason was to be found in the stomach, which is
situated at the center, and which was being served by all other members,
while it did nothing. The other members thought this was crazy and they
decided to stop. The feet no longer walked, the hands no longer held
anything, and the mouth refused to chew. But when this had gone on for a
whole day, the members did not feel happy. It became clear that the
stomach was not just being fed, but that the food was transformed into
strong blood which coursed through the arteries to the members and which
was necessary for them. In the new situation the members were in danger
of becoming victims of an action which was intended only to affect the
stomach. The members realized this, began to function again, and were no
longer unhappy.33
What can one learn from this fable that is related to the organological vision? How does
this fable help one describe the organological vision? In what way is the organological
vision both similar to and different from subsidiarity? Can the organological vision
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provide some fundamental basis for understanding the principle of subsidiarity? The next
section will address these pertinent questions.
The fable of Menenius Agrippa stressed the reality that peace and harmony were
necessary ingredients for healthy associations in a given community. It also underscored
the importance of having a united association, while rejecting an association where
members of the group live disjointedly without relating in some way with the other
members of the group. There is a connection between this fable and the organological
vision since they convey the meaning of maintaining interdependence of the parts to the
whole and vice versa. Ad Leys tells us that Ambros34 provided the context and
foundation on which the organological vision and more concrete organological concepts
are based. They include:
1.

The notion that wholeness and unity are in opposition to a simple

collection of unrelated organisms;
2.

The notion that individual realities are parts and not self-sufficient;

3.

The notion that the parts belong to the whole structure in which their

particular role and relation to the whole is constantly being determined, and at the same
time determines the whole.
It would seem then that the organological vision on associations should include,
among other things, some fundamental characteristics: the idea of some kind of unity in
diversity; the idea of interdependence of the parts rather than self-sufficiency, and the
idea that the structure of the whole be kept intact at all times.
What is meant by calling an association an organism? In general, organisms
convey the meaning of a concrete, individual, independent, living reality: a single cell, a
plant or an animal or a human body. These are largely biological and physiological
34
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realities, where the concrete existence of the parts and of the whole is constantly
dependent and interdependent on one another. Does this situation apply in the case of
associations involving human persons? One can argue, for instance, that human beings
are capable of some form of withdrawal from their society, without necessarily losing
their biological or physiological existence. In a situation where groups of people form a
social organism, there is not such a substantial unity as in a biological union; the same
directness and necessity of mutual relationships is lacking. That is why political, social,
cultural, religious, and economic interests are often opposed: “. . . individuals and groups
do not always work together harmoniously, they often oppose each other; yet that does
not necessarily lead to disintegration of the state or of society.”35 The position expressed
by Leys with regard to social harmony is pertinent because it raises two critical
implications: first, one must admit that some measure of conflict is vital for the healthy
functioning of society; second, the existence of absolute harmony in a social set up is
unattainable anywhere except as a utopian project.
Dohrn and Kluber, cited by Ad Leys,36 have shown that the State and society have
often been called an “organism” for as long as people have practiced political reflection,
and have pointed out the similarities between the biological and the social organism in
this way:
1.

There is a certain unity, connection, and interaction between the whole

and the parts. Political, economic, and social processes show that;
2.

Society as such survives change and/or even interchange of its parts: there

is continuity and history;
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3.

Society as such has its own goals which can be achieved by the

(organized) parts.
Having discussed the similarities between biological and social organisms, one
sees the context in which one could apply the term “organism” to a concept beyond the
normal biological connotation. Scholars such as Gundlach and von Nell-Breuning are
pioneers whose works are still being supported by those of Ad Leys and Manno in
making an analogous use of “organism” in connection with associations,37 a position
which one finds both useful and relevant for some understanding of the principle of
subsidiarity. What is most appealing in the analogous use of “organism” is its communal
character which allows one to expand the meaning of organism beyond biological
organisms. In view of this development, Ad Leys says, the organological vision takes on
a broader meaning: “In this vision one makes a choice for the way one sees the human
being, not the isolated individual, the monad, who only secondarily affirms his
coexistence with subjects, but as a person who knows that being human and becoming
subject is essentially a communal project.”38 By designating an association as an
organism, one is only at the primary level of comprehension, for the full content of how
an association will play out as an organism has not been clearly articulated. One is
pointing here to issues like the relationship between persons, between partial groups,
between persons and partial groups, between partial groups and the whole group. Thus,
any talk about an “organism” or an organological vision should be understood as
something more formal and more concrete.
Leys points out, for instance, how Schlanger in her study of “organism” as
analogon in the 18th and in the 19th centuries concluded that the concept is a variable: “.
37

Gundlach 1931/2, 1614; Nell-Breuning 1947, 9-11; cited in Ad Leys, Ecclesiological Impacts of the
Principle of Subsidiarity, p. 5; Bruno V. Manno, “Subidiarity and Pluralism,” pp. 321-322.
38
See Ad Leys, Ecclesiological Impacts of the Principle of Subsidiarity, p. 5.

28
. . especially in the texts on political questions it is not possible to indicate precisely what
the meaning of (organism) is.”39 Schlanger did offer a pertinent function of analogy: the
fonction de facilitation. This analogy offers a perspective which includes expressions,
arguments, and models that perform a heuristic role. Thus, the central role of an organism
is clarified when Schlanger says that an “Organism has a political or rhetorical meaning:
by describing society or the state in this way one wants to indicate that harmony,
integration, and solidarity are more important, more fundamental than opposition of
interests or classes, and are in fact prior to these.”40 Thus, in an organological vision,
emphasis will be placed on social harmony and unity, which does allow for the existence
of opposition which might give allowance for conflict. No doubt, opposition could lead to
some form of conflict and to safeguard that conflict does not reign, the judicious use of
the rule of law and public authority are employed in areas of conflict and disharmony.

1.3.1. Challenges to the Organological Vision
Nell-Breuning has examined the limitations of the organic analogy in the context
of the role of the organism in the moral order by taking a cautious approach in applying
this analogy to the social organism, especially with respect to the human person.
Accordingly, one cannot expect that the human person like the cell in an organism should
remain indefinitely in the place it happens to occupy by nature of its function: “. . . this
would actually bring us dangerously near guilds of birth. In reality the moral-legal
organism of society, demanded by nature, but for whose development we are given a
large degree of freedom, is freer and less rigid than the physiological organism.”41 Thus,
39
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one advocates an understanding of organism in the social arena that is much more fluid
and accommodating, to guard against “. . . the performance principle of liberal
competition, under which I must struggle for my social position and must expect to lose it
as a result of temporary inefficiency.”42
Similarly, Ad Leys maintains that the major difficulty with the organological
vision is that it allows some room for a centralist concept of the State:
Such centralistic concepts could be: in a totalitarian system the power of
the state (and/or the party) is seen as unassailable; principles of tolerance,
of free development of the person, and of autonomy of the various spheres
of life and culture are denied . . . an authoritarian system (is) seen as a
mild form of the totalitarian system. Collectivism not just gives preference
to the collective over the individual, but denies also the inalienable proper
value of the individual and human rights.43
Thus, the tendency to centralize is enhanced by appealing to the individual, the particular,
to subject to the whole just as in the fable of Menenius Agrippa- the theory shifts its
hierarchy of importance from the stomach to the head, and all the other parts of the body
are made subject to the head:
By giving so much emphasis to the head or to the whole, the organological
vision can easily become a centralistic vision of state and society, in which
the individual person is subject to the whole and cannot claim any rights
from that whole. The “head” (authority) determines everything and, in
order to let the whole function well, the “members” (individuals or
groups) must subject themselves: the interest of the whole prevails
sometimes even at the cost of the “members.”44
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In summary, centralism appears to be inherent to the organological vision. Ad
Leys has explained that, in the history of the West, this centralism was expressed in terms
of a corpus theory,45 and has shifted from one age to another. In the beginning, unity in
diversity was emphasized; then the Roman Empire and Emperors became synonymous
with the emperor as the head or the soul; the Middle Ages also insisted on the leading
role of the head, over and against the other members, in a body like State and Church;
while in the beginning of the 19th century some totalitarian tendencies become manifest
in this vision. Is there any way by which the centralism discovered in the organological
vision could be countered, so that the positive elements of this vision are maintained as
bridges to understanding the principle of subsidiarity? One can turn to Immanuel Kant’s
understanding of “organism” to find some basis for responding to this question.

1.4.

Immanuel Kant and the Organological Vision
Kant’s organism46 theory has been articulated and applied to society by some

scholars47 as providing some general understanding of the organological vision. Kant’s
three Kritiken provide us with major understanding on the preconditions of human
knowledge and the key issues involved with cognitive power. The questions of Kant’s
epistemological difficulties are far beyond this work. Thus, one can specifically examine
the usage made by Kant’s views on “organism” without going into the larger perspective
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of his Kritik der Urteilskraft.48 Kant uses the analogy of the tree49 to explain an organism.
According to him, a tree is capable of developing within itself the capacities of cause and
effect, as it grows from its genus. The true reality is that the permanence of the different
parts of the tree depends on their mutual interaction; just as the whole is dependent on the
parts, so too are the parts dependent on the whole, and the leaves as products of the tree
as well help the trunk to grow and the tree to survive. In case of an accidental damage to
the tree, the tree relies on its innate ability to recover and continue its growth. Following
these arguments, Kant posited that a natural goal could be simultaneously cause and
effect of itself.50
There are two interlocking necessary conditions for a thing to be goal in and of
itself: the form and existence of the parts are possible only in relation to the whole, but
this is not a sufficient determinant because such a thing could also be influenced
externally; the parts then must mutually form cause and effect of their own. In this way,
the whole is able to determine and inform the coherence of all the other parts.
Essentially, the position of Kant adopted here is that an “organism” which has an
inner cause and effect is that whereby each part exists through the other parts and for the
other parts and for the whole. Here, each part plays an equally productive part as the
other parts. Hence, one can affirm a goal in and of itself without any external influence.
Thus, Kant defined the organism as: “. . . an organized product of nature is one where
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everything is a purpose and reciprocally also a means. Nothing is gratuitous, purposeless,
or to be attributed to a blind natural mechanism.”51
What is the significance of Kant’s vision against centralist tendencies in
organological thought? There appears to be some positive contribution, arising from
Kant’s use of the “original contract”52 theory, which one can link with that of the
organological vision of the State. Kant maintains that a people constitute themselves into
a State by means of an “original contract” which legitimates the existence of the State.
The “original contract” is understood as the inner cause for the people coming together to
found the State. Thus, the link between the “original contract” and the organological
vision of the State lies in the inner causality for the existence of the State. Notice here
some correlation between the inner dynamism of an organism which is central to the
proper understanding of the organological vision, and the existence of the State without
any external cause articulated by Kant in the “original contract.”
Ad Leys supports the understanding that Kant’s organism theory agrees with a
non-centralist organological vision and thus provides a healthy perspective for
articulating the organological vision of the State that is devoid of centralist tendencies
like the “corpus theory” alluded to earlier.
The parts (the members) are mutually each other’s cause and effect and
maintain, therefore, a relative independence. No part is pure means, not
even in relation to the whole, which exists only thanks to the parts: as such
the whole is no more than the sum of the parts and their mutual interplay. .
. In Kant’s organism theory the relations between the parts and with the
whole are mutual and continuous and so the parts retain their own
position.53
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By way of summary, the interaction between the parts and the whole allows room
for a common goal, a holistic goal that embraces unity in diversity. The chapter discusses
the fact that the inner dynamism of an organism to exist is far more essential than any
form of external causation. Thus, an organological vision of the State with centralist
tendencies needs to be reformulated to reflect a mutually interdependent conception of
the state or society, where the parts and the whole work together in an organic and
harmonic unity, respecting the worth of each other in being part of the whole. The next
section will examine the bases for the organological vision of society from the African
perspective. This will help explain how African societies were traditionally organized and
the role played by the different social organs in these societies.

1.5.

The Organological Vision in African Societies
The study of the organizational arrangements of traditional African societies has

been carried out in depth by various scholars from different perspectives.54 It is beyond
the scope of this study to examine African traditional practices of self-government on the
whole of the African continent. The research is restricted to the Nigerian context, and
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particularly to the Tiv people of the middle belt of Nigeria. The study will, however, cite
examples of practices of tribal, family and kinship activities around the African continent
that are related and relevant to the topic. The goal is to highlight some of the key issues
around which African societies were able to organize themselves prior to the colonial
encounter and to examine the impact of modernity on these institutions; to ascertain the
role of the individual and the community in the African society; to see how some of the
positive values support the organological vision of the State; and to examine the
stabilizing role that the principle of subsidiarity plays in the ethical, social, political,
religious, cultural and economic reconstruction of the Nigerian State.
John S. Mbiti is of the opinion that, in African societies, the sense of a people,
society, and nation is centered on a person’s understanding of ‘tribe’:
A person has to be born a member of it, and he cannot change tribal
membership. On rare occasions he can be adopted ritually into another
tribal group, but this is seldom done. . . Tribal identity is still a powerful
force even in modern African statehood, although that feeling of tribal
identity varies like temperature, from time to time, depending on
prevailing circumstances.55
The meaning of the term ‘tribe’ is to be understood in the context of a kin-bonded
community:
. . . composed of several villages recognizing a traditional relationship to
each other based upon a shared name, a common language and culture,
marital boundaries that are isomorphic with the boundaries of the village
ensemble, and possibly recognizing supra-village religious authorities . . .
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Such a society is classless, functions through designated kin or quasi-kin
associations.56
An examination of the different facets of the tribe helps to further determine the different
organizational arrangements that have stood the test of time in the historical experience
and existence of these communities.

1.5.1. The Kinship System
According to Mbiti the major reason why tribal ties are still very strong in African
modern Statehood can be traced to the influence of kinship:
The deep sense of kinship, with all it implies, has been one of the strongest
forces in traditional African life. Kinship is reckoned through blood and
betrothal (engagement and marriage). It is kinship which controls social
relationships between people in a given community: it governs marital
customs and regulations; it determines the behavior of one individual
towards another. Indeed, this sense of kinship binds together the entire life
of the ‘tribe,’ and is even extended to cover animals, plants and non-living
objects through the ‘totemic’ system. Almost all the concepts connected
with human relationship can be understood and interpreted through the
kinship system. This it is which largely governs the behavior, thinking and
whole life of the individual in the society of which he is a member.57
The activities enumerated above deal with the kinship system and explain the
complex web of relationships and interrelationships that exists within the social system
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that can be likened to that of the relationship existing between the parts to the whole and
vice versa. Some concrete general observations can be made that will give understanding
of the issues at stake in terms of an organological vision of the State. According to Mbiti,
the kinship system is to be understood as embracing a network stretching both
horizontally and vertically. Horizontally, kinship ties are extended to many ‘brothers,’
‘sisters,’ ‘uncles,’ ‘nephews,’ ‘mothers,’ ‘fathers,’ etc. There appears to be some fluidity
in the arrangement and extension of kinship rights within the tribe. Vertically, the
kinship system is extended to include the departed and those yet to be born. Hence, the
position of ancestors is of paramount importance in the African social systems as will be
shown in the next section.

1.5.2. The Ancestorship System
According to Alyward Shorter, an ancestor can be described as:
A deceased blood relative who in life was responsible as head of lineage
for the continuation of the descent group and who in death continues to
exercise this responsibility in a new way, in solidarity with other deceased
blood relatives.58
Ancestors are departed members of the family, clan, and community who continue to
have some influence on family and social affairs. That is why Mbiti was able to describe
the personal and communal roles of ancestors in this manner:
They return to their human families from time to time and share meals
with them, however symbolically. They know and have interest in what is
going on in their family. . . They are guardians of family affairs,
traditions, ethics and activities.59
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Thus, genealogical ties to ancestors serve social purposes by establishing both
inter-family and inter-communal relationships. In some ethnic societies, ancestral
genealogical ties are traced as far back as the mythological symbol of the ancestral
founder or ‘first’ in the order of existence or national hero. This is significant because “. .
. it is also on genealogical basis that organizational divisions have evolved among
different peoples, demarcating the larger society into ‘clans,’ ‘gates,’ families,
households and finally individuals.”60 Perhaps, an example of the Tiv People of the
Middle Belt of Nigeria and their social and political organizational set up, which is based
on their ancestral genealogies, might help illustrate better the issues at stake.

1.5.3. The Tiv Tribe and Social Organization
The Tiv people are an ethnic group in Benue State of Nigeria. The term Tiv
connotes a triple heritage: an ethnic group, the ancestral father figure of the people and
the language spoken by the people. The population of the tribe is over three million,
which makes them the largest ethnic group in the Middle Belt of Nigeria and the sixth
largest ethnic group in Nigeria. While a majority of the Tiv people resides in Benue State,
some of them are scattered in neighboring States such as Taraba, Adamawa and
Nasarawa. The concern of this study is not to offer here a comprehensive perspective of
Tiv cultural, social, religious, and political heritage, but to articulate some of those
organizational practices and customs that are relevant to the scope and limits of this
research. Details about the Tiv people and some of the issues raised in this study can be
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read in the works cited.61
Makar62 has shown how the Tiv People organized their social system in the 18th
and 19th centuries before the British arrived on Tiv territory. What follows will be an
attempt to capture the major components of Tiv social organizational arrangements
during the 18th and 19th centuries. It is pertinent to State from the outset that some of
these social arrangements have been in place as long as the Tiv people have existed and
continue to serve as the cornerstone upon which the community is built. The Tiv people
believe that they are descendants of one ancestral Father Tiv. Dominic Yuhe quotes M.
Mead as saying:
All the Tiv were one in the person of the ancestor Tiv. The individual was
continuous with his community and his community was continuous with
the ancestors, who diminished in actual count until the whole society was
limited to the two sons of Tiv, and finally, to Tiv himself.63
Tiv had a brother named Uke and their father was Takuruku.64 Tiv had two sons from
whom emerged the social and political organization of Tiv land. The two sons were
Ichongo and Ipusu. Among the Tiv, territorial and social organization is construed in
terms of Tar. Tar is the Tiv word for the cosmos or world and country. This includes the
individual entities, visible and tangible and also the unseen forces that advance and retard
the affairs of humanity. Tar embraces the past and present, the people and their customs,
61
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habits and built-in traditions of the ancestors. The Tar was divided according to territorial
strata and social grouping into units named after a common ancestor and was further
subdivided into many segmentary units called ityar. Figure1 below presents the major
ancestral genealogical groupings among the Tiv:
Figure 1:

A. The Ipusu Ityar genealogies are:

B. The Ichongo Ityar genealogies are:

1. Shittire

1. Ugondo

2 Ukum

2. Tongov

3. Mbaikor

3. Ikurav

4. Jemgbagh

4. Nongov

5. Jechira

5. Iharev
6. Masev
7. Turan

One of the amazing stories of social cohesion among the Tiv people is that in spite of the
many impacts of colonialism, the various Tiv social segmentary units have survived to
this day in the 21st century and still serve as the basis for choosing their paramount leader
the Tor Tiv, the distribution of political power and the maintenance of law and order. The
diagram below provides a structural and patriarchal representation of the different
ancestral segmentary units which make up the social organizational network among the
Tiv people. The Tiv segmentary units also help define the degree of marital relationships
in terms of the levels of consanguinity.
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Figure 2:
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1.5.4. Tiv Traditional Administrative Council Systems
The tar was the largest social unit among the Tiv and was divided into many ityar.
However, for the purposes of administration, these segmentary ityar units were further
subdivided into subordinate or subsidiary units to act as administrative councils and
charged with social, economic, political and cultural functions. Thus, there were four
major councils with traditional administrative functions: Ya, Ingyor, Ityo, and Tar

Turan
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councils.65 A brief examination of how these councils were organized and administered
follows.
The Ya or family or compound council was headed by Orya, literally the
caretaker, who was normally the oldest male in the family or compound. He also had an
assistant ordondon (singular) or in some cases many assistants mbadondon (plural), to
whom he could delegate the power of governance. The council was responsible for the
maintenance of proper marital laws within its jurisdiction, the admission, entertainment
and expulsion of strangers, women who had left their marital homes and went back to
their ancestral homes, and the recovery of various forms of debts. These political, social
and economic roles of the Orya were, however, restricted and limited to only his council
and not beyond. But one did perform some useful service of governance at his level.
Makar has described the important role played by the Orya in the Ya council in this
manner:
So vital is the role of Orya that he was expected to be fair, kind, impartial,
and sympathetic in dealing with his subjects. The failure of Orya as a ruler
might lead to the disintegration of his Ya, the compound, leaving him and
his wife and children alone . . . a Ya which continued to exist and flourish
several years even after the death of Orya was a sign that the successive
mbayaav (plural of Orya) had been very successful rulers. It was a sign of
a successful government and administration of the lowest level of the
society.66
The Ingyor council was responsible for taking up any political, social or religious
issues that could not be handled by the Ya council discussed earlier. Thus, the Ingyor
council acted as a support group to the Ya council. The Ingyor council was made up
mostly of leaders from the different family or compound units that made up the different
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Uya (plural of Ya). Here, too, the senior elder acted as the leader of the group. But the
role of the leaders was limited and they could not discuss issues that were related to
traditional religious rites and those connected to death. These issues were considered
beyond their power of jurisdiction and had to be passed on to the council next in rank, the
Ityo.
The Ityo was a much larger group than the other councils under discussion so far.
This council was responsible for evaluating the problems of the larger society. It was
made up of prominent leaders and elders from the various angor (plural of ingyor)
groups. The head of the Ityo council wielded both political and religious powers.
Sometimes, two elders were chosen as coleaders, one with political authority and the
other with religious authority. This arrangement created an interesting cooperative
venture between political leaders and religious leaders that is best described in these
words.
This religious expert and co-equal of the president of the Ityo council had
a unique and very important role. This is because any social wrong or
crime was regarded as an evil and a violation of the traditional religious
order. A political settlement was therefore followed by a religious
settlement. The society was politico-religious hence a man with priestly
powers was needed in every segment of government.67
The Ityo council had judicial functions and tried cases of major crimes including
murder. It also intervened in both internal and external disputes like those involving peer
groups and those involving the status and rights of foreigners, atoatiev. According to
Makar, the organization of the Ityo group among the Tiv “. . . facilitated the holding
together of the Tiv society for purposes of social control, basic societal behavior,
religious rites and cultural unity.”68
67
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The Tar was the highest council of elders. It was in charge of both the internal and
external security and defense of the Tiv people in general. It also settled disputes between
members of the other council groups discussed earlier. The Tar council was, therefore,
the stabilizing council and the last resort. It also settled land disputes and was responsible
for nominating and screening members of the community who were selected for the
award of titles and initiation into religious leadership positions. The council units are
represented in a schematic arrangement in Figure 3 below.

Figure 3:
Tar Council
[Council Elders]

↑
Angor Units

↑
Ityo Council

↑
Uya Units

↑
Ingor Council

↑
Mbadondon
Ordondon

↑
Orya

↑
Ya Council

These council units operated from the bottom to the top and not from the top to the
bottom, which has important implications for subsidiarity which encourages that
decisions are best made by those at the level closest to them, the local level. That is why
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the Tiv people believe that power lies with the people and not the authority figures. The
above perception of authority might help explain why in the beginning the Tiv people
functioned without a central chief of the whole tribe but through local decentralized
leaders with voting rights in the general council of local chiefs. Thus, the Tor Tiv (Chief
of Tiv) was a later creation which took place in 1948 to meet the changing social
circumstances that were taking place among the Tiv and Nigeria in general. People in
authority are chosen from among the community, to perform particular roles on behalf of
the group. The famous Tiv saying: tahav ka ityo, power lies or belongs to the community,
conveys the people’s understanding regarding power. Once the community support is
withdrawn, one loses his or her power base and by implication, whatever power one
wielded.

1.5.5. The Clan System
Another significant subdivision of the ‘tribe’ is the clan. Clan systems vary from
one tribe to another and they can be either patriarchal or matriarchal depending on the
section of Africa under consideration. Clan systems further help define the extent to
which marital engagements are permitted. Clan systems also help provide human
cooperation, market conditions, social, and security issues. In some ethnic societies, these
clans are further subdivided into sub-clans: “. . . these localize clan matters, and deal with
affairs which need not concern the whole clan. It is probably this subdivision which, in
the course of time, grows into a full clan of its own. The ‘gate’ is made up of members
from a common ancestor up to six or eight generations back.”69
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Elochukwu E. Uzukwu70 has pointed out how, among the Igbo tribe of Eastern
Nigeria, the general pattern of social organization is that of village-groups. These villagegroups consist of a federation of clans composed of kindred and the kindred made up of
extended families. An important point for this study, in supporting a basis for
subsidiarity, is the fact that decision making involves a process of consultation at the
different levels of the village-group: family, kindred, and clan levels.
Through kinship, ancestorship, councils, the clan and gate are born to deal with
specific issues that do not have relevance to the larger society, but are limited to
particular families or households. In this type of kinship arrangements, one sees some
organological institutions that practiced the spirit of the principle of subsidiarity: where
the clan, council, and gate would deal with the issues within their social setting without
outside interference from the larger kinship group. The larger kinship group was only
invited to participate in decision making when the clan could not handle matters at their
own level or when it became necessary that lack of intervention on the part of the larger
kinship group could place the existence of the clan in jeopardy. Notice that in the spirit of
subsidiarity the larger kinship group could intervene in the smaller groups to protect the
common good of the clan. Uzukwu supports this position in his examination of the
organization of African societies with authority in many hands when he opined that “. . .
in these societies there is an experience of what some have called republicanism or direct
democracy. . . The power of these groups lies in persuasion rather than in coercion.”71
An examination of how such kinship arrangements played out in the relationship between
the individual and the community follows.
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1.5.6. The Community and the Individual in African Experience
In African tradition community life consists of the family, household and the
individual.72 The family setup includes both the immediate family and the extended
family structures. The extended family generally means that two or more brothers (in
patrilocal societies) or two or more sisters (in matrilocal societies) set up families in one
compound. The household is the smallest family unit: “. . . if a man has two or more
wives, he has as many households since each wife would usually have her own house
erected within the same compound where other wives and their household live.”73 Having
discussed the major components that make up the community, one might seek to know,
what is the place of the individual within the community?
According to Mbiti, the role and place of the individual within the community is
shaped by a fundamental African philosophical concept: “I am, because we are; and
since we are, therefore I am.”74 The individual does not exist alone except corporately.
The individual is part of the whole community and is shaped by the community. On the
one hand, the individual depends on the support of the corporate group; on the other
hand, the individual is conscious of his or her own being, duties, responsibilities and
privileges, but insofar as they are connected toward other human beings. Mbiti sums up
the various webs of interrelationships in this manner:
When he suffers, he does not suffer alone but with the corporate group;
when he rejoices, he rejoices not alone but with his kinsmen, his neighbors
and his relatives whether dead or living. When he gets married, he is not
alone; neither does the wife ‘belong’ to him alone. So also the children
belong to the corporate body of kinsmen, even if they bear only their
father’s name. Whatever happens to the individual happens to the whole
72

See Mbiti, African Religions and Philosophy, p. 106.
Ibid., p. 107. The practice of monogamy and polygamy has existed almost side by side in most African
communities. Today, while there is a major shift toward monogamy largely due to the influence of
Christianity, polygamy is still practiced in some households. It is beyond the scope of this project to discuss
the issue of marriage practices in Africa.
74
Ibid., p. 108.
73

47
group, and whatever happens to the whole group happens to the
individual.75
This pivotal point in the understanding of the African view of the human person provides
a central basis for the recognition of how the social and political setups in Africa were
organized. The philosophy of I am, because we are; and since we are, therefore I am,
defines to some degree the interconnectedness between the social, political, religious, and
economic setups of African societies. The interplay between the whole and the parts and
the parts with the whole is echoed in the relationship which the individual has with the
community, and that of the community with the individual. One can examine the issue of
corporate personality in a given African social context.

1.5.7. The Concept of Corporate Personality in Tiv Experience
The issue of corporate personality in the traditional Tiv society was taken up
recently in a critical research work.76 The term Tiv connotates a triple heritage: an ethnic
group, the ancestral father figure of the people, and the language spoken by the people.
These meanings associated with Tiv convey some major understanding about the
elements of social cohesion, communal heritage and identity and corporate personality in
society. Thus, the individual does not consider himself as an individual person as such,
but as a member of the group. It does appear that the individual is somehow submerged
both in the immediate and extended families and the larger ethnic community. Rubingh
puts it more forcefully: “. . . it is through the community that the individuality of each
person becomes recognized and finds expression. To be unique, therefore, is to set the
75

Ibid.
Terwase H. Akaabiam, The Proclamation of the Good News: A Study of LK 24 in Tiv Context,
XXIII/673(Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang/European University Studies, 1999), pp. 155-157; On the
relationship between the individual and the community from another African perspective, cf. Benezet Bujo,
African Christian Morality: At the Age of Inculturation (Nairobi: Paulines Publications Africa, 1998), pp.
95-102.
76

48
entire community into jeopardy.”77 As this research proceeds, the extent to which such an
understanding of the person in community could affect a proper vision of the integral
relationship between the parts and the whole in the context of the organological vision of
society will be explained. For now, the other views associated with the concept of
corporate personality are worth noting.
Both Rubingh and Tseayo have agreed that the reality of a common genealogical
heritage among the Tiv provides further basis for communality or corporate personality.
Hence, most social activities are mandatory realizing that “. . . the efficacy of the
individual is reflected in the lives and fortunes of all members of the community,” just as
the destiny of one is shared by all. Thus, the Tiv “minimize individuality in the interest of
the larger community.”78 The famous Tiv saying: aya tutu ka unyo, ka se, conveys the
meaning of unity is strength; united we stand; that which a people stands for in spite of
their differences and difficulties; the recognition and support for both the least and most
privileged of the community; it is the distinguishing mark of the clan, community or
society; joining hands together for a common purpose, a clear affirmation of solidarity.
Thus, the social and political organization of traditional Tiv society was very much
influenced by the view of corporate personality.79
This chapter has shown how Tiv social system was divided into ityar (segmentary
lineage, tar named after a common ancestor) units. Further, Tar is the largest genealogical
unit remaining among the Tiv people that have retained group consciousness and
organization. One major reason for this group consciousness is due to the experience of
survival tactics by members of the group. The group must have migrated together and
77
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experienced common difficulties, which have made them territorially and traditionally
bonded. Significantly, among the Tiv people, these genealogical groups still influence
social and political life today.80 E. Rubingh captured this attitude when he said, among
the Tiv, “. . . to be unique is evil; the I should forever be swallowed in the non-I.”81 The
extent to which such a social and cultural philosophy can be concretely articulated
without centralist practices that could inhibit individual self-realization requires some
attention in this research. Moti and Wegh have offered a perspective for articulating the
African understanding of the individual and the community in Tiv context that could be
properly enhanced to promote the existing social and political arrangements to embrace a
holistic organological vision devoid of centralist tendencies.
Community, however, does not mean an absence of individual selfconsciousness or the annihilation of the individual in the face of kinship
ties, traditional customs and religious beliefs. Tiv thought is that true
development of the individual self is achieved in activating oneself in
one’s relationship with others.82
1.5.8. Challenges to the Organological Vision in African Tradition
Benezet Bujo83 had raised a very pertinent question: “Is the African, whose acting
and thinking is always in solidarity and almost identical with his or her tribal community,
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able to make as an individual, an ethical, responsible decision at all?”84 Another closely
related question could be, “Is the individual absorbed by the community to the extent that
such an individual is unable to express his or her personal freedom?” These questions are
integral to some of the issues one has discussed in terms of ‘corporate personality’ and
the interrelated nature of the individual and community in African societies.
The major challenge which the individual faces in a pluralist State is that the
major African philosophical concept of solidarity, ‘I am because we are, and since we
are, therefore I am,’ is constantly undermined and in some respects even destroyed. Thus,
new sets of ethical norms are required in a pluralist world beyond the tribal setting. The
ties of kinship do not seem to have the same force in social settings where people are tied
together by different languages, ethnic groups, professions, associations, trade unions,
sports, political parties, and Church denominations. How might the individual balance his
or her loyalties between the kinship community and the larger community?
Bujo has argued that individual name-giving in African communities defines and
categorizes persons as unique individuals. Thus, the circumstance of one’s birth, the
family situation at the time of a person’s birth and the condition of the clan, all play
important roles in the name that is given to a person at birth. A person’s name contains,
then, both the prehistory and the history of the individual, family and clan. If, for
example, a person was born at the time when the family was in a crisis situation, the
moment was captured in the name of the child. A personal illustration might be helpful
here. The author’s ethnic name is Tsetim (tse means ‘lineage,’ while tim means ‘destroy.’
He was born at a time when his Father had just lost all his parents, hence the name
Tsetim literally ‘lineage is destroyed’ was given in memory of what had happened).
Thus, the ontological reality of the individual in African societies is made up of a
84
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network of relationships. According to Bujo, this means, “On the one hand, the individual
cannot be thought of outside of his or her community, though, on the other hand, he or
she is obviously a unique and irreplaceable being who has his or her own rights and non
exchangeable tasks within the community.”85
But the mere fact that the individual is not thought of outside of his or her ethnic
community raises some fundamental moral and social challenges about the extent to
which a person might be accepted outside of his or her ethnic community. How might a
people structure a given African State that evolves a national solidarity which builds on
the individual tribal solidarity without excluding other tribal groups? This might be one
instance where subsidiarity could help serve as a stabilizing principle between the
different ethnic groups in Nigeria. In this way, subsidiarity might help check centralist
and totalitarian tendencies aimed at domination of the individual, minority ethnic groups
or associations and putting into jeopardy the capacity of human persons in community to
model their lives according to the rule of law, freedom, justice and liberty. Uzukwu has
also raised the issue of the tendency toward dictatorship and autocracy among some
ethnic groups in Nigeria with centralized authority such as the Hausa kingdoms who were
greatly influenced by the Islamic culture after the Dan Fodio jihad.86
Even within a person’s ethnic community, the question may be raised as to how
the individual might act in solidarity with others in the community and at the same time
be able to maintain personal individual responsibility? The question of how the individual
is supported and promoted within the community in the African context is a very
contestable issue that deserves some serious consideration, because there continues to be
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major instances of abuses both in the family, clan, community and society at large that
require some major overhauling. How does the concept of ‘corporate personality’
practiced by the Tiv for instance constitute a serious danger to individual self-realization
in a pluralist society? Can one draw some positive lessons from the Tiv views of aya tutu
ka unyo, ka se, beyond Tiv tribal community to embrace other ethnic groups? Discussion
will ensue in the course of the research, how some of these issues have played out
concretely in the Nigerian context in areas like tribal and inter-tribal conflicts, communal
and boundary disputes, corruption and nepotism, majority and minority rights, women’s
rights, social and class warfare, religious fundamentalism and political uncertainty.87
These are significant areas where the principle of subsidiarity could play some major
stabilizing role in shaping the proper relationship that should exist between the individual
and the community in a given African civil social context in the light of Christian ethical
and social principles. This section will conclude by highlighting some of the major areas
that have been identified as providing the bases for the practice and understanding of the
meaning of the principle of subsidiarity as an organological principle of the family,
household, clan, community and State.

1.6.

Summary: Bases for the Principle of Subsidiarity
This chapter has traced the foundational meaning of subsidiarity as a principle of

organization for self-help among persons in community. This process involved, among
other things, the metaphysical framework for the principle in St. Thomas Aquinas; the
concept of organism in Immanuel Kant; the organological vision; and the organizational
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systems in an African society. This study reveals that a holistic concept of subsidiarity
supports the structures of grassroots social groups in African communities. Thus, this
research also supports the thesis that the understanding of subsidiarity as an organological
principle, which has been examined from different perspectives, might have served as a
paradigm for articulating the principle of subsidiarity in the papal social teachings. Thus,
this chapter establishes the bases for the principle of subsidiarity on the following
grounds:
1.

The central point of convergence for subsidiarity would necessarily begin

with the relationship between persons in community. Thus, this principle has universal
relevance and application wherever human beings are gathered on earth. In this regard,
the contribution of St. Thomas Aquinas was a novel one when he maintained that human
beings are willed by their creator to enjoy the capacity and freedom to choose and have a
say in their ultimate end.
2.

Subsidiarity seeks to help, support, and aid persons to organize and order

their communities to assist each other in the task of pursuing common goals. While
recognizing that communities are made up of people with different interest groups, this
principle promotes the healthy interaction of these varying interest groups with a view
toward the common good of all.
3.

The principle maintains that a central authority such as the State should

have a subsidiary function, performing only tasks which cannot be performed effectively
at a more immediate or local level.
4.

On the one hand, the organological vision of associations like the family,

church, and society provides the ground for a holistic understanding of subsidiarity since
it understands society and all other forms of associations as a unity and not just a
collection of loose and unrelated groups. On the other hand, this vision could be
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employed to wrongly support centralist and totalitarian tendencies. Hence, subsidiarity,
as a principle of competencies, could be developed to maintain tolerance, freedom of
persons, and the autonomy of the different groups which make up a given community.
5.

In view of the existing different social arrangements in the African

community, subsidiarity could be developed to help the social structures that will
promote healthy interaction between the different ethnic groups in a given
multiethnic/religious and socio-political plural context like Nigeria.
In conclusion, this chapter showed that while the organological vision of
associations, families, groups, and society could be helpful in promoting the capacity of
individuals and communities, there are some tendencies toward centralist and autocratic
rules that need to be addressed. Hence, this study has proposed to employ Catholic social
teaching which recognized the importance of bringing about harmony and understanding
between the different components of society; and to counteract centralist tendencies
through the principle of subsidiarity. This is why the research was able to establish the
bases for subsidiarity as a principle for the proper ordering of society. Chapter two will
specifically examine the articulation of subsidiarity in selected papal social encyclicals.

CHAPTER TWO
The Principle of Subsidiarity in Papal Social Encyclicals:
Origin and Development

Introduction
This chapter will specifically study how the principle of subsidiarity came to be
formally introduced into papal social encyclicals and its centrality and usage in Catholic
social thought. The term encyclical letter is:
. . . a word derived from the Greek which means a letter that goes the rounds, an
encyclical letter. In the early beginnings of the Church many bishops referred to
their peace and communion letters as such; these letters were given by bishops to
members of the laity traveling abroad, with the indication that they were ‘in
communion:’ i.e. received communion in their local Church and were
recommended to other local Churches. Thus, since the sixteenth century, the title
has been used to refer to papal letters concerned with doctrinal or moral matters,
exhortations, warnings or recommendations.1
It is beyond the scope of this study to examine all the different issues with which the
encyclicals were concerned or the conditions under which the papal social encyclicals
under review were articulated. The focus of the study is to examine particular areas in
these documents which have direct relevance to the principle of subsidiarity, and other
related issues that might enhance its understanding.
The study is guided by the central thesis and question of this study: Ever acting
out of social charity, how can one structure interlocking groups in society so as to engage
in social and moral reconstruction, with a view to maximize liberty and still pursue a
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common good ordered toward the achievement of social justice? This study affirms,
among other things, that the human quest for self-actualization and the interplay between
social groups in society were at the center of the social and moral reconstruction, which
gave rise to the formulation of subsidiarity in the social encyclicals. This research
involves an examination of the social encyclical of Leo XIII, Rerum Novarum (RN)
1891, where the background work for the eventual articulation of subsidiarity can be
traced. Next, much attention is devoted to the social encyclical of Pius XI, Quadragesimo
Anno (QA) 1931, where the principle of subdiarity was formally and definitively
articulated in papal social encyclicals. Some attention is given to the contributions of
Oswald von Nell-Breuning,2 the great German moral theologian and social philosopher,
who undertook the noble task of writing QA and offering critical interpretations on the
document. The study then considers the development of subsidiarity in subsequent social
encyclicals, beginning with those of John XXIII, Mater et Magistra (MM) 1961, and
Pacem in Terris (PT) 1963. We will then look at the documents of the Second Vatican
Council, especially Gaudium et Spes (GS) 1965; then the letters of Paul VI, Populorum
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Progressio (PP) 1967, and Octogesimo Adveniens (OA) 1971; and those of John Paul II,
Laborem Exercens (LE) 1981, Sollicitudo Rei Socialis (SRS) 1987, and Centesimus
Annus (CA) 1991. Lastly, the opinions and interpretations of some scholars will be
advanced to highlight some critical perspectives that have arisen down through the ages.
The chapter concludes with some critical perspectives and a summary statement of the
major goals of subsidiarity.
In examining the above social encyclicals, attention is focused on the
contributions of each document to the development of the principle of subsidiarity, in the
larger framework of integrity and responsibility that are the hallmarks of Catholic social
teaching in three ways:
1.
The contemporary documents need to be examined in the light of
the continuing historical effort to relate Christian faith to the problems of modern
society, that is, to Catholic theology, broadly understood.
2.
The documents need to be examined as well in the context of the
overall life of the contemporary church; these teachings are one, but only one,
important expression of Catholic faith and life. They can be understood and
evaluated only in relation to other expressions of Catholicism, from the spiritual
lives of individuals through the worship and fellowship of congregations to the
ongoing development of Catholic theology.
3.
The documents are best read and evaluated from the viewpoint of
the laity. More than other formal documents of the church, these are located at the
intersection of the church and the world, the sacred and the secular. Of their very
nature they deal with the problems of living the Christian life in the midst of
ordinary human relationships.3
Thus, the social encyclicals are read and understood in three complementary
ways: 1) the moral guidance they give on human rights stems from the dignity of women
and men made in the image and likeness of God, and it is the central basis for assessment
in every school of thought and every policy and practice of its teaching; 2) they are
3
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promulgated primarily for members of the Church who have faith in her teaching, but
also for all women and men of good will; 3) they provide moral judgments at the ordinary
teaching level of the Church, which means that they are binding in conscience.4 What
follows then is an analysis of the central indicators for subsidiarity in the major social
encyclical of Leo XIII.

2.1.

The Encyclical of Leo XIII, Rerum Novarum (RN) 1891: Foundation for
Subsidiarity
The social encyclical of Leo XIII RN clearly was the first papal social document

to appropriate the teaching of St. Thomas Aquinas as the foundational basis for its
theoretical framework, which points toward an understanding of the principle of
subsidiarity in Catholic social teaching. One can trace the structures of thought in this
social encyclical that ground the doctrine of subsidiarity from the following points of
view.
Leo XIII provided the first basis for understanding subsidiarity in the context of
human dignity. The human capacity to exercise choice distinguishes human beings from
any other animal. Human beings are capable of being masters of their acts, making
decisions in freedom out of their own personal human experience and from their Godgiven talents. Hence, the power of reason makes human beings the custodians of the earth
and places them at the level of existence which is prior to the State. “Man is older than
the State, and he holds the right of providing for the life of his body prior to the formation
of any State.”5 This is the basis from which the rights of the family are advocated in the
social encyclical.

4
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Thus, the human family is “. . . a society limited indeed in numbers, but a true
‘society,’ anterior to every kind of State or nation, with rights and duties of its own,
totally independent of the commonwealth.”6 The human family has a natural right, then,
to own property. The inner dynamism by and through which a family is governed must be
respected. “A family, no less than a State, is, as we have said, a true society, governed by
a power within itself that is to say by the father.”7 The document maintains that the
family has equal rights as the State insofar as the pursuit and preservation of liberty are
concerned. Consequently, both the State and any other type of association which human
beings participate in must necessarily seek to help promote their well-being rather than
place their capacity for self-actualization in jeopardy.
. . . since the domestic household is anterior both in idea and in fact to the
gathering of men into a commonwealth, the former must necessarily have rights
and duties which are prior to those of the latter, and which rest more immediately
on nature. If the citizens of a State - that is to say, the families - on entering into
association and fellowship, experienced at the hands of the State hindrance
instead of help, and found their rights attacked instead of being protected, such
associations were rather to be repudiated than sought after.8
Furthermore, the document challenges any civil government that seeks to take
over the functions of the family and the household. It called such reasoning and policy a
grave mistake. What the document recognizes is limited intervention by government in
affairs of the family in a situation of dire need and for a specific period, and a targeted
goal: “. . . but the rulers of the State must go no further: nature bids them stop here.
Paternal authority can neither be abolished by the State nor absorbed; for it has the same
source as human life itself; the child belongs to the father.”9 Also, the document
encourages the formation of multiple organizations that will help promote the claims of
6
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the working class. This is to be carried out as a cooperative venture between the different
ranks of the working class themselves and the State: “. . . social and public life can only
go on by the help of various kinds of capacity and the playing of many parts, and each
man, as a rule, chooses the part which peculiarly suits his case.”10 This should also be the
underlying principle for the relationship between the employer and the employee. Here
one notices how Leo XIII made use of the analogy of the human body earlier discussed in
chapter one both in Aquinas and the fable of Menenius Agrippa. Thus, Leo XIII affirmed
that:
Just as the symmetry of the human body is the result of the disposition of the
members of the body, so in a State it is ordained by nature that these two classes
should exist in harmony and agreement, and should, as it were, fit into one
another, so as to maintain the equilibrium of the body politic. Each requires the
other; capital cannot do without labor nor labor without capital. Mutual agreement
results in pleasantness and good order; perpetual conflict necessarily produces
confusion and outrage.11
Moreover, the document holds on the one hand that there are some functions that are
better carried out by organizations such as the Church, whose ‘heroism of charity’
through various institutions for help and mercy is a novelty in human experience. Thus,
to resort to “. . . a system of State-organized relief,”12 is an attempt to substitute for the
many avenues of charity that have stood the test of time in human history. On the other
hand, the proper role of the State is to promote the well-being and common good of its
citizens. This is ensured by providing justice toward all members and recognizing that
each person has an important role to play. In this connection, the relationship between the
parts and whole which St. Thomas Aquinas articulated is employed to provide a credible
argument for distributive justice:
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Ibid., Par. 14, p. 20.
Ibid., Par. 15, p. 20.
12
Ibid., Par. 24, p. 25.
11

61
. . . the State must not absorb the individual or the family; both should be allowed
free and untrammeled action as far as is consistent with the common good and the
interests of others. Nevertheless, rulers should anxiously safeguard the
community and all its parts; the community, because the conservation of the
community is so emphatically the business of the supreme power, that the safety
of the commonwealth is not only the first law, but is a government’s whole reason
of existence; and the parts, because both philosophy and the Gospel agree in
laying down that the object of the administration of the State should be not the
advantage of the ruler, but the benefit of those over whom he rules.13
Even here, the role of government should be limited to the correction of a
particular anomaly in society. Paragraph 29 then points out the different exceptional
cases under which government intervention would be appropriate. Nevertheless, the
document insists that: “The limits must be determined by the nature of the occasion
which calls for the law’s interference - the principle being this, that the law must not
undertake more, nor go further, than is required for the remedy of the evil or the removal
of the danger.”14
Another instance for subsidiarity is envisaged in the area of “just wages” for
workers. The document maintained that where there was a clear case of injustice by way
of refusal to pay just wages to workers, the State should intervene to remedy the
situation. It considered such an action on the part of the State to be pertinent because the
worker’s wages were both personal and necessary to him. However, the process for
further negotiations should be discussed directly between the contractor and workers’
unions: “. . . in order to supersede undue interference on the part of the State, especially
as circumstances, times and localities differ so widely, it is advisable that recourse be had
to societies or boards such as we shall mention presently, or to some other method of
safeguarding the interests of wage earners; the State to be asked for approval and
protection.”15
13
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The call for the formation of the “workmen’s associations,” is one major area
where the basis for subsidiarity is laid. The document thought of these associations as,
societies for mutual help; various foundations established by private persons for
providing for the workman, and for his widow or his orphans, in sudden calamity,
in sickness, and in the event of death; and what are called ‘patronage,’ or
institutions for the care of boys and girls, for young people, and also for those of
more mature age.16
The associations for mutual help are the basis for building a civil society. Here, the
document, drawing on the work of St. Thomas Aquinas, makes an important distinction
between “public society” and “private society.” The former is related to civil society and
exists for the common good, and is concerned with the interests of all in general. The
latter is related to the State, its primary purpose is the private advantage of the
associates.17 Thus, the document upheld the natural right of persons to enter into
associations of their own choosing:
Particular societies, then, although they exist within the State, and are each a part
of the State, nevertheless cannot be prohibited by the State absolutely and as such.
For to enter into a “society” of this kind is the natural right of man; and the State
must protect natural rights, not destroy them; and if it forbids its citizens to form
associations, it contradicts the very principle of its own existence; for both they
and it exist in virtue of the same principle, viz., the natural propensity of man to
live in society.18
The document does allow, however, that there are instances when it would be appropriate
for the State to ban associations that are harmful to persons and the common good of the
society from existing. Even here, there are some words of caution.
There are times, no doubt, when it is right that the law should interfere to prevent
associations; as when men join together for purposes which are evidently bad,
unjust, or dangerous to the State. In such cases the public authority may justly
16
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forbid the formation of association, and may dissolve them when they already
exist. But every precaution should be taken not to violate the rights of individuals,
and not to make unreasonable regulations under the pretense of public benefit.19
The document sets forth important principles of organization for the State to help
bring about harmony between the different classes of workers’ associations with different
interests. By so doing the State will help provide individuals and families with better
conditions for their mutual support. Another word of caution is emphasized: “ Let the
State watch over these societies of citizens united together in the exercise of their right;
but let it not thrust itself into their peculiar concerns and their organization, for things
move and live by the soul within them, and they may be killed by the grasp of a hand
from without.”20
Lastly, the document maintained that each organization is to fashion its own mode
of governance depending “on national character, on practice and experience, on the
nature and scope of the work to be done, on the magnitude of the various trades and
employments, and on the circumstances of fact and of time. . . ”21 The aim of these
associations is still to promote the well-being of individuals, families, and the
community. These are some of the major ideas in Leo XIII’s social encyclical, Rerum
Novarum, which were taken up by Pius XI in Quadragesimo Anno to formally formulate
the principle of subsidiarity as a papal term.

2.1.1. Critique
Having examined some of the thoughts which served as background to the
eventual formulation of subsidiarity as a papal term, the following observations are
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necessary to help highlight some of the issues that were fine tuned in subsequent social
encyclicals.
First, Leo XIII embraced the organic model of the social order without many
reservations, which has grave implications for subsidiarity. It would seem, for example,
that he supported the paternalism of the time which was very oppressive especially
toward women and sought to perpetuate their subjugation in society based on their Godgiven condition, which Leo considered restricted their role in society. “Women, again,
are not suited to certain trades; for a woman is by nature fitted for home work, and it is
that which is best adapted at once to preserve her modesty, and to promote the good
bringing up of children and the well-being of the family.”22 This type of reasoning could
be interpreted, today particularly, as a negation of the understanding that all human
persons are created equal with a God-given dignity to exercise their own choices without
unnecessary human limitations. This is the central basis upon which the principle of
subsidiarity is itself based, since it allows persons in community to contribute to the
common good without undue interventions from other quarters. In view of the restrictive
role of the woman that the document could be said to have promoted, “. . . work which is
suitable for a strong man cannot reasonably be required from a woman or a child,”23 one
might argue that its ground for understanding subsidiarity was laid on a somewhat shaky
foundation. In general Stephen J. Pope supports this position when he opines “. . . in
Leo’s paternalistic view, the ‘rulers’ hold responsibility for the common good of the
entire society, and their fatherly guidance is needed by those whom Leo regarded as the
ignorant and undisciplined masses.”24
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Second, while on the one hand Leo XIII called for changes in the socio-economic
order that will improve the working conditions of the workers against exploitation, on the
other hand, the process which he advanced for this transformation raised some difficulties
for subsidiarity. Leo held that the State had a duty to protect the rights of workers by
ensuring that ownership of property is much more widely distributed. But how was this to
be effected? Donal Dorr supports the view that “Leo wanted these changes to be initiated
‘from the top down,’ that is, by the very people or classes who were benefiting from the
existing liberal-capitalist order. If they failed to introduce a more equitable society, Leo
was not prepared to encourage the poor or workers to engage in confrontation.”25 The
challenge lies in the fact that if Leo had defended the rights of workers to form unions,
why did he not wish the unions to play a political role in changing society which would
have revised its modus operandi “from the top down” to “ from the bottom up,” which is
favored by the principle of subsidiarity? The issue of the role of unions and their
relationship with the State in the context of the subsidiarity principle is so pertinent that it
will be taken up by QA in fashioning the proper place of unions in the relationship
between the State and civil society.
Third, in general, one would agree that while Leo XIII was concerned with
“superceding undue interference from the State, he unequivocally rejects the laissez faire
doctrine of noninterference.”26 In so doing, Leo clearly anticipated the doctrine of
subsidiarity by insisting that while self-help of the individual was necessary, organized
self-help was much more important and this issue was taken up by Pius XI in QA as one
will read in the next section.
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2.2

The Encyclical of Pius XI, Quadragesimo Anno (QA), 1931: Formal
Definition of Subsidiarity
The principle of subsidiarity was formally introduced into Catholic social

teaching in the social encyclical QA by Pius XI. At that point in time, the 40th
anniversary of Leo XIII’s landmark social encyclical RN was being commemorated and
great tribute was given by Pius XI to the work of Leo XIII. The need for a social order
animated by justice and characterized by the decentralization of wealth and power in the
socio-economic world, which Leo XIII advocated, was reaffirmed by Pius XI. This
background sets the general context for QA, but in this study, one is concerned with how
the principle of subsidiarity was formally articulated. The section of QA that one needs to
focus on is that entitled “Reconstruction of the Social Order, 76-80.” Even here, one’s
attention is limited particularly to Par. 79-80 where the formal articulation of subsidiarity
is contained. Since Par. 79-80 of QA are so central to this study, it is pertinent to quote
them in their entirety below:
It is indeed true, as history clearly shows that owing to the change in social
conditions, much that was formerly done by small bodies can nowadays be
accomplished only by large organizations. Nevertheless, it is a fundamental
principle of social philosophy, fixed and unchangeable, that one should not
withdraw from individuals and commit to the community what they can
accomplish by their own enterprise and industry. So, too, it is an injustice and at
the same time a grave evil and a disturbance of right order to transfer to the larger
and higher collectivity functions which can be performed and provided for by
lesser and subordinate bodies. Inasmuch as every social activity should, by its
very nature, prove a help to members of the body social, it should never destroy
or absorb them. (Par. 79).
The State authorities should leave to other bodies the care and expediting of
business and activities of lesser moment, which otherwise become for it a source
of great distraction. It then will perform with greater freedom, vigor and
effectiveness, the tasks belonging properly to it, and which it alone can
accomplish, directing, supervising, encouraging, restraining, as circumstances
suggest or necessity demands. Let those in power, therefore, be convinced that the
more faithfully this principle of “subsidiarity” is followed and a hierarchical order
prevails among the various organizations, the more excellent will be the authority
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and efficiency of society, and the happier and more prosperous the condition of
the commonwealth (Par. 80).27
In this social document one finds more than a mere validation of a fundamental principle
of social philosophy. Rather, as a Christian document, one finds a view of the dignity and
destiny of the human person, a view enlightened by Revelation, and, therefore, much
broader in perspective than one would find in a philosophical, sociological, or political
text. The document articulates a view of the human being as one who knows, strives and
is deserving of justice and opportunities for integral human development including, of
course, one’s relationship with God. This view is fundamental to the Church’s
understanding of how one is to live as both Christian and citizen in a civil society,
promoting social justice for the common good.
Oswald von Nell-Breuning comments that the principle of subsidiarity is central
to the Christian social doctrine because of its distinctive character that is “. . . different
from every collectivistic and one-sidedly exaggerated universalistic social philosophy.”28
Accordingly, this fundamental principle of Christian social doctrine leads one to
understand the working relationships between member associations and the larger
society. Nell-Breuning maintains that the interrelationship existing between these groups
involves three key principles: autonomy, intervention, and hierarchy.29 These principles
help explain the rights of the larger society to the member associations and vice versa.
Indeed, some understanding of the inner workings of the principles of autonomy,
intervention, and hierarchy is necessary to help provide a balanced perspective of the
subsidiarity principle.
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2.2.1. The Principle of Autonomy
The principle of autonomy maintains that:
Since member societies are societies in the true sense of the word, having their
own purpose, there follows first of all that all the legal conditions peculiar to each
social organization will in their case exist and be effective, valid by themselves,
and independent of a superior social authority investing them with their original,
and therefore social, rights of individuals. A member society must above all take
care that it does attain its particular, special purpose and must regulate the affairs
determined by this special purpose. This is the natural right of self-government
which is an attribute of the member societies for the sake of realizing their special
purpose and the fulfillment of their own vital tasks.30
The autonomy principle stresses the fact that some degree of independence is necessary
for both member associations and individuals to be able to operate in a given society.
Such independence should be from within the social organism itself and not from
without. This is the sense in which such autonomy would be conceived as both authentic
and valid for upholding the rights of the members of the organization. Thus, the right to
self-government emerges from this inner dynamism and flows from its participation and
fulfillment of this role in society. In terms of subsidiarity, the autonomy principle helps
explain to some degree the individuality of the person and associations to make free
choices without any form of external coercion.

2.2.2. The Principle of Intervention
The principle of intervention defines the extent to which the autonomy principle
could operate:
This autonomy, however, cannot be absolute, but is subordinate to the moral end,
therefore, to the whole social order. According to the law of unity of authority
within society, it follows that the supreme authority, which must care for the
common good of the entire society, must also possess the right to supervise the
activity of the member societies, to regulate the indispensable contributions of the
30
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member societies toward the society as a whole and to intervene against violations
of the public welfare committed by member societies.31
One major distinction that has emerged is the non-absolute nature of autonomy both for
the individual and the association. This independence must be accountable to the
common good of the entire society. This calls for some form of mutual supervision both
on the part of the small associations and the larger society. It is in this context that some
form of intervention could be permitted when there are clear cases of violations against
the common good.

2.2.3. The Principle of Hierarchy
The principle of hierarchy helps explain the levels of authority in society
especially as they participate in different ways in their associations and societies. Thus,
hierarchy is understood as:
The order of social authorities itself is in conjunction with the order of special
objectives within the general social objective; the good to be realized by member
societies within the framework of public welfare will be the greater, the more they
participate in the social authority. As a result, we have a subordination and
superordination of the multifarious authorities in society which we designate as
the principle of hierarchy.32
The principle of hierarchy underscores the various levels of participation among the
social groups that promote the individual values of their associations, while at the same
time upholding the social objectives of the larger society. This process necessarily
involves limited power sharing among the member societies in view of the common good
of all, and leaves some room for putting in check any arbitrary use of such powers. In this
way, the principle of hierarchy is related to subsidiarity in the sense that it allows for
some degree of authority according to the level of participation. There are, no doubt,
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instances of hierarchical abuse that might demand prompt intervention. In such a
situation, it is in the nature of subsidiarity to act as a stabilizing principle.
Furthermore, Nell-Breuning explains that all the three principles discussed,
namely, autonomy, intervention and hierarchy, are geared towards the fulfillment of a
common goal.
The social order does secure for individuals as well as member groups that free
play which they need in order to fulfill their natural tasks, and that the entire
society as a whole, superior and overlapping as it is, can devote itself to those
tasks only which the individuals or the subordinate member groups cannot
administer by their own power. Consequently, the law prevails that each and
every social activity is by its nature and concept subsidiary.33
This is precisely the context in which the principle of subsidiarity finds its clearest
articulation as it is formulated in QA 79-80. Having discussed the roles of the principles
of autonomy, intervention and hierarchy as integral to the formulation of the principle of
subsidiarity, one will next examine some of the component parts of subsidiarity as it was
articulated in QA 79-80.

2.3.

The Essential Parts of Subsidiarity
Nell-Breuning has offered five essential parts that are central to the principle of

subsidiarity.34 These essential parts of subsidiarity are discussed below with two
additional components: the principles of social education and tolerance.35
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The essentially social individual

2.

Subsidiarity protects essential rights

3.

Subsidiarity rehabilitates State authority
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4.

Subsidiarity and solidarism

5.

Subsidiarity and social justice or social charity

6.

Subsidiarity as the principle of social education

7.

Subsidiarity as the principle of toleration

2.3.1. The Essentially Social Individual
The essentially social nature of the individual emphasizes that the individual is at
the heart of the social system; hence, both the economy and social life are at the service
of the individual. The individual is not understood here as an independent entity living
entirely for his or herself, but rather one who is social by nature and living in community.
Thus, to view the individual in relation to the community is at the heart of the principle of
subsidiarity and conveys an intrinsic quality of the individual. Hence, “. . . the double
relationship of the individual to society and of society to the individual has been intended
by the Creator, and we must not only recognize it but make it the basis of scientific
investigation.”36
James P. Hanigan37 has also offered a standard understanding of the relationship
between the individual and the community or social groups which employs subsidiarity:
It establishes a complex set of inter-related mutual rights and obligations between
the individual and his or her social groups, as well as between smaller and larger
entities. The individual has both the right and the obligation to do what he or she
can do on one’s own to fulfill basic needs and satisfy the demands of human
dignity. The social group has the obligation to honor and to protect individual
initiative. But it also has the right and the obligation to do what individuals alone
are unable to do to meet their needs and honor their dignity. The individual, for
example, has both the right to an education and the obligation to seek it with
36
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diligence. But his or her community has the obligation to provide the means by
which an education may be gained, e.g., a school system, libraries, teachers. It
also has the corresponding right to tax individuals to support the system and to
require students to attend school. More specifically, teachers should not do for
students what students are able to do for themselves, but teachers may and should
provide the structured setting and discipline that education requires when
individuals are unable to do this.38
According to Hanigan, there are some things that are so essential to human life and
dignity that human beings need to and ought to cooperate with each other, rather than
engaging in pursuing these goals all by themselves. Thus, it is, “. . . a fundamental feature
of our love for one another that we join together to create and to care for social bodies,
social structures and social systems which help us to be more fully human.”39 This study
will address some of the issues which a given social setting could help provide for the
general well-being of its citizens and those which the citizens themselves need to take up
in order to bring about the mutual rights and obligations between the individual and
social groups advocated by the subsidiarity principle as articulated in QA 79.
Similarly, Jean - Yves Calvez and Jacques Perrin affirm that, essentially,
subsidiarity does not wish to render society useless. It could not, since it is the natural
means by which humans express their social characteristics. Rather, the principle does
encourage that great allowance be made for individual initiative:
. . . in order to help men to realize their fundamental rights, society ought in
practice to see that men have scope for free and responsible action. Society is not
subsidiary in the sense of being secondary or accidental, but in the etymological
sense that it ought to provide help to the person to permit the concrete realization
and the guarantee of his fundamental rights.40
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This contribution is necessary to underline the complementarity which exists, on the one
hand, between the purpose of the common good to develop the individual, and on the
other hand, the demand that the attainment of that very common good be an open
possibility for all people to exercise their personal and individual liberty in a responsible,
and conscious manner.
The Church does not oppose individual liberty to social power as two forces
acting in opposite directions. What is opposed, and then only in a relative manner,
is personal liberty and the common good of the society. These two concepts are
put in opposition only to show that the second, the common good, is external to
and above the other-personal liberty-only to the extent that the liberty of the
person is the object of the care of the common good.41
2.3.2. Subsidiarity Protects Essential Rights
The principle of subsidiarity of associations, articulated in QA, encourages the
bonding of the various social relationships in the whole social system. How can this role
be effectively carried out in society? There are two ways of looking at the social system.
On the one hand, some persons may conceive it as an external structure whose activity
may or may not impact their lived experience like a solitary individualistic setup within
the whole. On the other hand, one might consider the activity of the social structure to
have some impact on one’s life-experience and so to have integrated some essential
aspects of the individual. The implication would be to challenge the internal logic of the
system, which in the first instance provided room for unrelated parts of the whole, to find
some form of relevance in a sociological system. In both cases, not only is an organic
thought pattern lacking, it is grossly misrepresented which leads to collectivistic and
universalistic tendencies. The role of subsidiarity then would be to strengthen the bonds
of interrelationships existing between individual rights and the social system and vice
versa. This is why QA upholds the enduring essential conditions for building up these
41
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interrelations in community by maintaining that “Man is older than the State” and that “. .
. the domestic household is antecedent, logically as well as in fact, to the civil
community.”42 In so doing, the principle is established to both provide for the rights of
the private activity of the individual and the rights of smaller communities, in contrast to
the activities of larger communities, but most especially, that of the State. This means
that insofar as the activity of the individual and the smaller or immediate community is
sufficiently efficient and responsive to the community, it should not and ought not be
replaced by the activities of higher units within the social system. Such an intervention
would be considered a violation of the rights of the smaller units to responsibly impact
the social system, and should be challenged through the various organs of the social
system.

2.3.3. Subsidiarity Rehabilitates State Authority
The relationship between subsidiarity and State authority is central to
understanding the different levels of competencies in a given social structure. The
principle of subsidiarity provides a limited role for State authority, ensuring in the
process that the State does not become an absolute and domineering force without any
form of control. Thus, QA advocated a process of equitable power sharing between State
authorities and the other structures of civil society: “The State authorities should leave to
other bodies the care and expediting of business and activities of lesser moment, which
otherwise become for it a source of great distraction.”43 Rather, the State should
concentrate on providing the necessary set of conditions and structures for a peaceful and
harmonious ordering of society: “. . . a major and pressing duty of the State and of all
good citizens: to get rid of conflict between ‘classes’ with divergent interests, and to
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foster and promote harmony between the various ‘ranks’ or groupings of society.”44 This
does not in any way imply that individual and personal rights could be swallowed up by
society under the guise of providing opportunities for the common good. Rather, the
structures, which the society will provide, must necessarily safeguard and ensure their
realization; otherwise, it would appear as if the society is the proper end of the human
person, and an end in itself. Calvez and Perrin support the above position when they
affirm that:
It is in society that persons find their full development. Society is, therefore, in
itself absolutely necessary. But the necessity for society is not such that it may be
its own end. It remains true that society exits for the person. A simple expression
of all of this teaching is to be found in the principle of the subsidiary function of
society in relation to persons.45
The subsidiary function of the State or Society does not in any sense imply a
secondary or accidental position. It is a question of society acting in some cases, as a
deputy when the situation does arise as envisaged in the principle of subsidiarity to
provide the desired help. In general, the exercise of this subsidiary role by the society
consists:
Primarily and above all in interventions made by society in its own right,
interventions which are necessary even when there is no failure by individuals to
perform their functions. Subsidiarity is the characteristic of all the functions of
society, and of the common good itself, and not only of actions where the State
supplements for the deficiencies of individuals in those things which they ought to
be doing for themselves.46
Here the State is envisaged to perform its subsidiary functions for the common
good by providing help to other members of the society, while, at the same time, it ought
to carry out its proper tasks. Hence, its subsidiary role with regard to other societies and
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individuals should not be subsidiary by reference to the State proper, or society as a
whole. In other words, subsidiarity should not be conceived as secondary and the State
thought of in the same manner. The principle of subsidiarity is about the relationship of
the State with the other societies, and the nature of the State itself. Thus, everything
which the State does should be a help, a support, and not forced on the citizens since the
State is not an end in itself.
Pius XI stated clearly that the proper functions of the State cannot be performed
by any other member of the society. The State brings help to these societies without
destroying itself in the process. Rather, the role of the State is enhanced and made easier
by the various roles performed by the other societies, as long as the State does not
constitute a stumbling block to the lesser societies in the exercise of its subsidiary
functions.
The State authorities should leave to other bodies the care and expediting of
business and activities of lesser moment, which otherwise become for it a source
of great distraction. It then will perform with greater freedom, vigor and
effectiveness, the tasks belonging properly to it, and which it alone can
accomplish, directing, supervising, encouraging, restraining, as circumstances
suggest or necessity demands.47

2.3.4. Subsidiarity and Solidarism
According to Nell-Breuning, solidarism is another major pillar of Christian social
ethics next to common welfare and social justice. The central link between subsidiarity
and solidarity lies in the fact that, while subsidiarity allows the community to develop
itself freely without external coercion, solidarity is the dynamic principle that governs the
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creation and development of social structures. The word solidarity is taken from the Latin
juridical term in solidum, which connotes that each of the persons in a group or society is
responsible to the part and to the whole. It embraces the general sense of the various
means of mutual dependence or belonging together.48 Solidarity is that ethical principle
that binds persons together for a common task:
The principle of solidarity states that when the individual faces a necessary task
which he cannot properly accomplish by himself, he may count upon the orderly
help of others for the fulfillment of the task . . . this solidarity means, on the part
of the community, an obligation to foster or create, within its historical
possibilities, all organizations and undertakings that are necessary or useful to
supply the members with the material and spiritual goods required for the
satisfaction of their individual wants and the fulfillment of their personal
vocation.49
Thus, the principle of solidarity is a socio-ethical concept that promotes the
personal and communal obligation to form proper social organs in society. These social
organs serve the need for mutual assistance of the members of the community. Solidarity
is the principle which helps define the social order as comprising harmonious coopertion
of occupational groups and a necessary means of promoting social harmony among
groups.
But there cannot be question of any perfect cure, except this opposition be done
away with, and well-ordered members of the social body come into being:
functional “groups,” namely, binding men together not according to the position
they occupy in the labor market, but according to the diverse functions which they
exercise in society. For as nature induces those who dwell in close proximity to
unite into municipalities, so those who practice the same trade or profession,
economic or otherwise, constitute as it were fellowships or bodies. These
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groupings, autonomous in character, are considered by many to be, if not essential
to civil society, at least a natural accompaniment thereof.50
This document affirms, on the one hand, that the oppositional conflict between persons
and society is destructive of the very reason for their existence, namely, the development
of persons. On the other hand, it admits that the opportunities of the common good
should be offered to all persons, to exercise liberty and responsibility both at the personal
and community levels. Thus, there should be no opposition between individual liberty
and social power.
Clearly, persons are called to higher responsibility in conscience to the common
good, so that, “. . . personal rights and social obligations are inseparable. Social
obligations find their root in personal rights and so become obligations for the person.”51
This means that the union of persons is pursued and realized in a cultural community, by
coming together in solidarity to responsibly create social structures that can best serve
their individual and social needs in community.

2.3.5. Subsidiarity and Social Justice or Social Charity
The relationship between the principle of subsidiarity and social justice takes
center stage. The principle of subsidiarity is related to social justice in the sense that it
inspires on the one hand, the exercise of distributive justice by promoting an organic
community, which allows for the participation of the different structural levels, especially
smaller groups like the family, local groups, churches, and voluntary organizations. On
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the other hand, it gives liberty to the State’s right to intervene when intervention is
necessary for the common good or to protect distributive justice or the rights of members
of the group, class or community.
The question of the necessity for State intervention and the connection between
the State and the economy was the context that moved Pius XI to appeal to subsidiarity as
a guiding fundamental principle of relationship between the State and other societies or
groups. The nature of the State is to seek the common good of all members and to bring
about social justice. The other associations and groups which make up the State exist in
their own right, but do not necessarily seek to realize the universal common good. The
State should not put itself in the place of these associations or groups as regards their
proper functions. Consequently, it may not seek to overrun these organs, without at the
same time putting into jeopardy the freedom of persons to legitimately form self-help
groups. Hence, Pius XI, points out on the one hand: “. . . that owing to the change in
social conditions, much that was formerly done by small bodies can nowadays be
accomplished only by large organizations.”52 This allows room for State intervention in
some economic activity due to its size or importance in the name of the larger good of
society. On the other hand, the history of human individualism is full of negative images
that implicate the State itself:
On account of the evil of individualism . . . things have come to such a pass that
the highly developed social life, which once flourished in a variety of prosperous
and interdependent institutions, has been damaged, all but ruined, leaving
virtually only individuals and the State, with no little harm to the latter.53
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Thus, it was within this context that Pius XI found it compelling to establish a
principle that would coordinate the activity of the State in relation to other associations,
especially with a view to the economy by saying:
One should not withdraw from individuals and commit to the community what
they can accomplish by their own enterprise and industry. So, too, it is an
injustice and at the same time a grave evil and a disturbance of right order to
transfer to the larger and higher collectivity functions which can be performed and
provided for by lesser and subordinate bodies. Inasmuch as every social activity
should, by its very nature, prove a help to members of the body social, it should
never destroy or absorb them.54
Calvez and Perrin affirm that the principle of subsidiarity was stated here with a
universal appeal to every society, and particularly to the State in its dealings with the
other associations. Their articulation of the applicability of subsidiarity to the State stands
out distinctively:
The principle does not mean that the State should intervene as little as possible.
To say this would be to return to a modernized version of the liberal thesis, or at
least to conceive of the State’s intervention in purely pragmatic terms, though the
State were some sort of factotum. What the principle does mean is that we should
so arrange matters that whenever the State does intervene, it does so to help
individuals and lesser societies, which is the same as to say that it should never
intervene save when the common good and distributive justice require.55
Furthermore, they maintain that the principle of State subsidiarity is not meant to
suppress the State, but to promote the view that the State carries out the functions that are
proper to it while, at the same time, allowing the other associations their proper roles. In
this case, it would become clear that:
It is quite impossible to delegate to lesser societies than the State the functions
and responsibilities which belong to it. That would be to suppose that these
societies also are subsidiary to the State, and this is impossible: subsidiarity looks
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only one way. The State brings aid (subsidium) to other societies, but they do not
bring aid to the State- at least, not in the same sense.56
What is emerging clearly is that the principle of subsidiarity does contain an
intrinsic limitation on the right of State intervention. The State fulfils a subsidiary
function on the basis of the common good of all and distributive justice. It does not seek
to suppress them on any other account. Calvez and Perrin have warned about the attempt
to exchange subsidiarity with substitution:
Apart from such substitutive action which might be required of the State in
special circumstances, subsidiarity covers all the tasks which it ought to assume
for the sake of the prosperity of the community and of all its members, as well as
all those which are needed to guarantee distributive justice, when one form or
another of economic association endangers the lawful rights of a social class or a
special group. . . If this were not so, it would be necessary to hold that State
intervention is only pragmatical and is founded on no more than the de facto
efficiency or inefficiency of societies which are weaker than the State and stand in
need of its help. To reason in these purely pragmatic terms would be to abandon
the wider view of Leo XIII and Pius XI, which sought to establish the right of the
State within its own nature and that of the common good. Subsidiarity could no
longer apply to the relations of this natural society, the State, with the lesser
societies; the term would stand only for recourse to an instrument of general
utility in those cases where lesser societies which ought to be able to look after
their own affairs had failed, through some unfortunate circumstance, to do so
effectively. Action would then be a matter of taking over a task, a purely
empirical problem dealt with in purely empirical terms. There would no longer be
any question of an authentic and natural function of the State.57
In summary, it is pertinent to insist that the principle of subsidiarity does not
operate based only on pragmatic and empirical consequences. In other words, it is not to
be subjected to the whims of social utility. Subsidiarity by nature has within it an inner
dynamism as a principle of competencies to assign roles to the State which are proper to
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it and at the same time allows the State to render functions to the lesser societies that are
directly aimed at protecting the universal common good and ensuring distributive justice
in the process. In so doing, subsidiarity is understood as “. . . a fundamental principle of
social philosophy, fixed and unchangeable, that one should not withdraw from
individuals and commit to the community what they can accomplish by their enterprise
and industry.”58

2.3.6. Subsidiarity as the Principle of Social Education
John Walgrave was the one who explained the concept of subsidiarity as an
important tool for social education and transformation. By education, he was not referring
to the process whereby the student, not so knowledgeable, is at the receiving end of all
the personal decisions of the teacher who is outflowing with knowledge. Rather, what he
meant by education was the direct opposite.
To educate means to assist another in forming his own correct judgment, and in
making wise decisions for his own life. To educate is to help another in selfeducation, and the latter can ultimately come only from the freedom and the
responsibility of the one who is being educated. If we wish to educate someone to
freedom, we must also give him as much freedom of movement and initiative as
possible and use coercion only when it happens to be necessary.59
Similarly, Paulo Freire,60 working on the basic assumption that one’s “ontological
vocation” lies in being “fully human,” opines that one is an active subject who is able to
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act upon and transform the world, as opposed to being a passive object that is being acted
upon. Freire came to the understanding in his philosophy of education for “critical
consciousness” that every human being, no matter how “ignorant” or submerged in the
“culture of silence,” is capable of looking critically at the world, society, community, in a
dialogical participation with others. As long as the right tools for such an encounter are
available, the individual is able to engage in, and to perceive his or her social reality with
a new sense of self-awareness. This radical awareness of the self is considered an
educational experience.
Thus, the basic principle of pedagogy is that the educator should strive toward the
advancement of the student to the extent that the educator’s intervention is finally
unnecessary. This pedagogical tool is broadened into the principle of subsidiarity and
made into a socio-ethical principle. Here the principle is applied to the relations of person
to person, groups to persons, larger groups to smaller groups, the State to the local
communities and associations, the society to the individual: do not absorb or replace, but
foster free unfolding and development, promote healthy self-growth, enhance mutual
participation, and intervene only to the extent that the common good of the all-embracing
community, State, and persons demands it. By so doing, there is no discrepancy between
the personal good of all and the good of the social groups. Together, they make up the
common good of society, and encourage the growth of its members in personality: “. . .
that is why it has as its task to help the members, according to its own nature and with its
own means, to attain that degree of material freedom and of moral freedom which makes
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them free for the union of persons, the community of love, which is the ultimate end and
the supreme common good of the community in all its members and on every level.”61
In summary, the principle of subdiarity is valuable as a tool for social education.
Here one is concerned with an educational process that is geared toward self-formation.
Thus, by providing the necessary means for self-formation, the student is given the
freedom to discover critical ways of self-help. Freedom that fosters the right conditions
for self-growth promotes an aspect of the absolute good. Thus, any intervention by the
higher groups in the lower, which limits the freedom of persons or associations, might be
justified only on the basis of the demands of freedom itself. Since there is the human
tendency to sometimes engage arbitrarily in dubious and immoral behavior like
repressive and totalitarian acts against the other’s freedom, which may be directed against
self-development and liberty, then a higher group should and ought to intervene in the
name of freedom itself in order to protect and promote it. This is the sense in which the
principle of subsidiarity has universal appeal with regard to the person.
As much freedom as is permitted by the common good, and only as much
coercion as is demanded by the common good, which, ultimately, is but the good
of freedom itself. This principle is universally valid. In the first place, it applies to
the State with respect to all groups and persons that live within its territory. It is
also applicable to every community within the State in relation to partial groups
and persons that are organic parts of the larger community.62

2.3.7. Subsidiarity as the Principle of Tolerance
The principle of tolerance in its most general formulation deals with the
relationship and attitude between persons, social groups, and communities. Thus, one
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could affirm from the outset that this principle helps maintain solidarity and subsidiarity
among groups and subgroups in society, even in situations where their coexistence is
hampered due to differences in opinions and convictions. Walgrave has provided the
ambiance within which one can conceptualize this principle:
Tolerance is an attitude of a person or group of persons toward another person or
group insofar as these are “different.” The “otherness” in question does not arise
from natural differences, such as race or temperament, nor from unimportant
differences in opinion, but is based on more profound differences of conviction
concerning the ultimate questions of existence, concerning that which man
ultimately accepts as the fundamental truth and value. From such a difference
follows a different interpretation of existence, hence a divergent project of life
that expresses itself in personal and social activities and conduct.63
This is the position from which Walgrave was able to define tolerance as “. . . the
ethical attitude which a person must take with respect to another person who differs from
him in his view of the world and of life.”64 Tolerance, understood from this perspective,
connotes a secondary aspect of the attitude that should exist between persons in society.
Fundamentally, it means that one allows the other to be himself, which includes acting
freely in his being different, not for selfish reasons, but out of respect for the other’s
inviolable character as a person. Here lies the primary sense in which the ethical attitude
among persons is a positive one, namely, to respect the freedom of persons.
But tolerance is not simply an interior disposition about one’s convictions. It
ought to leave some room for outward expression, especially in the form of social
organizations with those who share the same opinions. Walgrave puts it succinctly:
Tolerance means to let another act freely. Negatively it means that we abstain
from any kind of coercion, physical or moral, by which we might make one who
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thinks differently change his conviction or prevent him, as existing in this world,
from following his own way of life.65
This means that one should be ready to allow the other person the freedom to lead
his life in a self-responsible way, free from undue external pressure but through the
dictates of one’s conscience. At the same time, tolerance invites one to protect that
freedom from acting out aggressively toward the other person. Thus, at the core of
tolerance lies the fundamental view that the tolerant person should be open to the position
that others would make an option in life that might be directed negatively toward another
person. In this respect, the principle of tolerance is upheld when the tolerant one decides
to speak against the violation of individual freedom and refuses to support the ideology
that justifies such acts. This notwithstanding, there are instances when the tolerant option
might prove to be a challenge.
Hence tolerance does not exclude every ideological battle that is fought with the
weapons of force. Freedom in our earthly community of persons is a universal
condition of the common good. As such, it must take away from the members of
that community all freedom to combat freedom. Liberty, as belonging to the
common good, excludes every action of particular freedom that is directed against
freedom. Those who are responsible for the common good-this includes
fundamentally all citizens and formally the bearers of authority in the communitymust repress the expressions of particular freedom that are directed against the
right of liberty of members, whatever might be the ideological reasons offered for
those expressions.66
Rahner appears on the one hand to have challenged the above understanding of
tolerance when he said that “the tolerance that lets itself be restricted by the common
good is intolerant of the tolerance which free subjects demand spontaneously as their
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unrestricted right . . . Reality is not such that everything will always be harmonized.”67
On the other hand, he maintains that “. . . in their private and public lives, people must
often be intolerant toward one another, in order to show their tolerance by securing and
protecting the possibilities of freedom of others.”68 Here lies the practical difficulty with
the application of tolerance. The understanding of tolerance one advocates helps to
prepare the stage for it as a socio-ethical principle. Here, one is encouraged in every
society to promote and practice tolerance at different levels of the community: between
members of larger groups and those of smaller groups; between the State and the other
social groups that make up the society. Since the family is the primary human society, it
follows then that the State, which is secondary, should exist for the good of the
community that has organically developed from the family.
Fitzgerald has proposed, for instance, that any form of toleration one practices
should lead toward greater human solidarity. While recognizing that the human
community is far from having a peaceful world because of the different levels of conflicts
that abound between individuals and their distinct communities on the one hand, and at
the international levels on the other hand, one is optimistic that “. . . it may be easier for
rulers and people of great powers to develop a sense of human solidarity that can
transcend their differences and conflicts than it is for people embedded in local conflict
situations to raise their sights to broader horizons.”69 In this assertion, one notices how it
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affirms the necessity for the levels of competencies which allows larger power groups to
carry out their roles and affirms the right of smaller groups to attend to its functions so
that they do not spread out beyond their capacities.
Similarly, MacIntyre proposed that one would need the right set of conditions and
context to exist for any healthy conversation that might promote “effective practical
decision-making.” Accordingly, it would involve two subsidiary aims: “. . . that of
enabling those who participate in it both to give voice to their own concerns and to
understand those of others, and by so doing that of framing and cataloguing the best
reasons for and against each alternative course of action.”70 Thus, toleration is to be
extended to the different facets of life in community to ensure that different points of
views are respected and that persons are not threatened in society. Hence neither the State
nor persons may attempt to impose any one ideology. What is being challenged here that
is central to subsidiarity is coercive violence against persons and groups in community in
view of the common good of all as Keenan constructively states:
. . . tolerance (is adopted) not as a form of patience nor as a form of disapproval
but rather as an admission that in the present limited situation, the obligation to
protect certain values overrides the ability to recognize as right or acceptable
others’ decisions in conscience to live or act as they do. Thus, the tolerant attitude
is one of hope that one day greater understanding will resolve the present
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incompatibility or threat and lead somehow to the reconciliation of which Paul
calls us all to be ministers (2Cor 5:11-6:13).71

2.4.

Summary
In QA, one has traced the structures of thought that gave rise to the formal

articulation of the principle of subsidiarity. At the center of the discussion was that
subsidiarity protects the rights of the individual by insisting that the State and all other
associations or groups be at his service. The different elements of subsidiarity help clarify
the content of QA Par. 79-80 by specifying the roles and competencies of persons in
these social structures. Thus, subsidiarity holds that the State or Society should not
undertake that which individuals can do for themselves. On the other hand, the State or
other larger social organizations have the duty to assume those tasks that neither
individuals nor smaller groups can carry out. This means that the help of the community
and the State may be needed in order that smaller and intermediate groups may attain
their ends, but it should not supplant their initiative in the process, rather help facilitate it.
This was the rationale that under-girded the formal formulation of subsidarity as a
principle in QA 79-80. Since Pius XI, many papal social encyclicals have used the
principle of subsidiarity in various ways building on the formal formulation one has
examined. Thus, one could trace the major shifts and developments that have taken place
in Catholic social thought on subsidiarity as one will discover in the next section.
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2.5.

The Development of Subsidiarity in Subsequent Social Encyclicals
In the attempt to understand and interpret the principle of subsidiarity as

formulated in QA, some pertinent issues have been raised by different papal social
documents. What follows is an overview of the major positions, shifts, and developments
that have arisen down through the years.

2.5.1. John XXIII, Mater et Magistra (MM) and Pacem in Terris (PT)
In general, John XXIII in MM sought to apply the teachings of his predecessors to
modern challenges by affirming the role of the Church as a teacher, and as a nurturing
guardian of the poor and oppressed of society. The document called for greater awareness
of the need for all peoples to live as one community with a common good. The complex
nature of social progress was recognized in MM, but it encouraged a commitment to the
value and rights of workers, and acknowledged that the particular characteristics of
different countries and cultures are important elements of the social question. One would
specifically address the issues that relate to the principle of subsidiarity in MM. There are
two major developments one would identify to have taken place since QA.
First, John XXIII articulated a pluralist vision of the world whereby different
nations of the world could increase the mutuality of relations between them with an aim
to providing help for the less advanced nations. Thus, MM recognized the changed
historical, technological, economic, social, and political circumstances that took place
since Pius XI in the internal arrangements of individual nation States and in the mutual
relations of countries. Specifically, the document stated that:
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Today, in many communities, citizens from almost all social strata participate in
public life. Public authorities intervene more and more in economic and social
affairs. The peoples of Asia and Africa, having set aside colonial systems, now
govern themselves according to their own laws and institutions. As the mutual
relationships of peoples increase, they become daily more dependent one upon the
other. Throughout the world, assemblies and councils have become more
common, which, being supranational in character, take into account the interests
of all peoples. Such bodies are concerned with economic life, or with social
affairs, or with culture and education, or, finally, with the mutual relationships of
peoples.72
The explicit recognition of the nations of Asia and Africa in a papal social
encyclical by John XXIII was a novelty. Also, the affirmation that these nations “. . . now
govern themselves according to their own laws and institutions,” was a welcomed
development in the type of the social and economic participation that was being
envisaged. Moreover, the call for “. . . mutual relationship of peoples” at that point in
history was itself remarkable. The following implications are evident for subsidiarity:
how and why was this wonderful pluralist vision of society advocated in MM not fostered
to bring about the desired cooperation and participation in the decision making process of
communities advanced by the principle of subsidiarity? Did the “mutual relationship of
peoples” advocated by MM take place in areas of economics, politics, and technology,
between the advanced nations and the less advanced nations in such a way that the less
advanced nations could truly say that they received subsidium that enabled them to help
themselves? Did the less advanced nations take advantage of whatever form of subsidium
was received or gained to improve the living conditions of their people or did they
squander the opportunity?
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Second, John XXIII addressed the issue of “private initiative and State
intervention in economic life,” which raises important consequences for subsidiarity. On
the one hand, he maintained the priority of “the private initiative of the individual”:
Experience, in fact, shows that where private initiative of individuals is lacking,
political tyranny prevails. Moreover, much stagnation occurs in various sectors of
the economy, and hence all sorts of consumer goods and services, closely
connected with needs of the body and more especially of the spirit, are in short
supply. Beyond doubt, the attainment of such goods and services provides
remarkable opportunity and stimulus for individuals to exercise initiative and
industry.73
On the other hand, the document maintained that where “. . . the appropriate
activity of the State is lacking or defective, commonwealths are apt to experience
incurable disorders, and there occurs exploitation of the weak by the unscrupulous strong,
who flourish, unfortunately, like cockle among the wheat, in all times and places.”74 The
role of the State is to follow faithfully the subsidiarity principle.75 However, the effects of
socialization, while providing the avenue for multiple social relationships, could also give
room to intervention by public authorities in the personal lives of individuals.76 Thus, the
contribution of MM was to fashion a way by which the threat posed to individual
initiative could be averted or minimized. This made the document to pose a pertinent
question that is at the center of the principle of subsidiarity: “Will men perhaps then
become automatons, and cease to be personally responsible, as these social relationships
multiply more and more?”77 In response to this question, the document upheld that the
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provisions of the common good should be respected to enable persons to grow more
fully. The common good, then, is to embrace “. . . the sum total of those conditions of
social living, whereby men are enabled more fully and more readily to achieve their own
perfection.”78 Furthermore, the document indicated that the State should maintain a
healthy balance between: “. . . (1) the freedom of individual citizens and groups of
citizens to act autonomously, while cooperating one with the other; (2) the activity of the
State whereby the undertakings of private individuals and groups are suitably regulated
and fostered.”79 This was an important development by John XXIII, which had
implications for subsidiarity and helped to explain the sense in which individual initiative
could be jeopardized by the multiplicity of relationships in a commonwealth. One would
have to consider next Pacem in Terris to discover the other contributions John XXIII
made to the principle of subsidiarity.
In PT, John XXIII was optimistic about the great potential for human beings to
work together for peace on earth. The document focused its attention on the relations
between individuals, between the individual and the community, and between nations.
Above all, the inviolability of human rights was affirmed. In this regard, peace is brought
about through mutual trust, unity of right order and genuine respect for and adherence to
the law of God. One will now focus on the developments that took place in PT that were
related to subsidiarity.
First, the emphasis on the rights of persons within the commonwealth was a major
development in Catholic social thought that is related to subsidiarity. This teaching
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provided the opportunity for maintaining the centrality of the dignity of the human person
as the foundation, goal, and end of all social institutions.
Any human society, if it is to be well-ordered and productive, must lay down as a
foundation this principle, namely, that every human being is a person; that is, his
nature is endowed with intelligence and free will. Indeed, precisely because he is
a person he has rights and obligations flowing directly and simultaneously from
his very nature. And as these rights and obligations are universal and inviolable,
so they cannot in any way be surrendered.80
In this way, PT81 indicted the different types of rights which help promote and
hold together this anthropological vision. These include personal and social rights,
economic rights, rights of association, and political rights among others. In particular, PT
quoted Pius XII to have upheld that: “The human individual, far from being an object
and, as it were, a merely passive element in the social order, is in fact, must be and must
continue to be, its subject, its foundation and its end.”82 This emphasis is critical for
subsidiarity in the sense that it makes the case against unnecessary interference and
coercion that might seek to overrun individual initiative. Next, PT focuses on the
corresponding duties which accompany these rights such as “. . . the right of every man to
life is correlative with the duty to preserve it; his right to a decent standard of living with
the duty of living it becomingly; and his right to investigate the truth freely, with the duty
of seeking it ever more completely and profoundly.”83 The document maintained that
persons who fail to carry out their civic responsibilities put asunder the very rights they
claim: “Those, therefore, who claim their own rights, yet altogether forget or neglect to
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carry out their respective duties, are people who build with one hand and destroy with the
other.”84 Thus, mutual collaboration was encouraged on the issues of rights claims and
responsibilities as integral to building a civil society. This mutuality of rights was to
transcend the different facets of social life and be guided by the virtues of “truth, justice,
charity and freedom.”85
Second, John XXIII recognized that three characteristics: the role of the working
class in economic and public affairs; the role of women in domestic and public life; and
the independence of many nations in social and political life;86 make it necessary to state
the relations that should exist between individuals and public authorities within a State.
The central positions of this document that promote subsidiarity are the centrality of
persons, the common good of all, and participation of persons in the commonwealth.87
Thus, the goal is to build a healthy society where rights of persons are respected and the
common good of all is maintained without giving undue advantage to others in the
process as the document states clearly: “It should not happen that certain individuals or
social groups derive special advantage from the fact that their rights have received
preferential protection. Nor should it happen that governments, in seeking to protect these
rights, become obstacles to their full expression and free use.”88
Third, John XXIII recognized another essential element of subsidiarity, namely,
the protection of the rights of minorities in society. The pope considered various attempts
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made “. . . to limit the strength and numerical increase of these lesser peoples;”89 as a
violation against justice itself. Thus, civil authorities are encouraged to support rights
claims of minorities particularly when it “. . . concerns their language, the development of
their natural gifts, their ancestral customs, and their accomplishments and endeavors in
the economic order.”90
Similarly, the economic assistance that the developed countries should extend to
underdeveloped countries should be the kind of subsidium that would lead these countries
to self-help. Thus, the document affirmed that: “The wealthier states, in providing varied
forms of assistance to the poorer, should respect the moral values and ethnic
characteristics peculiar to each, and also that they should avoid any intention of political
domination.”91
Fourth, PT considered the role of the United Nations organization as central to the
protection, promotion, and preservation of individual rights of persons especially in the
international social, economic and political arenas. Thus, it upheld as a healthy
development the “Universal Declaration of Human Rights” by the United Nations.92
Next, one would have to study the contribution made by the Second Vatican
Council to the principle of subsidiarity.
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2.5.2. The Second Vatican Council, Gaudium ET Spes (GS)
In general, the pastoral constitution on “The Church in the Modern World”
advocated for a new sense of service by the Church in a rapidly changing world, by
presenting the ethical framework of the Church’s commitment to pastoral work in the
world. The document also emphasized the dignity of families, the uniqueness of cultures,
and the importance of establishing justice in the process of development. The council also
advocated for disarmament and just, peaceful international relations among nations.
Significantly, the council document provided the sound basis for the promotion of culture
in relation to the Gospel. This development was the key to unlocking the doors of the
Church in Africa, Asia and generally in the ‘third world’ countries. Specifically, one
would concentrate on the contributions made by the document in developing the
understanding of the principle of subsidiarity. There are five major areas that are worthy
of note.
First, GS focused on the dignity of the human person and the claims of the person
stressing individual rights over and above the claims of society. At the heart of the human
person is the dignity of one’s moral conscience from which flows individual capacity and
initiatives:
In the depths of his conscience, man detects a law which he does not impose upon
himself, but which holds him to obedience. Always summoning him to love good
and avoid evil, the voice of conscience can when necessary speak to his heart
more specifically: do this, shun that. For man has in his heart a law written by
God. To obey it is the very dignity of man; according to it he will be judged.
Conscience is the most secret core and sanctuary of a man. There he is alone with
God, whose voice echoes in his depths. In a wonderful manner conscience reveals
that law which is fulfilled by love of God and neighbor. In fidelity to conscience,
Christians are joined with the rest of men in the search for truth, and for the
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genuine solution to the numerous problems which arise in the life of individuals
and from social relationships. Hence the more that a correct conscience holds
sway, the more persons and groups turn aside from blind choice and strive to be
guided by objective norms of morality.93
In order for objective norms of morality to guide people in community, it is
necessary to place the human person as the foundation, goal and end of social
relationships. The inner voice of conscience supports persons in their daily choices in life
which help determine human interactions. The search for truth becomes a cooperative
venture between persons and the social situation with which they interact. Thus, it is
important for persons to form and fashion correct consciences in order that individuals
and groups might objectively respond to the common good of all people.
Karl Rahner, commenting on GS 16, further articulates the freedom of conscience
and of religion that distinguishes persons in community and at the same time protects the
well-being of others:
. . . Through their conscience human beings are real subjects; they may not be
treated like objects. Conscience must be respected by all social and ecclesiastical
authorities, since their immediate function concerns the objective structures of
reality. One’s freedom of conscience and of religion should not infringe upon that
of others because this would constitute what is usually called a violation of the
common good.94
The implication for subsidiarity is that by forming correct consciences, persons
would more truthfully make those choices that would protect their individual rights and
the rights of others. Some might ask how persons could form correct consciences. Rahner
offered some useful advice when he said that “. . . both society and the Church have the
right and the duty to teach people about objective norms of morality and to exhort them
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to observe these norms. In other words: They teach the right way of applying conscience
to concrete realities. This does not infringe upon freedom of conscience.”95 It may also be
helpful in building healthy relationships that respect the dignity of persons as mutual
partners without seeking to overpower them in the process. In truth, conscience protects
liberty and persons act in freedom by promoting human relationships without coercion: “.
. . man’s dignity demands that he act according to a knowing and free choice. Such a
choice is personally motivated and promoted from within. It does not result from blind
internal impulse nor from mere external pressure.”96
Second, GS promoted the social nature of the person in human society which
raises several implications for subsidiarity. The document emphasizes the fact that the
promotion of communion between persons has and continues to take place at different
levels in society:
Among those social ties which man needs for his development, some, like the
family and political community, relate with greater immediacy to his innermost
nature. Others originate rather from his free decision. In our era, for various
reasons, reciprocal ties and mutual dependencies increase day by day and give
rise to a variety of associations and organizations, both public and private. This
development, which is called socialization, while certainly not without its
dangers, brings with it many advantages with respect to consolidating and
increasing the qualities of the human person, and safeguarding his rights.97
Furthermore, GS challenged those who hold onto an “individualistic ethic:”
. . . Many in various places even make light of social laws and precepts, and do
not hesitate to resort to various frauds and deceptions in avoiding just taxes or
other debts due to society. Others think little of certain norms of social life, for
example those designated for the protection of health, or laws establishing speed
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limits. They do not even avert to the fact that by such indifference they imperil
their own life and that of others.98
The persons who hold such individualistic morality are enemies to themselves and
the society. Such an individualistic morality hardly promotes the cherished position of
subsidiarity, which seeks to build relationships in community. In the true spirit of
subsidiarity, GS stated that the obligation to build social relationships in community is
paramount to persons because it promotes communal solidarity: “. . . the more unified the
world becomes, the more plainly do the offices of men extend beyond particular groups
and spread by degrees to the whole world.”99
Third, GS articulated the role of the Church in the modern world in terms of
degrees of subsidiary functions. From the onset, GS affirmed that the Church and the
world are mutually related: “. . . everything we have said about the dignity of the human
person, and about the human community and the profound meaning of human activity,
lays the foundation for the relationship between the Church and the world, and provides
the basis for dialogue between them.”100 The document then showed the various types of
subsidium the Church could offer individuals, society, and human activity.101 In the spirit
of mutuality, GS showed the help the society should render to the Church. Essentially,
the document acknowledged that: “. . . whoever promotes the human community at the
family level, culturally, in its economic, social, and political dimensions, both nationally

98

GS Par. 30, p. 183.
Ibid.
100
GS Par. 40, p. 189.
101
See GS Par. 40-43, pp. 189-194.
99

101
and internationally, such a one, according to God’s design, is contributing greatly to the
Church community as well, to the extent that it depends on things outside itself.” 102
Fourth, GS discussed the issue of the plurality of cultures and development. The
document begins by acknowledging the significance of cultural values and how these are
related to human values. Thus, cultural issues are pluralistic and can be found among
different groups of people in different nations of the world. In fact, “. . . in every group or
nation, there is an ever-increasing number of men and women who are conscious that
they themselves are the artisans and the authors of the culture of their community.”103
Therefore, it is pertinent to advance some principles that would help promote healthy
cultural development among persons in community. In truth:
It is a duty most befitting our times that men, especially Christians, should work
strenuously on behalf of certain decisions which must be made in the economic
and political fields, both nationally and internationally. By these decisions
universal recognition and implementation should be given to the right of all men
to a human and civic culture favorable to personal dignity and free from any
discrimination on the grounds of race, sex, nationality, religious or social
conditions.104
In so doing, the document hoped that cultural development would be promoted
within a plural context. The implication for subsidiarity is that it supports the formation
of groups and associations based on mutual needs in a community. Hence, such groups
should be transparent and avoid discrimination and domination of persons based on the
aforementioned elements. Its main purpose should be the service to humanity. By service
to humanity “. . . we mean every man whatsoever and every group of men, of whatever
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race and from whatever part of the world.”105 In so doing, GS remained faithful to the
principle of subsidiarity when it stated that “. . . let all individuals and governments
undertake a genuine sharing of their goods. Let them use these goods especially to
provide individuals and nations with the means for helping and developing
themselves.”106
Fifth, GS advocated that persons participate in the life of the political community.
The document made use of the principle of subsidiarity when it stated on the one hand
that smaller associations be given the opportunity to contribute to the body social without
unnecessary intervention from higher authorities:
Authorities must beware of hindering family, social, or cultural groups, as well as
intermediate bodies and institutions. They must not deprive them of their own
lawful and effective activity, but should rather strive to promote them willingly
and in an orderly fashion. For their part, citizens both as individuals and in
association should be on guard against granting government too much authority
and inappropriately seeking from it excessive conveniences and advantages, with
a consequent weakening of the sense of responsibility on the part of individuals,
families, and social groups.107
On the other hand, following the spirit of subsidiarity, GS acknowledged the
important role that higher authorities could play in helping to coordinate the complex
web of relationships that exists in society, and so allowed some limited and well defined
role for the government:
Because of the increased complexity of modern circumstances, government is
more often required to intervene in social and economic affairs, by way of
bringing about conditions more likely to help citizens and groups freely attain to
complete human fulfillment with greater effect.108
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2.5.3. Paul VI, Populorum Progressio (PP) and Octogesimo Adveniens (OA)
In general, PP was written against the background of the worsening
marginalization of the poor around the world. Thus, Paul VI presented the various
dimensions of an integral human development and the necessary conditions for growth in
the solidarity of peoples. There was also the disparity of wealth among nations which the
pope identified as traceable to the heritage of colonialism, neo-colonialism, and in the
imbalance of power that leads inevitably to an imbalance in contracts of trade. Hence, it
was necessary to bring theological reflection to impact liberation from injustice and
genuine human values that would engender true development towards a more human
situation. One would now concentrate on the salient points in the document where the
principle of subsidiarity was employed. One can identify three major areas.
First, Paul VI stated that the social question had become an international issue and
that in order to offer less advanced nations the means to help themselves, justice and
peace was the way forward. He indicated that having visited Latin America, Africa, the
Holy Land and India, it had become clear to him that development was a problem in
these continents that deserved the attention of the international community.109
Consequently, Paul VI declared that these inhuman conditions “. . . whose injustice cries
to heaven,”110 diminish the worth of persons and stagnate human initiative and
responsibility, which are at the heart of subsidiarity. Thus, “integral development” is
necessary to support developing nations to bring about the desired changes in their
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communities: “Development cannot be limited to mere economic growth. In order to be
authentic, it must be complete: integral, that is, it has to promote the good of every man
and of the whole man.”111
Second, Paul VI advocated that the spirit of solidarity of the human race prevail in
the area of development. Thus, PP in the spirit of solidarity called for equity in trade
relations between developing and developed nations. Explaining that the goal is to bring
subsidium to the weaker nations in order to enable them to become “artisans of their
destiny”:
The past has too often been characterized by relationships of violence between
nations; may the day dawn when international relations will be marked with the
stamp of mutual respect and friendship, of interdependence in collaboration, the
betterment of all seen as the responsibility of each individual. The younger or
weaker nations ask to assume their active part in the construction of a better
world, one which shows deeper respect for the rights and the vocation of the
individual. This is a legitimate appeal; everyone should hear it and respond to
it.112
Furthermore, in the spirit of solidarity with the weaker nations, Paul VI
challenged industrialists and multinational institutions to be socially sensitive in those
developing nations where they carry out their business endeavors:
. . . industrialists, merchants, leaders, or representatives of larger enterprises. It
happens that they are not lacking in social sensitivity in their own country; why
then do they return to the inhuman principles of individualism when they operate
in less-developed countries? Their advantaged situation should on the contrary
move them to become the initiators of social progress and of human advancement
in the area where their business calls them. Their very sense of organization
should suggest to them the means for making intelligent use of the labor of the
indigenous population, of forming qualified workers, of training engineers and
staffs, of giving scope to their initiative, of introducing them progressively into
higher positions, thus preparing them to share, in the near future, in the
responsibilities of management. At least let justice always rule the relations
111
112

PP Par. 14, p. 243.
PP Par. 65, p. 255.

105
between superiors and their subordinates. Let standard contracts with reciprocal
obligations govern these relationships. Finally, let no one, whatever his status, be
subjected unjustly to the arbitrariness of others.113
In this way, Paul VI indicated the key elements that could help persons in a
weaker position gain help from one in a stronger position that would eventually lead to
self-help which is promoted by subsidiarity.
Third, Paul VI linked integral development with peaceful existence and, in the
spirit of subsidiarity, emphasized the need for an international body that could help
establish and coordinate just political and economic environments.
This international collaboration on a worldwide scale requires institutions that
will prepare, coordinate and direct it, until finally there is established an order of
justice which is universally recognized. With all our heart, we encourage these
organizations which have undertaken this collaboration for the development of the
peoples of the world; our wish is that they grow in prestige and authority.114
In OA, Paul VI set out to commemorate the 80th anniversary of RN by providing
guidelines toward realizing the need for a genuine renewal in domestic and international
societal structures. Emphasizing the aspiration to equality and participation, justice and
peace, the pope called on Christians to live up to their responsibility in social and
political reform as a way of discovering the truth and living out the Gospel. Specifically,
some close examination of areas where the principle of subsidiarity was employed
follows. Two major areas stand out distinctively.
First, Paul VI explained that two “. . . fundamental aspirations: the aspiration to
equality and the aspiration to participation”115 help determine the kind of relationships
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which inform human dignity and freedom. However, human rights are violated and other
forms of discrimination are on the increase, so much so that to legislate on such matters
appears superficial. Thus, it would seem that legislation alone is not enough to build up
“relationships of justice and equality.” Therefore, one would turn to Gospel values where
instruction is provided on how weaker persons in society should be treated: “. . . the more
fortunate should renounce some of their rights so as to place their goods more generously
at the service of others.”116 In so doing, the more fortunate members of society would
engage in the practice of solidarity and the common good. Furthermore, Paul VI
maintained that relationships of justice and equality are enhanced through the building of
the “political society.” The political society should not be imposed on the people but
should grow out of their experience as OA indicates.
It is not for the State or even political parties, which would be closed unto
themselves, to try to impose an ideology by means that would lead to a
dictatorship over minds, the worst kind of all. It is for cultural and religious
groupings, in the freedom of acceptance which they presume, to develop in the
social body, disinterestedly and in their own ways, those ultimate convictions on
the nature, origin, and end of man and society.117
The preference for subsidiary forms of associations to help build the political
society with minimal government intervention supports the position that one should not
withdraw from individuals and commit to the community what they can do for
themselves.
[Political power] While respecting the legitimate liberties of individuals, families,
and subsidiary groups, it acts in such a way as to create, effectively and for the
well being of all, the conditions required for attaining man’s true and complete
good, including his spiritual end. It acts within the limits of its competence, which
can vary from people to people and from country to country. It always intervenes
116
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with care for justice and with devotion to the common good, for which it holds
final responsibility. It does not, for all that, deprive individuals and intermediary
bodies of the field of activity and responsibility which are proper to them and
which lead them to collaborate in the attainment of this common good.118
Second, Paul VI realized that the realities of the political society demanded that
persons have “. . . a greater sharing in responsibility and in decision-making,”119 which is
proper to subsidiarity. This shared responsibility should evolve out of true freedom and
mutual interaction in the social, cultural, economic, religious, and political relationships
that persons build in community. Moreover, shared responsibility would help promote
equality and participation of persons in a more reasonable way that is humane,
democratic, and dialectical:
Admittedly, it is true that the choices proposed for a decision are more and more
complex; the considerations that must be borne in mind are numerous, and the
foreseeing of the consequences involves risk, even if new sciences strive to
enlighten freedom at these important moments. However, although limits are
sometimes called for, these obstacles must not slow down the giving of wider
participation in working out decisions, making choices and putting them into
practice.120

2.5.4. John Paul II, Laborem Exercens (LE), Sollicitudo Rei Socialis (SRS) and
Centesimus Annus (CA)
John Paul II, in LE, celebrated the 90th anniversary of RN by highlighting human
work as the essential key to the social question. The pope recognized the value of the
laborer in the process of production and subordinated the right to private property to the
right of common use. Thus, he upheld the priority of labor over capital in production.
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John Paul II then presented a spirituality of work with the insistence on upholding the
dignity of labor. There are two main areas where subsidiarity was used in the encyclical
that one needs to examine.
First, LE presented the meaning of work both in the “objective” and “subjective”
sense that raises important implications for subsidiarity. The objective meaning refers to
the objects produced by labor, from manufactured goods to agricultural products and
technology. The subjective meaning refers to the centrality of the human person who uses
his or her labor as a means for self-realization. Thus, the encyclical recognizes the
pertinent position of the human person in production.
. . . a subjective being capable of acting in a planned and rational way, capable of
deciding about himself and with a tendency to self-realization. As a person, man
is therefore the subject of work. As a person he works, he performs various
actions belonging to the work process; independently of their objective content,
these actions must all serve to realize his humanity, to fulfill the calling to be a
person that is his by reason of his very humanity.121
Thus, LE gave priority to the human person as the measure for determining the
effectiveness and quality of work: “. . . the basis for determining the value of human
work is not primarily the kind of work being done, but the fact that the one who is doing
it is a person. The sources of the dignity of work are to be sought primarily in the
subjective dimension, not in the objective one.”122 By so doing, one realizes that the
objective dimension of work is and ought to be at the service of the subject, the human
person. The manufactured goods, agricultural products, and technology are meant to help
the human person and not to take over the subject.
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Thus, the encyclical clearly states that “. . . in some instances technology can cease to be
man’s ally and become almost his enemy, as when the mechanization of work ‘supplants’
him, taking away all personal satisfaction and the incentive to creativity and
responsibility . . .”123 In this instance there would be a violation of the principle of
subsidiarity. Thus, LE states clearly that “. . . work is ‘for man’ and not man ‘for
work’.”124 The encyclical affirms the personal worth which the human being should
derive from work and the ethical meaning of work in this way.
Work is a good thing for man-a good thing for his humanity-because through
work man not only transforms nature, adapting it to his own needs, but he also
achieves fulfillment as a human being and indeed in a sense becomes “more a
human being.”125
The above position explains how the subjective meaning of work may help
promote the building of a healthy civil society that recognizes the interrelationships
which exist among social groups in community.
Second, John Paul II, in LE, affirms the priority of labor over capital in the
process of production.
. . . we must first of all recall a principle that has always been taught by the
church: the principle of the priority of labor over capital. This principle directly
concerns the process of production: In this process labor is always a primary
efficient cause, while capital, the whole collection of means of production,
remains a mere instrument or instrumental cause. This principle is an evident truth
that emerges from the whole of man’s historical experience.126
In taking the above position, the encyclical was addressing the age-old conflict
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that existed between labor and capital where highly influential business men controlled
the “means of production” over and against the exploited and poor majority of
workers.127 Accordingly, LE held that the conflict between labor and capital was an
ethical one that had to do with the manner in which the subjects of production, namely
human beings, are wrongly marginalized. Hence there was the need for solidarity with
workers. The solidarity with workers was to take the form of building new partnerships
that respect the majority of the persons involved in the process of production: “. . .
proposals for joint ownership of the means of work, sharing by the workers in the
management and/or profits of businesses, so-called shareholding by labor, etc.”128 One
major implication for subsidiarity is that collectivist approaches in doing business that
undermined the worth of the subjects of production might be minimized. Thus, LE
affirms that there was the need to replace the “. . . system of excessive bureaucratic
centralization, which makes the worker feel that he is just a cog in a huge machine moved
from above, that he is for more reasons than one a mere production instrument rather than
a true subject of work with an initiative of his own.”129 By so doing, the encyclical raised
an important issue that is central to subsidiarity, namely, the recognition of the
contribution made by persons from below in the family, local workers unions, Churches,
civil society groups that build various relationships to promote the dignity of persons in
community.
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In general, John Paul II sets out in SRS to address the widening gap between the
rich and poor. He recognized the universal dimension of the gap between the abundant
wealth of the northern hemisphere contrasted with the dire poverty in the southern
hemisphere. Accordingly, he opined that true development demands a critique of the
moral dimension of development, a commitment not only from individuals, but States as
well, and some recognition of the limited resources of nature. John Paul II exhorts
solidarity with and a concern for the poor as motivation for reform. One would
specifically identify where the principle of subsidiarity was employed in the encyclical.
Two major areas deserve some attention.
First, John Paul II, while commenting on the situation in the world, opined that
the right of economic initiative is one that is often relegated. According to him, economic
right is related to both the initiatives of the individual and for the common good. Thus,
the real threat is with “. . . the creative subjectivity of the citizen,” which in turn affects
the output of the larger society. Consequently, in the spirit of subsidiarity, the pope stated
that larger organizations should not take over individual creativity since this would
amount to making them “objects” rather than “subjects” of society:
It must also be restated that no social group, for example a political party, has the
right to usurp the role of sole leader, since this brings about destruction of the true
subjectivity of society of the individual citizens, as happens in every form of
totalitarianism. In this situation the individual and the people become “objects,” in
spite of all declarations to the contrary and verbal assurances.130
This type of situation could place in serious jeopardy the “authentic development”
advocated by John Paul II which encourages the participation of individuals and poor

130

SRS Par. 15, p. 403.

112
nations in the development processes taking place in their communities.
Second, John Paul II argued that developing countries that are unable at the
moment to foster authentic development could be helped through international structures
and movements geared toward the fulfillment of this purpose. In so doing, the key to a
holistic development would be offered to these developing nations in the true spirit of
solidarity. The principle of subsidiarity is respected in the sense that the aim of the pope
is to bring an international collaboration to provide help that would favor “selfaffirmation” of the citizens in developing nations.131
In general, John Paul II sets out in CA to commemorate the centenary of RN and
to examine the events of 1989-90: the break-up of Eastern Europe, the weakening of
oppressive regimes in Africa, Asia, and Latin America with the hope for “new things”
rerum novarum within the social order. The pope urged all people of good will to
dialogue and to cooperation for justice to overcome the alienation and poverty so
extensive throughout the world. It is within this larger context of the encyclical that one
would sort out particular areas where the principle of subsidiarity was employed as an
integral part of the Church’s social thought. There are two major applications of
subsidiarity that stand out in CA.
First, John Paul II used subsidiarity while carrying out some re-reading of Leo
XIII’s RN in the light of contemporary issues. John Paul II appealed specifically on the
one hand, to the right of the State to intervene in the social order in order to bring about
the needed help to promote the common good of society. On the other hand, he cautioned
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that the State should always protect the rights of individuals and not take them over.132 It
is from the above position that CA presents the “new things” of today in paragraph 12.
Moreover, in recounting the working conditions set forth for workers and the type of
relationship that should exist between workers in a union, CA thought it necessary to
recall the principles of subsidiarity and solidarity as it was applied in both QA and LE to
make the point for an “authentic culture of work,” and the role of the State in two
respects.
The State must contribute to the achievement of these goals both directly and
indirectly. Indirectly and according to the principle of subsidiarity by creating
favorable conditions for the free exercise of economic activity, which will lead to
abundant opportunities for employment and sources of wealth. Directly and
according to the principle of solidarity, by defending the weakest, by placing
certain limits on the autonomy of the parties who determine working conditions,
and by ensuring in every case the necessary minimum support for the unemployed
worker.133
The appeal to these principles, namely subsidiarity and solidarity, emphasizes the
fact that they are central to building authentic human relationships and promoting integral
development that respects the rights of persons in society.
Second, John Paul II, on the one hand, challenged the welfare State as frequently
or often contradicting the principle of subsidiarity by intervening somewhat directly into
the affairs of a lesser community and so depriving these lesser communities of their
proper roles and responsibilities in society.
Accordingly, such a situation “. . . leads to a loss of human energies and an
inordinate increase of public agencies which are dominated more by bureaucratic ways of
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thinking than by concern for serving their clients and which are accompanied by an
enormous increase in spending.”134 On the other hand, the pope supported the principle of
subsidiarity by maintaining that “. . . needs are best understood and satisfied by people
who are closest to them and who act as neighbors to those in need.”135 In this way, the
pope supported the contribution made by intermediate groups and communities in
creating “. . . networks of solidarity,”136 that help build their social situations and
encourage individual and communal initiatives.
Having examined the development of the subsidiarity principle in some
encyclicals, one would next address some of the issues that some scholars have
commented upon based on their critical reading of the documents and in view of
contemporary social issues.

2.6.

Critical Perspectives: Implications and General Goals of Subsidiarity
In this section, one sets out with two goals in mind: to provide a critical overview

of the comments and analyses of some scholars on some of the major issues that have
arisen from the understanding and development of subsidiarity in the encyclicals and
their implications; to provide a synthesis of the general goals of subsidiarity that
highlights the central tenets of this principle. The critical overview would address the
implications for applying the principle of subsidiarity to issues such as: the universal
Church and local Church; human rights and “claims in conflict”; pluralist societies;
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communal solidarity; and “creative subjectivity of the person.”
Jack Mahoney raised the issue of subsidiarity in regard to the nature of the Church
proper. According to Mahoney, at the heart of the debate on subsidiarity lies the question
of the difference between subsidiarity and delegation.
Delegation is the granting of power by a higher authority to a lower in terms of a
carefully prescribed function and limited sphere of activity. The superior might do
it better, and might prefer to do it in person. But we cannot all do everything, and
so faute de mieux, one recruits assistants and delegates them, while keeping a
careful eye on them and requiring of them a regular account of their
stewardship.137
In contrast, subsidiarity is not a “trickle-down theory of power;” it is rather “. . .
the acknowledgement of particular stratified competencies at each level of society. It
does not impart power; it recognizes it wherever it already exists. It is an honest
acknowledgement of the inherent tension in any society between particularity and
universality.”138 The interpretation by Mahoney that subsidiarity seeks not to impart
power, but to recognize it, was central to the formulation by Pius XI that “. . . inasmuch
as every social activity should, by its very nature, prove a help to members of the body
social, it should never destroy or absorb them.”139
Hence, one might agree with Mahoney that it is simply accurate to restate this
papal idea as a principle of ‘non-absorption,’ which implies, in the first place, that
something already existed therein which ought not be taken over except in circumstances
of absolute necessity when, for instance, the common good is placed in jeopardy.
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Furthermore, a pertinent ecclesiological implication was raised by Mahoney when
he opined that the controversy over subsidiarity is largely a confrontation of mentalities
about one’s view of Church.
Does one start from the universal Church, with a stress on its world-wide unity,
and then ask how much diversity and how much initiative is permissible
consonant with that unity? Such a universalistic perspective is probably more
congenial to Roman curial personnel with a tradition of exercising power on a
world-scale and suspicious of anything which appears to erode their power. Or
does one start from the ecclesial and collegial reality of local or regional churches
and their particular cultural and pastoral characteristics, then ask how much
restriction or self-denying ordinance is required of them in order to maintain
communion with others in the universal Church?140
Similarly, James D. Sangu in an address to the plenary assembly of African
bishops on the theme of “Evangelization in Africa,” offered some thought provoking
comments on the relationship between the Church in Africa and the universal Church that
support subsidiarity.
The unity with Rome and the Holy Father is very highly valued in Africa and His
authority over the Church is as yet unchallenged here. But the changing
conditions, and especially the coming-of age of the Church require a re-thinking
of the relations between the African Churches and the Holy See; between the
African Churches and the Congregations for the Evangelization of Peoples;
between Episcopal conferences and the Roman curia, so that Episcopal
conferences could handle local matters which do not prejudice the universal
Church; relations too between Episcopal Conferences and Papal Legates should
be clearly redefined.141
The issue of the particular church and the universal church will take central stage
in the course of this work. Suffice it now to say that the role of subsidiarity in the Church
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was addressed in a recent theological work by Ad Leys and other Scholars.142 It is still an
open-ended question whether the appeal to subsidiarity might help resolve the difference
in basic mentalities about Church alluded to earlier. One can only hope that it may
provide an opening for addressing the issue of whether or not social categories and the
principles of social justice could and should apply across the board to a body such as the
Church, not withstanding its position as a divine and human institution. In fact, Leys143
has defended the thesis that the Church as communion is an incarnate salvific reality from
which follows that socio-ethical principles for human associations are, to some degree,
applicable and valid for the Church. One can affirm that it is only proper that the Church
as a truly human community and with a missionary obligation to practice what it
preaches144 should comply with the principles which the Church itself places on human
associations, and one of those is the principle of subsidiarity.
Clifford Kossel based his argument on the fact that the Church’s social teaching
has always insisted that world community and the principle of subsidiarity should go
together. Thus, world unity and authority should not be imposed as an imperialist project.
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Rather, it should arise out of the peoples’ experience and need to build a viable social
structure.
Subsidiarity is simply the old principle of hierarchy viewed from the bottom up.
Hierarchy looks at order from the top down. When it moved from the cosmic to
the social order, it tended perhaps to see in terms of too rigid and “eternal”
structures. Subsidiarity does not eliminate all hierarchy even in the social order,
but it opens the way to greater flexibility and adaptability. For the human person,
who is to be served by community, is the free and responsible agent who must
build and adapt his forms of association to the changing conditions and to his
changing awareness of his needs.145
Thus, the larger question which some scholars have addressed that relates to
subsidiarity is that of decision-making authority and leadership in the Church.146 These
scholars have identified over the years three models of authority that have operated in the
Christian community, namely: authority as hierarchical, authority as charismatic, and
authority as pluralistic.147
1.

Authority as Hierarchical.

The term “hierarchy,” is derived from two Greek words, hiereus (priest) and arche
(rule, principle), which means “priest-rule.” The hierarchical structure has been operative
in the Roman Catholic Church down through the ages. The Second Vatican Council
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states the context for understanding the divine nature of the “ecclesiastical ministry” as
having been “. . . exercised in different degrees by those who even from ancient times
have been called bishops, priests and deacons.”148 According to LG 20, the hierarchical
structure is grounded in sacramental ordination and the principle of apostolic succession
with the divine mandate to carry on the mission of Christ until the end of the world. Thus,
the hierarchical model could be said to have identified authority to a large extent with the
ordained ministry and consequently the institutional Church.149 There are two challenges
that the hierarchical model of authority poses for the proper understanding of
subsidiarity.
First, the hierarchical model places much emphasis on the authority of the
ordained to the detriment of the other charisms and ministries in the Church. Thus,
Leonardo Boff identifies this phenomenon as “. . . the result of the pathological view of
the Church’s reality.”150 Boff quotes two popes that have pursued the clericalism that is
central to the hierarchical model: Gregory XVI (1831-46) who said that: “No one can
deny that the Church is an unequal society in which God destined some to be governors
and others to be servants. The latter are the laity; the former, the clergy,” and Pius X who
said that:
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“Only the college of pastors have the right and authority to lead and govern. The masses
have no right or authority except that of being governed, like an obedient flock that
follows its Shepherd.”151 Thus, the hierarchical model tends to take away the
ontological right of the person to participate in the process of decision making in the
community by relegating the person to the status of a spectator, which is a direct violation
of the principle of subsidiarity.
Second, the hierarchical model tends to equate its narrow understanding of
authority with power. According to Boff, the hierarchy understands itself as the primary
seat of power from which the Church’s teaching authority is handed out to the laity who
is deprived of power. In this type of structure: “Unity is understood as conformity and
uniformity. Conflict or criticism is seen as something pathological, threatening division
and schism. The simplest solution is elimination of critical elements. Typical of every
power structure are the court proceedings against anything or anyone not wholly part of
the system.”152 This type of power structure tends to centralize all power to decide within
the community in one person similar to a totalitarian State.
2.

Authority as Charismatic.

The charismatic model of authority traces its roots to the Spirit given in baptism.
The word charism is derived from the Greek word charis-gift and is basically translated
as “spiritual gift” and is found mostly in the Pauline letters, especially in 1Cor where St.
Paul stresses a variety of gifts (charismata) and ministries (diakonia) within the Church.
Thus, the spiritual gifts and ministries are not opposed to each other but work as a whole
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for the good of the community. According to Raymond Brown, in 1 Cor 12 Paul used the
imagery of the body.
. . . as a theological basis for rejecting jealousies about charisms. All the parts or
members of the body are indispensable; and so there is no reason for the foot to be
jealous of the hand, nor the ear jealous of the eye. . . Similarly, there is no reason
for those who have one charism (apostles, prophets, teachers, workers of miracles,
healers, speakers in tongues) to desire another. It would not help if all were
apostles, if all were prophets, etc.; for the Church needs the diversity of
members.153
Leonardo Boff emphasizes the charismatic structure of the primitive community,
where all shared in the Spirit to develop a “laical” model of the Church. Boff argues that
the Church hierarchy has imitated the tendency of ruling classes to appropriate all power
for personal use instead of for the benefit of the community. This situation has led to “. . .
a gradual expropriation of the means of religious production from the Christian people by
the clergy. In the early years, the Christian people as a whole shared in the power of the
Church, in decisions, in the choosing of ministers; later they were simply consulted;
finally, in terms of power, they were totally marginalized, dispossessed of their
power.”154
Similarly, Elisabeth Fiorenza has traced the roots of the Church to the “Jesus
Movement” where the leadership roles of women were recognized to serve “as a renewal
movement within Judaism.”155 The “Jesus Movement” also led to “Liberation from
Patriarchal structures and the Discipleship of Equals.”156 Fiorenza then discusses the
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structure of “The Patriarchal Household of God and the Ekklesia of Women,”
emphasizing the various shifts that have taken place down through the ages that have led
to the shift from the charismatic and shared authority to that of authority invested in
particular authority figures.
The shift which took place in the second century was not a shift from charismatic
leadership to institutional consolidation, but from charismatic and communal
authority to an authority vested in local officers, who-in time-absorb not only the
teaching authority of the prophet and apostles but also the decision-making power
of the community. This shift is, at the same time, a shift from alternating
leadership accessible to all the baptized to patriarchal leadership restricted to male
heads of households. . .157
There is no doubt that such a development would stifle individual creativity and
jeopardize the contribution of the majority who are at the grassroots level of the
community.
3.

Authority as Pluralistic.

Avery Dulles is the major proponent of the pluralist model of authority. Dulles
advocates that any authentic authority could only teach what the whole Church believes;
hence he places major emphasis on the level of participation by the faithful believers and
upholds that the voices of “committed Christians should be given more weight than those
of indifferent or marginal Christians,” without neglecting, of course, the views of those
who show less commitment.158 Thus, Dulles describes three levels of participation that
are essential to the pluralist model. These essential levels of participation are the doctoral,
prophetic, and pastoral ministries.159 In the first place, the professional theologians or
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doctors have an authority that is based on their scholarship and competence which calls
them to offer critical perspectives that will promote the growth of the community.
Second, the prophetic voices in the Church are persons who help stir it in the right path of
truth. These voices should always be welcomed in the Christian community. Lastly, the
bishops are called to speak in their capacity as those appointed to the Church’s pastoral
office with the necessary graces to help them in the task of being shepherds of their flock.
Thus, one can see that the pluralist model attempts to strike a balance between the
institutional and the charismatic models. The pluralist model could help promote the
principle of subsidiarity by recognizing the different levels of competencies as intrinsic to
the process of decision making. In this way, the pluralist model gives each of the groups
mentioned above the opportunity to participate and contribute to the decision-making
process.
The major setback with the pluralist model of authority is that the various groups
of persons (doctoral, prophetic, and pastoral) who speak for the Church are still a select
group within the community, notwithstanding its expansion. Thus, subsidiarity
encourages that the voices of the majority of persons at the grassroots become an integral
part of the decision-making body since most of the decisions made by the doctoral,
prophetic, and pastoral groups to a large extent affect the larger Christian community.
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David Hollenbach has provided some critical perspectives for understanding the
principle of subsidiarity in the midst of different and differing rights claims among
diverse social groups.160 Hollenbach agrees that the classic formulation of subsidiarity
contained in QA79-80, justifies government intervention when it truly provides help to
persons and smaller communities which make up the society. However, smaller
communities such as the family, the neighborhood, professional labor groups, and
churches must be recognized as having a dynamic life of their own that needs to be
respected by government, since it is out of these that their claims are rooted and
structured. Accordingly, Hollenbach links the principle of subsidiarity to the claims made
by people arising from the concrete experience of group life. In so doing, he makes the
case for viewing society as comprised of two complementary strands: individuals that are
unrelated and persons who are related and active in different kinds of associations.
Hollenbach makes the case that the provision for government intervention protects both
the individual and the different associations to which one belongs.
The power of government to intervene is real. It should be exercised to the extent
necessary for the production of distributive and social justice. . . Both the scope
and limits of this intervention arise not only from the claims of individual persons
but also from the need to insure that multiple forms of human community are not
obliterated by the power of the State.161
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Furthermore, Hollenbach maintains that subsidiarity “. . . gives priority to the
claims of smaller groups and intermediate associations over and against the centralizing
tendencies of government.”162 But this is not done in an absolute manner. It leaves some
opening for government intervention when the common good is at stake. Thus,
Hollenbach insists that the principle “embodies a pluralist model of social interaction,”
that one hopes is capable of maintaining the social balance in community relationships.
This other face of the principle of subsidiarity emphasizes communal solidarity as
a counterbalance to the disintegrative effect of competing group claims. The
principle of subsidiarity, therefore, does not provide an apriori answer to the
question of rights conflict. It does not assign an absolute priority to the claims of
small or intermediate groups.163
The principle does leave open its concrete applications and implications to the
nature, needs, and claims of the particular social context, which would help determine
the proper action to be taken. In this way, one realizes that the principle appreciates the
need for concrete human experience to serve as the governing norm, and not some
abstract formulations.
The major difficulty addressed by Hollenbach concerns the issue of how the “. . .
pluralist and organicist aspects of the Catholic tradition’s model of society relates to
subsidiarity.”164 According to Hollenbach, both aspects were combined to provide the
possibility of a harmonious reconciliation of competing group claims under the paternal
guidance of the State. This led to the down playing of class conflict, despite appeals to
pluralism. Thus, the attempt to reconcile the “plural” and the “organic” reached its apex
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in the “corporatist” social order advocated by Pius XI in QA 80. In the words of
Hollenbach:
As a social theory, corporatism makes the supposition that the problem of conflict
will be solved by integrating the different kinds of communities and associations
(“corporations”) into an organically structured social system. In effect, social
conflict is to be eliminated by the creation of a functionally differentiated and
hierarchically stratified social organism. The whole system is to be held together
by the coordinating authority of the State. Such coordination is the help (the
“subsidium”) provided by government to the lower communities.165
In so doing, Hollenbach maintained that the “corporatist” model made a major
mistake when the problem of conflict was sublimated rather than resolved.
The theory aimed at the maximum recognition of the rights claims of individuals
and of communities such as families, occupational groups and neighborhoods. It
also aimed at the organic harmony of society as a whole. The price paid for the
denial of conflict between the claims of groups was the legitimating of unequal
access to public grounds and unequal participation in the shaping of public
institutions. It produced a legitimating of inequality in the sphere of instrumental
rights. Institutional inequality was demanded because the relation between the
plural groups in society was thought of as static. Organic harmony was identified
with keeping each group in its assigned place within the whole.166
This is a major challenge that any healthy understanding of the principle needs to
address properly: how to balance the need for pluralism with the need for communal
solidarity in society as a whole? Leo XIII provided the fundamental basis for maintaining
the balance between pluralism and communal solidarity by appealing to the power of
governmental authority to pay attention to the proper claims of the poor, working classes
and organized groups of laborers, by guaranteeing “. . . that these social groups had
access to sufficient power to make the claims of their human dignity both known and
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effective.”167 Pius XI further emphasized this through appeal to social justice which has
become a major contribution shaping communities and groups as one would discover in
chapter three of this study. John XXIII affirmed that the achievement of equality in the
concrete life of society was a major development of the “social question.” The Second
Vatican Council in GS took up the issue of equality especially among institutions as
central and fundamental when it stated that “. . . with respect to the fundamental rights of
the person, every type of discrimination, whether based on sex, race, color, social
condition, language, or religion, is to be eradicated as contrary to God’s intent.”168
Hollenbach has provided the context for balancing the reality between the
pluralism of group life with the concern for communal solidarity of society. According to
him, this reality could be achieved in the midst of social conflict. This is because “. . . the
balance between pluralism and community is not static but dynamic. It is not organic but
conflictual.”169 This is the vantage position from which Hollenbach advocates a positive
implementation of the claims to human rights in society.
The process of integration of group life does not occur by eliminating either
pluralism or conflict. It is rather by recognizing both the positive and negative
impacts of these political institutions on the plural groups of society that norms
for their organization must be developed. When the “discontinuities of group life”
become so great that some groups are denied access to or participation in the
economic and political life of the whole community injustice is being done and
human rights are being violated. Conversely the same can be said when power is
so distributed that one or another privileged group is able to manipulate large
economic and political institutions at will. Each of these situations indicates a
breakdown of the political order itself.170
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Furthermore, Hollenbach advocates “political responsibility” and “political
solidarity” as ways of dealing with the conflict between pluralism and communal
solidarity. Political responsibility “. . . is a kind of loyalty to the whole which does not
eliminate pluralism or group conflict… Rather, political responsibility moderates the
disintegrative effects of a group pluralism which is left unchecked by the notion of
citizenship. Political responsibility is due to persons and groups by right.”171
Political solidarity is:
a form of social organization which demands participation in and loyalty to the
life of society as a whole. It is a form of solidarity which reaches beyond family
or vocational group or class. At the same time, it is political rather than organic,
for it recognizes that genuine participation of all persons and groups in the
common good does not occur in a non-conflictual way. Those competing claims
of persons and groups which further greater equality of access to and participation
in the common life of society give concrete content to the notion of political
solidarity.172
From this analysis of the developing social model to address the issues of
pluralism and communal solidarity, one can understand how the questions of human
rights claims have taken center stage. The role of subsidiarity in formulating a human
rights policy cannot be overemphasized: “. . . the principle of subsidiarity points out that
persons are members of many different kinds of communities. They thus have rightful
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claims to both freedom and participation in as many different social spheres or
sectors.”173
Another significant contribution offered by Hollenbach on how the question of
rights claims could be addressed that relates to subsidiarity, social and distributive justice
and organizational structures in community is the relevance of “strategic morality.” It is a
form of social analysis “. . . formulated from analysis of the kinds of social activity which
will lead to the protection of the rightful claims of all persons under present social
conditions. It is morality because it represents a way of responding to the genuine claims
of human dignity.”174 The need for “strategic morality” is to help specify the extent to
which “institutional processes and instrumental rights,” could be ordered toward the
economic and political arena to bring about the protection of human rights. Thus,
“strategic morality,” understood as “. . . a synthesis of historical interpretation and basic
value commitments,”175 is necessary in every historical social context that seeks to
uphold the protection of human rights.
Another critical interpretation took place when Michel Novak176 followed in the
direction provided by John Paul II in emphasizing the “creative subjectivity of the
citizen.” Some of the virtues outlined by Novak are worthy of note since they promote
the dignity of the person in participation with others to bring about a new social order.
Hence, the virtues of personal “initiative, enterprise, social cooperation, public

173

Ibid., p. 177.
Ibid., p. 188.
175
Ibid., p. 189.
176
Michael Novak, The Catholic Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (New York: The Free Press, 1993), pp.
221-237; cf. John Paul II, SRS Par. 15, p. 403; CA Par. 42- 43, pp. 471-472.
174

130
spiritedness and civic responsibility,” among others are at the heart of subsidiarity
because they deal with the relationships that exist between persons in society at different
levels and how these interrelationships could help fashion the common good of all the
members. Recently, Michael Mukasa177 followed the direction provided by Novak to put
forward the theoretical and practical frameworks for the application of the principles of
democratic capitalism in a given African social context in Uganda.

2.6.1. Implications for Subsidiarity
The implications for subsidiarity are six fold. First, one realizes that economic and
political institutions affect the social order and consequently human relationships in the
process. Hence, one needs to examine how large social institutions shape to a larger or
lesser degree the actual relationships between persons in community. Thus, the content of
“institutional processes and instrumental rights” should not be determined in the abstract
but one needs to pay attention to claims made by intermediate associations, cultural
issues, family values, and religious groups, social and historical conditions.
Second, the question of the social rights of the community and the individual
claims in the face of a dominating institution need to be addressed within the context of
the protection of human rights. The extent to which personal rights and social rights may
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conflict deserves some attention that is both meaningful and respectful of human dignity.
This issue is particularly a difficult one in the developing countries where economic and
political arrangements are very fluid. Thus, the need to shape both individual action and
institutional structures by advocating policy positions that will respect and guarantee
human dignity is essential to promote healthy social interaction.
Third, the level of marginalized existence experienced by different groups in
society needs to be addressed since it jeopardizes the individual creativity of the human
person, which is at the heart of human dignity. The 1977 pastoral statement of the
National Conference of Brazilian Bishops on the “Christian Requirements of a Political
Order” capture the major elements experienced by a marginalized group of people
particularly in the developing nations:
To be marginalized . . . is to receive an unjust salary. It is to be deprived of
education, medical attention, and credit; it is to be hungry and live in sordid huts;
it is to be deprived of land by inadequate, unjust agrarian structures.
To be marginalized is above all, not to be able to free oneself from these
situations. To be marginalized is not to be able to take part freely in the process of
creativity which forges the original culture of a people. To be marginalized is not
to have effective representation to make known one’s needs and aspirations in
decision-making centers; it is to be seen not as a subject of rights but as an object
of favors granted in the measure necessary to reduce the militancy of the common
people; it is to be manipulated by propaganda.
To be marginalized is not to have a chance to participate. It is to be deprived of
the recognition of the dignity which God has conferred upon man.178
Archbishop Renato Martino appears to have taken up the challenge in a
presentation of the Vatican position at the World Summit on Sustainable Development
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with great appeal for the application of the principle of subsidiarity to help protect the
poor in society and to promote good governance.
In keeping with the principle of subsidiarity, the poor must be heard on issues and
be at the center of local, national and international programs for sustainable
development. Persons living in poverty must be considered as participating
subjects. Individuals and peoples cannot become tools but must be the
protagonists of their future, able to be the “agents of their own development” and
“in their specific economic and political circumstances, to exercise the creativity
which is characteristic of the human person and on which the wealth of nations
too is dependent.
Mindful of the principle of subsidiarity, good governance is one of the
prerequisites in the fight against poverty. It is in service of the common good. For
good governance to be successful there must be new partnerships that promote
investment in people and in infrastructures and that will facilitate participation of
citizens in decisions that affect their lives. Valued in this context is the democratic
system inasmuch as it strives to ensure the possibility of participation of citizens
in making political choices and having a voice in governing.179
The fourth implication for subsidiarity is that a “strategic morality” in a given
social context should be based on “. . . the three areas of need, freedom and
relationship,”180 that have led Hollenbach to propose three priority principles, which one
considers are indispensable in any social arrangement of persons in community and
which should provide the guidance needed toward a strategic morality that will stand the
test of time. The principles are:
1.
2.
3.
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Fifth, the creativity of the human person should be given priority at all times and
in all places insofar as it promotes the dignity of the person in community and the
common good of society. This would involve, among other things, that personal rights
and liberty are guaranteed, and that social justice and civil society are given allowance to
thrive. Here, the “. . . tripartite system: the political, economic and the moral-cultural,”
set forth by John Paul II in CA 42 provides the key to healthy governance and
subsidiarity to operate, realizing that it is necessary to maintain the balance of power in
any social system.
These principles are central to subsidiarity because they emphasize the priority of
human persons in social relationships who are in need of help to self-help rather than
being taken over in interpersonal and group relationships. As Hollenbach puts it, “. . . a
choice must be made between protecting privilege and guaranteeing minimum standards
of living for all.”182 Moreover, Hollenbach clearly addressed the key components of the
principle of subsidiarity when he affirmed on the one hand that forming interpersonal
relationships is necessary to sustain a sense of community and promote fraternity.
Some of these relationships are highly personal and built on friendship, shared
belief, and love, such as the family and the Church. Others are functional and goal
oriented, such as professional and occupational groups. Still others, such as racial,
ethnic and cultural groups, are the result of circumstances of birth. Participation in
groups and relationships such as these is an essential condition for the
preservation of personal agency as the principle of subsidiarity suggests.183
On the other hand, Hollenbach maintains that while respecting the importance of
group life as indicated by subsidiarity, it is pertinent to realize that membership in some
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groups carries great social disadvantages, while membership in others brings
“disproportional” advantage:
Economic elites who control large corporations, and the intellectual elites who
have major influence on the formation of policy, derive a kind of effective agency
from their group memberships which is denied to persons excluded from these
groups because of their race, educational level, cultural background, religion or
nationality.184
McCormick, while articulating his ten-point vision for “Moral theology in the
year 2000,” maintained among other things that the principle of subsidiarity should be
appropriately implemented rather than the over-centralization currently in operation,
especially in the case of the roles of the individual person in society and that of national
Episcopal conferences of bishops in dealing with local ecclesial issues. More specifically,
McCormick opined that when it came to decision-making concerning particular
circumstances, those more familiar with the local context should be given the benefit of
doubt to apply the principle.
Applications of moral principle demand expertise and knowledge of
circumstances, therefore they should be entrusted above all to those who have
such knowledge and expertise. When a higher authority (whether it be the
Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, a local bishop, a pastor) attempts to
assume this role, we have a violation of subsidiarity. One of the results of this is
that the Church is deprived of the richness of experience and thought some of its
members can contribute. Another is the promotion of a kind of moral infantilism
or dependency.185
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Thus, McCormick noted that, in allowing the subsidiarity principle to operate, the
Second Vatican Council particularly sought to bring about “the toppling of the pyramidal
notion of the Church wherein truth descends uniquely from above in a kind of mysterious
paternalistic flow.”186 In so doing, lay people will be given more opportunities to
participate in the Church in view of the different competencies they posses.
Sixth, there is the need for some urgent Canonical changes187 in the Church in
view of a better appreciation of the role of subsidiarity to address issues of global
diversity and specific needs of some local Churches especially in the developing world.
Thus, the application of subsidiarity would necessarily begin with the recognition of the
legitimate autonomy of local Church leaders to govern themselves with the necessary
powers to formulate governing principles that are relevant to their social contexts without
being grand-fathered from the Vatican. Among other things, issues like the universal
retirement age for the clergy world wide with the great disparity in health care systems
between the developed and developing countries would have to be addressed.
Suppose every country were to fix retirement age of their clergy and religious to meet the
retirement requirements of their particular country; the lack of retirement benefits for
most people who work for the Church in developing countries is another major area of
concern where the principle of subsidiarity might help address the near death situation
people have to face after so many years of service to the Church. Another issue might be
how the Church is structured to meet the needs of the extended family system which has
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several layers of dependents at every stage in an egalitarian and community based fashion
which more often challenges the individualized Western family model and consequently
Church structures.
This study proposes to address in chapter four the Nigerian pluralistic and
conflicted world view in the light of the major proposals that have been offered by
Hollenbach, McCormick, and one’s social analysis of the Nigerian context, realizing that
the concrete applications of these principles must be done by persons who are inserted in
the historical experience of the community one wishes to study. In so doing, the principle
of “strategic morality” is concretized and localized between persons in a given social
context.
In summary, one can highlight the goals of subsidiarity as a basic norm for the
proper ordering of civil society both from some of the issues addressed by scholars like
Nell-Breuning, Walgrave, Hollenbach, and from the important overview presented by
Joseph Komonchak.188

2.6.2. General Goals of Subsidiarity
The principle of subsidiarity could be described as consisting of the following
goals.
1.

The priority of the human person as the origin and purpose of society:

civitas propter cives, non cives propter civitatem is at the heart of subsidiarity.
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2.

The human person is not a solitary individual but one that is social by

nature, only able to achieve self-realization in and through social relationships between
persons in community-what is sometimes called the “principle of solidarity.”
3.

Thus, social relationships and communities exist to provide help, support

and aid (subsidium) to individuals in their free but obligatory assumption of
responsibility for their self-realization. This “subsidiary” function of society is not a
matter, except in exceptional circumstances, of substituting or supplying for individual
self-responsibility, but of providing the sets of conditions necessary for personal selfrealization.
4.

The larger, “higher,” communities exist to perform the same subsidiary

roles toward smaller, “lower,” associations and communities.
5.

The principle of subsidiarity requires positively that all communities not

only permit but enable and encourage individuals to exercise their own selfresponsibility, and that larger communities do the same for smaller ones.
6.

The principle of subsidiarity requires negatively that communities not

deprive individuals and smaller communities of their right to exercise their selfresponsibility. Hence, intervention is only appropriate as “helping people to help
themselves.”
7.

The subsidiarity principle, therefore, serves as the means by which to

regulate competencies between individuals and communities, and between smaller and
larger communities.
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8.

The principle is a formal one, needing determination in virtue of the nature

of a community and of particular circumstances.
9.

Since subsidiarity is grounded in the metaphysics of the person, it applies

to the life of every society and has universal relevance and applicability.
10.

The principle promotes the balance between pluralism and communal

solidarity without sacrificing political responsibility, political solidarity, and strategic
morality in the process.
11.

Subsidiarity recognizes that conflict in society is real, especially class

conflict. Hence, it supports the thesis that much attention be given to claims in conflict
arising from the dignity and rights of the human person.
12.

Subsidiarity, Solidarity, and Social justice are integral to the development

and formulation of policy toward promoting civil society.
13.

Subsidiarity supports the thesis that society exists for the person and not

the person for the society.
In conclusion, this chapter has traced the formal formulation, definition,
development, application, interpretation and goals of the principle of subsidiarity in
selected papal social encyclicals. The study reveals that the articulation of subsidiarity
provided by Pius XI in QA has universal significance in every social arrangement of
persons in community. This is because subsidiarity emphasizes the priority of the person
in communion with others to bring about the bonum commune. Thus, the vision of the
common good sees in the human person the personal dignity proper to one’s nature but
directed essentially to others in the society. Hence, the common good and the good of the
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individual do not oppose one another, but the good of the individual whose nature is
personal has a dignity proper to itself, but nonetheless is social in character, that is, it is
directed to the well-being of others. Hence, the common good is realized through the
participation and contribution of the individual to others in society. In this way, the
relationship between the individual to the social group remains a question for everybody
in a given social context.
Chapter three will address the issue of social justice in the Christian tradition as a
regulating principle in the socio-economic life of society both from the perspectives of
some social encyclicals, other relevant texts and how it is related to subsidiarity in
providing the ground for building a prosperous and humane civil society.

CHAPTER THREE
The Concept of Social Justice:
A Regulating Principle in the Society

Introduction
This chapter will study the concept of social justice as a regulating principle of
society from a theological perspective. The study will no doubt rely to some extent on the
philosophical, political, social, economic, cultural, moral and religious influences that
have shaped and continue to help determine the major shifts and emphases of the
question of social justice. We will first broadly examine the biblical meaning of social
justice from both the Old Testament and New Testament perspectives without engaging
in the minute details of literary criticism. In this way, we will lay the theological
foundation for discussing the theme of social justice.
Next, the study will specifically focus on the understanding of social justice as an
integral part of the virtue of justice, drawing from the useful insights of St. Thomas
Aquinas. This inquiry will involve, among other things, tracing the context in which the
term social justice was formally introduced in the papal social document of Pius XI
entitled Quadragesimo Anno.
The relationship between social justice and society will then take center stage.
Here one is concerned with the regulating role that social justice plays in society by
incorporating the practices of subsidiarity and solidarity to promote peace among social
groups and to help build a responsive civil society. In so doing, the religious, social,
political, economic, and humanitarian reasons for the Church’s involvement in socioeconomic issues are discussed.
140
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Finally, we will examine the relationship between social justice and the common
good. The aim here is to envision the social context for promoting social justice in a
multiethnic and pluralistic society and to set forth the essential issues that might form the
agenda for building community through healthy participation of persons who imbibe the
virtue of altruism as a necessary component of social justice which is the essential key to
the common good.
The study is guided by the central thesis of this dissertation: Ever acting out of
social charity, how can one structure interlocking groups in society, so as to engage in
social and moral reconstruction, with a view to maximize liberty and still pursue a
common good ordered toward the achievement of social justice?

3.1.

The Biblical Meaning of Social Justice1
According to Donahue, “The centrality as well as the richness of the biblical

statements on justice is the very reason why it is difficult to give a ‘biblical definition’ of
justice which, in the Bible, is a protean and many-faceted term.”2 Thus, our task is to
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trace the multi-dimensional aspects of social justice which revolve around the history and
practices of the Israelites. Biblical justice has been described in the following way:
. . . The biblical idea of justice can be described as fidelity to the demands of a
relationship. In contrast to modern individualism the Israelite is in a world where
“to live” is to be united with others in a social context either by bonds of family or
by covenant relationships. This web of relationships - king with people, judge
with complainants, family with tribe and kinfolk, the community with the resident
alien and suffering in their midst and all with the covenant God constitutes the
world in which life is played out.3
The biblical notion of social justice as fidelity to the demands of a relationship challenges
one to engage in some form of concrete manifestation of this relationship. Thus, one will
attempt to highlight some of the concrete ways through which the different relationships
that existed within the Israelite community might have informed and formed their
understanding of social justice. There are, then, two tasks central to the elaboration of this
biblical view of social justice: (1.) to describe some of the Old Testament practices that
convey the meaning of social justice and the transgression of it; (2.) to describe the New
Testament teaching of Jesus on the practice of social justice. In this way one hopes to
show that:
. . . the contemporary realization that faith must be involved in the quest for and
expression of justice, far from being foreign to biblical thought, recovers a core of
the biblical heritage which, when neglected, brings the danger of reducing this
heritage to a manual of personal piety.4
Thus, the first major element one hopes to identify is the various ways through which the
faith of Israel found concrete expressions and how these practices inspire and challenge
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the practice of social justice today.

3.1.1. The Old Testament Teaching on Social Justice
In the book of Genesis one discovers three key revelatory moments that shed
some light on the notion of social justice. The first moment of revelation is contained in
Gen 1:1ff. where the seven-day creation story conveys the true reality of how God
created the world with the underlying theological intent at every stage of the process. The
theological affirmation is to provide pertinent insights about God’s relationship with
humanity and the created world. In so doing, one is able to re-echo the Divine intent:
“God looked at everything He had made, and He found it very good,” (Gen. 1:31). Thus,
the fundamental substance of creation, the plants, animals, earth, water, light, and most of
all, humankind are basically good in themselves.
The theological affirmation of the goodness of God’s creation may not seem to be
very obvious to some persons today. Kammer puts it succinctly:
. . . Many of our cultural messages and even our religious attitudes, however, are
diametrically opposed to the Genesis view that God looked upon the completed
creation and found it “very good” (Gen 1:31). This opposition can be found in
philosophical traditions dominated by a body/spirit dualism or religious traditions
that disdain feelings and emotions . . . society’s persistent quest for new means
and measures of self-esteem betrays its profound doubt in even the fundamental
worth of human persons; and too much economic development occurs with rank
disregard for the basic value of the natural universe around us.5
Thus, one would argue that the need to affirm the fundamental goodness of God’s
creation and the ability to appreciate this creation is at the heart of how one conceives the
notion of social justice that has been passed forward. Similarly, Bergant and Stuhlmueller
5
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are of the view that “. . . creation in biblical thought cannot be separated from Israel’s
unique appreciation of God and particularly of God’s action as savior in their midst.”6
The view of the goodness of God’s creation is largely responsible today for the concept
and practice of creation spirituality.7 However, one is aware of the theological difficulty
of theodicy8 in affirming the goodness of creation in the face of innocent suffering of
God’s faithful people (1 Mac 1:37-39). But this is an issue that will be taken up in the
discussion on wisdom literature and social justice.
The second revelatory affirmation is contained in Gen 2-4. This second creation
story begins with God empowering human beings with the responsibility to nurture God’s
creation in Gen 2:15. Kammer maintains that human beings were given dominion over
the other created things but not domination or exploitation. Thus, persons are invited to
be cocreators with God in caring for and giving life to the earth. Hence to destroy the
resources of the earth without being conscious of its life-giving force is to engage in
domination. In acknowledging the creation of men and women in the image and likeness
of God one discovers an important truth that
. . . explains not only the human relationship with God but also their relationship
with the animals and the Lord. They are representatives of, but not identical with,
the true sovereign, women and men must act as regents of the true ruler, not as
absolute rulers in their own right.9
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Thus, to have dominion over the earth is an act of justice for the earth. It shows
responsibility toward the earth. But to engage in domination over the earth is an act of
injustice which neglects its responsibility for the goodness of the earth’s resources. Thus,
a major challenge with this revelatory affirmation is how to understand the nature of
human stewardship of creation. Today, the language of “dominion over the earth” may be
perceived in some quarters, e.g., ecological groups, as pointing more toward the control
and exploitation of nature than to social justice. But one hopes that the sense in which
one has explained the meaning of the biblical text from Genesis provides room for a more
holistic understanding and appreciation of the difficulty of biblical interpretation.
The third revelatory insight is contained in this covenant affirmation “I will be
your God and you will be my people,” (Lev 26:12). Here one encounters the abiding
relationship between Yahweh and Israel to form a covenant community of persons with
shared values and common destiny. The bonding between Yahweh and Israel images the
bonding between God and human beings and persons among themselves who are called
to participate in a web of relationships in community.
The three revelations briefly described here help convey the meaning of reverence
for the goodness of God’s creation, the understanding of healthy stewardship toward the
earth and the need to build human communities that are in the image and likeness of God.
Thus, one can summarize the major issues contained in the book of Genesis that have to
do with faith and social justice in this way:
. . . Men and women are God’s representatives and conversation partners in the
world, with a fundamental dignity that must be respected and fostered. They are
to exist in interdependence and mutual support and are to care for the world with
respect, as for a gift received from God. Yet the human condition is flawed by a
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drive to overstep the limits of the human situation and to claim autonomous
power. The result of this is violence (Cain and Abel) and idolatry (the Tower of
Babel). The Genesis narrative functions both as a normative description of the
human condition before God and a critical principle against any power that
distorts or usurps the dignity of humanity or God’s claim over men and women.10
These revelations help one to understand another important dimension of Israel’s life
where the issues of social justice take center stage in the Old Testament, namely, the
question of the jubilee year.

3.1.2. The Jubilee Year and Social Justice
According to Faley the jubilee derives its name from the trumpet (yobel in
Hebrew which refers to the “ram’s horn”) sounded to mark the beginning of the grand
sabbatical year. “The year was to begin on the Day of Atonement (the tenth day of Tishri)
and was a period of emancipation (deror) in which, in addition to the usual sabbatical
observance, all alienated property was returned to its original owner.”11 Thus, the central
tenets of the jubilee year are related to the practice of justice in the community especially
to help support the most vulnerable.
The understanding that there is the need to share the resources of the earth with all
the members of the community is a recurring theme which underlies the communal and
social aspects of justice in the Old Testament. The following Old Testament phrases (year
of the Lord, the sabbatical year, and the jubilee year) connote the reality of the interplay
between the goodness of God’s creation and human responsibility toward the same
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creation. In Lev 25 one finds a vivid description of the major elements of the jubilee
year:
1.

Restoration: the jubilee shall be a period when the people are restored

fully to the community and engage in right order: a community of faith and fidelity,
sharing the goods of the earth, with God dwelling in their midst. The restoration was not
hampered by class distinctions in the community, but the sharing of the earth’s resources
was promoted. Property was to be returned to its original owners, and freedom given to
slaves. Thus, the dignity of persons was restored to the community and their participation
and integration encouraged (Lev. 25:6-7).
2.

Liberty: the jubilee year shall be a period of freedom for all the inhabitants

and “the land shall not be sold in perpetuity,” for the land belongs to God. There shall be
equitable distribution of land and its resources among the members realizing that they are
all tenants of the Lord (Lev. 25:10-11, 44-46).
3.

Respect for the poor: the jubilee year shall be a special time for making

the poor feel they are part of the community by supporting them to help take care of their
families. The poor are to be recognized as hired workers and not as slaves (Lev. 25:1317, 23-28, 35-43).
4.

Solidarity: the members of the community were continually encouraged to

be their brothers and sisters’ keepers. They were to respect each other and to support the
web of relationships through which they were bonded together (Lev. 25:47ff.).
Thus, the understanding of the jubilee year has led Kammer to compare its central
practice with what is present today in modern times in this way:
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Even in our modern laws, then, there seems to survive a kind of jubilee year and
its underpinning rationale, that the goods of the earth are meant for everybody,
and that we are one human community. If people are brought so low that they
cannot get up, the community helps them on their feet again and lets them start
life over.12
We notice then, how the practices of the jubilee year support our understanding of
Biblical justice. In addition, the help provided by the community to the most vulnerable
members to find their feet in the community was a clear indication of their attempt to
give each member their due and of engaging in social justice as a means of promoting the
common good. The next notion that is closely tied to faith and social justice is that of
liberation which we will discuss in the book of Exodus.

3.1.3. The Book of Exodus on Social Justice13
The Exodus describes the story of how Yahweh led the people of Israel out of
slavery in Egypt. This event has become one of the more forceful themes of liberation in
today’s biblical history. Most people in dehumanizing situations find here a biblical story
of hope they can identify with, and look forward to ultimate liberation from God as they
pursue different avenues that might alleviate their inhuman condition. Thus, from the
onset, it is pertinent to heed the advice provided by Donahue as one attempts to examine
the exodus event in relation to social justice.
The Exodus from Egypt (Exodus 1:1-15:21) has emerged as one of the most
dominant biblical events for a biblical theology of liberation from evil and unjust
social structures. There are two dangers here: the first, that a too generalized
12
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statement of its meaning absolves people from close attention to the rich
theological dimensions of the text; the second that the exodus is considered in
isolation from other biblical themes. While liberation from oppression is a
fundamental aspect of the exodus narrative, it is not simply freedom from that is
important, but freedom for the formation of a community that lives under the
covenant.14
Having made the above comment, one will proceed to examine some of the central
themes in the exodus event that are relevant toward the building of a community that is
able to support the fundamental elements of social justice and peace. These elements
surround the understanding that provides one with some possible clues to trace some
paradigm of liberation in Exodus.
According to Fretheim, one needs to guard against three perspectives which
appear to present the liberation of Israel from Egypt as “explicitly political.”15 First, it is
controversial to insinuate that the people of Israel might have engaged in some form of
military or violent revolution to help secure their release from Egypt. Israel’s release
should be seen as an act of God. Even in instances where it does appear that some form
of violent encounter ensued (Ex. 2:11; 5:1-3), it was the divine activity that was in
operation. Hence, the true paradigm lies in God’s activity to intervene and save the
Israelites.
Second, the salvific act that happened during the exodus ought not to be described
in overly political tones. Rather, one should see in the exodus event some clear indication
of a universal salvation that is all-embracing: “The historical redemption is real and
constitutive in character because it participates in a cosmic victory. To interpret salvation

14
15

See Donahue, What Does the Lord Require? p. 18.
See Fretheim, p. 18

150
in sociopolitical terms only or primarily scales down the import and effect of what
happens at the Red Sea (Ex. 15:1-21).”16
Third, the liberation from Egypt is to be seen as the movement from freedom to
responsibility for and by the people who formed the community of Israel. It involved the
refusal to serve Pharaoh as a god and the turn to the service of Yahweh. This is because
“Exodus would claim that true freedom is found only in the service of Yahweh.”17
Gowan supports the position of Fretheim here when he maintains that the central theme
which ensues from the encounter between Pharaoh and Yahweh leading up to the release
of the Israelites from slavery in Egypt is the issue of sovereignty.18 Thus, from these three
perspectives Fretheim offers an understanding of the exodus event, which is holistic in
approach that one wishes to adopt here.
God’s salvific activity is directed not just toward internal change but toward
societal change, the external conditions of life. Salvation is thus conceived in
holistic terms as the work of God affecting change in all aspects of life: religious
and political, social and individual. Perhaps above all, the exodus is seen to be a
sign of hope that poverty and oppression are not the last word, for God is at work
on behalf of a different future.19
The exodus event is rightly understood as embracing both the liberative and salvific
aspects as two sides of the same coin. Gutierrez has interpreted the exodus event from
these perspectives and asserts that they form the basis for the justice of Yahweh:
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The Exodus is the long march towards the Promised Land in which Israel can
establish a society free from misery and alienation. Throughout the whole
process, the religious event is not set apart. It is placed in the context of the entire
narrative, or more precisely, it is its deepest meaning. It is the root of the
situation. In the last instance, it is in this event that the dislocation introduced by
sin is resolved and justice and injustice, oppression and liberation, are
determined.20
In this way, Gutierrez was able to affirm an important biblical thrust that is central to the
exodus narrative on social justice, namely that “The Covenant gives full meaning to the
liberation from Egypt; one makes no sense without the other . . .”21 Thus, the justice of
the exodus event lies in recognizing that the political and religious life-giving are
intertwined. This divine activity provides the paradigm for which subsequent acts of
injustice might find some consideration.
In fact, Donahue22 asserts that there are two essential elements which have
emerged from Israel’s covenant experience with Yahweh that relate to issues of justice:
first, the covenant manifests how the people of Israel become aware of God’s law and
justice; second, the covenant binds together persons in community who place their trust
in Yahweh and at the same time support each other in the practice of worship and social
life. The unifying force for the covenant relationship between Israel and Yahweh lies
precisely in Yahweh’s unbreakable fidelity to the covenant promise even when Israel
deviates from this pact. Perhaps, some consideration of the role of some Prophets in
Israel and how they continually challenged the people to be faithful to the covenant
promises by promoting social justice in the community would be helpful.
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3.1.4. The Prophets and the Call for Social Justice
According to Anderson:23
The English word “Prophet” comes to us from the Greek word prophetes, which
literally means one who speaks for another, especially for a deity. The
corresponding Hebrew term is nabi, which is apparently related to the Akkadian
verb nabu, meaning “to call, to announce, to name.”
There is some uncertainty, however, as to whether the Hebrew form has an active
meaning (“one who calls, an announcer”) or a passive meaning (“one who is
called”). In the former case, the emphasis would be on the role of a prophet to
proclaim a message; in the latter, the stress would be on the prophet’s vocation to
be a messenger in the service of the deity.24
Anderson maintains that both views are necessary for understanding Israelite prophecy.
Thus, the prophet was seen as “. . . one who communicates the divine will . . . an
intermediary, a spokesperson, one who acts and speaks on behalf of another.”25 The
prophetic vocation in Israel embraced various concerns from cultic practices to socioethical living. The social message of the prophets has provided a key emphasis to the role
of an Israelite prophet which Bruce Vawter has described as the “conscience of Israel.”26
Thus, the prophet provided the conscience for the people of Israel in those matters where
such conscience was most needed. According to Vawter one major area that the prophets
served as the conscience of Israel was their concern for “Yahweh’s poor (anawim):”
. . . the socially oppressed whose redress could only come from Yahweh, and
who, therefore, became virtually synonymous with the just, the faithful remnant,
23
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with the right to call upon the Lord. In this theme, too, prophetic teaching
maintained its accustomed balance. . . The poor man was not just because he was
poor, but the existential fact could not be ignored that poverty and injustice were
frequent companions. It was the evil of other men that had created this situation,
and the whole of prophetic effort was directed against the evil.27
Thus, Donahue is able to offer two important distinctions on poverty. First,
etymologically speaking, poverty has not stood entirely alone as a human value but is
rather an evil. Second, there is the need for a proper use of the term “spiritually poor.”
The term denotes those who are materially deprived and still open to God’s generous
love. Hence, Donahue rejects some contemporary understanding of “spiritual poverty” as
embracing “. . . extremely wealthy people who are unhappy even amid prosperity. . .”28
or those who are indifferent to riches amid wealth as not being faithful to the biblical
tradition. While it is important to understand any given biblical text by looking at its
literary context and Sitz im Leben, this is not one’s goal here. There are excellent
commentaries where the literary and historical contexts of prophetic texts have been
critically discussed.29
The goal here is to examine some of the prophetic messages in particular social
contexts in order to identify some of their social concerns. In general, one could say that
neglect of the Mosaic provisions for assistance to the poor, as well as disobedience to the
law of Moses and the prohibitions against exploiting the misfortunes of the poor were
strongly and unequivocally denounced by the prophets. The Prophet Isaiah pronounced a
27
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series of woes on the legislators for their infamous laws, on those who issued tyrannical
decrees, who denied justice to the unfortunate and cheated the poor, who made widows
their prey and snubbed the orphan (Isaiah 10:21).
The Prophet Jeremiah showed disgust for the unjust practices against the people
and demanded reform from the leaders (Jeremiah 7:5-7). Similarly, Micah carried out a
mission focused on justice in the Southern Kingdom of Israel. Micah denounced the
princes of the House of Israel for the evils against the poor and oppressed of their
community (Micah 3:1-2). But above all, it is the prophet Amos who has been regarded
as the prophet of social justice and so one will devote some time to examine Amos’ role
in the prophetic tradition.
The social and political context of Amos’ mission is located within the prosperous
rule of Jeroboam in Israel (786-746) and King Uzziah who provided able leadership for
Judah for forty years (783-742).30 During this era, Israel experienced prosperous growth
and expansion, good business and a vigorous economy (Amos 8:5); farmers raised sheep
and cattle (Amos 6:4-6); planted vineyards (Amos 5:11); and erected new homes with
lavish decorations in ivory (Amos 6:4-6). But while this lasted, the rich felt a sense of
complete security with the resulting complacency and moral decay, particularly, the
neglect of the poor who had not an adequate share in the prosperity. Thus, Amos arose
from this social situation to challenge the exploitation, injustice and neglect of the poor.
The message of Amos could be summarized as embracing four sections: God’s
punishment is coming upon the nations (Amos 1:3); the people have abandoned justice

30

Eugene H. Maly, Prophets of Salvation (New York: Herder and Header, 1967), p.75ff note that a major
part of the ideas expressed here are taken from this work.

155
(Amos 5:12); their religion is hypocrisy (Amos 8:5-6); and consequently, the people
should repent (Amos 5:14). There are some utterances and outbursts of Amos against
Israel which reveal the moral and ethical corruption that existed among the different
levels of society. Amos upheld that the rich degraded the poor and the helpless, and sold
the debtors into slavery though they owed nothing more than the price of a pair of sandals
(Amos 2:6-7).
Furthermore, Amos delivered prophetic condemnations against the court system
that discriminated against the powerless. The magistrates of Israel and Judah were
denounced for taking advantage of the vulnerable poor (Amos 5:7-13). Another group of
people who earned Amos’ wrath were the merchants because they abandoned honesty
and cheated their customers (Amos 8:4). In Amos 8:5ff. the prophet analyzed how the
corrupt merchants harbor in their hearts evil thoughts and plot to defraud their customers.
The flamboyant rich women of Israel did not escape Amos’ harsh and scathing words
because they engaged in an irresponsible lavish lifestyle which contributed toward the
suffering of the poor (Amos 4:1). The leadership in Jerusalem and Samaria also earned
Amos’ ire for their notoriety in ease and arrogant pride (Amos 6:1).
From the above overview, what was evident in Amos’ prophetic mission was the
concern for social justice. The cry for fair treatment of the poor and the powerless was
the central focus of the sermons he preached. Amos directed his denunciations against
real human beings, such as, kings, judges, merchants, highly placed women, and the
leadership of Israel in both the Northern and Southern capitals of Israel. In the next
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section, one will look at the contribution of wisdom literature to the issue of social
justice.

3.1.5. Wisdom Literature and Social Justice
There are five main books in the Bible that are usually classified as “wisdom
literature”: Job, Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, Sirach and Wisdom. Additionally, other books
like Tob 4:3-21; 12:6-13, and the poem in Bar 3:9-4:4 are also included in the list.31 It is
beyond the scope of this project to discuss any of the above-mentioned books in detail.
The task of this dissertation is to offer some of the central elements of wisdom literature
that throw some light on the concept of social justice.
In general, wisdom – hokmah (Hebrew); Sophia (Greek); Sapientia (Latin) - deals
with issues around life and living. The term is used to cover a wide range of issues like
the talent displayed by an artisan (Ex. 36:8), royal judgment (1Kgs 3:28), a clever attitude
(Prov 30: 24-28), code of conduct (Prov 2: 1-22), piety (Prov 9:10; Job1:1).32
Wisdom was not tied to age exclusively as in the case of King Solomon who, with great
foresight cooperated with the Spirit of Yahweh in ruling God’s people (1Kgs 3:28).
While it is true that wisdom predates Israel, it had a specifically Israelite context in the
light of Israel’s faith in Yahweh. Sirach for instance affirms that “all wisdom is from the
Lord and is with Him forever” (Sir 1:1). Thus, the truly wise man will follow the
commands of Yahweh, for to fear the Lord “is the beginning of wisdom” (Sir 4:1).
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Furthermore, some of the wisdom books discussed issues that deal with the
problems of life, of good and evil, and of human suffering. The books of Job and
Ecclesiastes for example questions the justice of human experience, the failure of
righteousness and the success of wickedness. Wisdom Literature categorizes human
beings into two main divisions: the wise and the foolish. The wise ones accept correction
and good counsel (Prov 9:8ff; 21:11) while the foolish ones refuse to learn and that
accounts for their unhappiness. Wisdom is therefore both a moral and practical norm for
life.33
Specifically, there are two interrelated theological principles in wisdom literature
that are central to social justice, namely: the principle of retribution and of deeds and
destiny on the one hand, and on the other hand, the principle of divine reversal of human
fortune.34
The principle of retribution affirms that the attitude and actions of wise persons
bring them prosperity and happiness, while those who take the path of folly end up in
disaster and unhappiness. This was the central idea supported by the biblical doctrine of
divine retribution (Deut 28, 30). Therefore, the doctrine of divine retribution had two
implications. The first was the consequence of deeds: “Thus the good or evil deed
produces of itself a good or evil consequence (Prov 26:27; Ps 7:16). This is supposedly a
‘deed-consequence’ order of things established in creation and watched over by God.”35
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The second implication was the consequence of destiny. Since one’s actions
determined their situation in life, it directly affected their destiny in life. According to
(Prov. 28:1) the faithful member of the community dwells in safety, will have a goodly
inheritance (28:10), will prolong life (28:16), and will obtain honor (29:23). “But
whoever digs a pit will fall into it and stone will come back on the one who starts it
rolling” (26:27). What is stressed in these verses is that the one who acts in a particular
way either ‘good’ or ‘bad’ is going to experience the consequences of his or her actions.
This is seen as divine justice at work. Thus, the role of God is to complete the process by
seeing to it that human “deeds and destiny” correspond. But there are clear instances
where the principle of “deeds and destiny” has been challenged in biblical history as one
would point out in the next section.
The “deeds and destiny” doctrine has suffered many setbacks in the midst of
individual and community experiences of the people of Israel which contradicted it. The
events of 587 B.C.E. were the turning point. In 587 B.C.E. Nebuchadnezzar took over
Jerusalem, destroyed the temple, and exiled the nobles and leaders of the people. Thus, it
clearly appeared as though God was using Nebuchadnezzar and the Babylonians as the
“rod of anger” against Israel. The result was that some Jews wondered why God would
allow his temple to be destroyed at all. Did the punishment fit their crime? Was their
suffering so enormous that God appeared to some to be a malevolent deity who inflicts
suffering on the innocent (Lam. 3:1-19)?
At the individual level, the principle of “deeds and destiny” was challenged in the
Book of Job. Though Job was “blameless and upright” (Job 1:1), God appeared to have
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disregarded Job’s actions and allowed disaster to fall upon him (Job 1:6 - 2:10). This
meant that the good deeds and righteousness of Job never counted. In the same tradition,
Qohelet could not square his own experiences with the traditional doctrine of “deeds and
destiny”: “Another thing I have observed about man’s life in this world is that where
justice should be found, there wickedness is; and where the just man should be, there is
an evildoer” (Eccl 3:16; 4:1).
Thus, both Job and Qohelet seem to suggest a major failure of the “deeds and
destiny” principle. To them, there is no divine justice on earth but rather a divine reversal
of their human fortune in spite of their good deeds. They seem caught up in a situation
where the righteous suffer while evildoers prosper. Perhaps that is why, in order to
vindicate divine justice, the Book of Daniel moved God’s justice to the next life: “Many
of those who sleep in the dust of the earth shall awake, some to everlasting life, and some
to shame and everlasting contempt” (Dan 12:2). Next, an examination of the implications
arising from the brief presentation of the doctrines of retribution and divine reversal
follows.
The major implication to the understanding of social justice is how to respond on
the one hand to the reality of innocent suffering of individuals and groups, and on the
other hand to explain the reality of the goodness of God in creating the world good. This
question is the age-old problem of theodicy alluded to earlier. There are several complex
questions that are implicated in the issue of theodicy in the face of injustice in the world.
How does one justify the viewpoint, for instance, that some persons who find themselves
in situations of desperate poverty are paying the price for their bad actions? Human
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experience informs us that, while this might be true in some cases, there are instances
when this argument is very untrue. How does one explain natural phenomena like
drought, earthquakes, tornadoes, and hurricanes that bring unbearable hardship on
people? While it is true that there are some phenomena in the world that transcend human
understanding, which are attributed to the divine, one may and must not absolve human
beings of their responsibility to be co-creators with God. In this way, the challenge to
take up the task of providing social justice in the world remains very much a partnership
of cooperation between persons among themselves and between them and God. Thus, the
principle of “deeds and destiny” and that of divine reversal of human fortune appear
somewhat inadequate to determine the nature and cause of injustice in the world and by
implication are insufficient for articulating the necessary path to social justice.

3.1.6. Summary
We have discussed the Old Testament understanding of social justice by affirming
the fundamental goodness of God’s creation, the human responsibility toward this
creation which was formulated in a covenant relationship between Yaweh and Israel. We
then noted how the practices of the jubilee year, such as respect for the poor, liberty, and
restoration support the notion of solidarity in the practice of social justice. The
relationship of persons in community is at the heart of how we practice the virtue of
social justice. In the Exodus event, the Covenant provided the ambience for a holistic
experience of liberation in God that is inextricably bond up with the experience of
liberation among persons in community. The Prophetic utterances were messages from
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Yaweh which served as the “conscience of Israel” by challenging the Israelites to show
concern for the poor and vulnerable in their society. We can learn an important lesson
from the Prophetic tradition, namely, the need for a Prophetic voice in every generation
which will address the moral, social, and political crises which threatens the goodness of
God’s creation and attempt to take away in some fashion the human dignity of persons
who are made in the image and likeness of God.
Furthermore, we have discussed the pertinent contribution made by wisdom
literature in the promotion of social justice in the Israelite community. There were two
questions that have continually challenged the practice of social justice in the Old
Testament, namely, the principle of retribution and deeds and destiny and that of the
divine reversal of human fortune. These questions relate to the age-old issue of theodicy,
the reality of innocent suffering of individuals and groups in the face of the goodness of
God. While the Old Testament does not address the issue of theodicy sufficiently, the
question is taken up in the New Testament with renewed vigor. Indeed, it will become
clear that both the Old Testament and New Testament maintain that the practice of social
justice may and must continue even in the face of innocent suffering in the world,
because the questions of theodicy will ultimately find resolution in the context of
Christian hope.
Thus, in the next section, we will examine how the Old Testament notion of social
justice was continued and expanded in view of New Testament teaching starting with the
message and mission of Jesus Christ.
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3.1.7. The New Testament Teaching on Social Justice
In this section, the goal is to utilize the different insights provided in New
Testament studies, which offer some of the major critical perspectives that scholars36
have developed over the years. In so doing, one will discuss in a very general fashion
some of the indicators pointing to the theme of justice in the message and mission of
Jesus and some New Testament writings.

3.1.7.1. The Kingdom of God and Social Justice
The central event around which cohere the New Testament writings is the
message and mission of Jesus on the fulfillment of the kingdom of God (Mk. 1:15ff.).
Jesus expanded the prophetic tradition by identifying with the plight of the poor, the
oppressed, and the afflicted in proclaiming the coming of God’s kingdom in their favor,
and offering humanity new hope for liberation from the sins of injustice.
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Jesus’ preaching centered on the coming of the kingdom as a historical reality to
challenge the existing unjust social order. His preaching indicated that human coexistence
in the socio-political and religious context of Israel did not reflect that the will of God
was being done adequately on earth as in heaven, as stated in Jesus’ prayer: “Your
Kingdom come, your will be done, on earth as in heaven” (Matt. 6:10). The coming
kingdom in the context of this prayer has historical and social implications. The
historicity of the coming reality could be determined by the fact that Jesus preached and
demanded from different groups who were apparently in conflict with each other, a
change of heart or conversion. Jesus proclaimed the poor blessed, for the coming
kingdom was theirs (LK. 6:20-21).
Jesus addressed the rich and the powerful whom he challenged to change their
ways or they might be made wretched by the kingdom which was at hand (LK. 6:24-25).
Jesus also challenged those who, because of their position in the socio-religious structure,
felt the kingdom which was being proclaimed was not designed to overturn the values
around which they had organized their lives. There were also those who enjoyed a certain
level of socioeconomic security because of the wealth they had accumulated (LK. 12:1622; 16:1-9).
Michael Cook37 has identified three fundamental emphases associated with the
teaching of Jesus with regard to the fulfillment of the ‘kingdom of God.’ This perspective
helps point out some of the healthy tension that exists in the message proclaimed by Jesus
between the ‘already’ and ‘not yet’ dimensions of Christian hope. First, the kingdom is
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by nature eschatological. It symbolizes the end of history and the definitive act of God for
the people. But one does not visualize the kingdom as distinct from the concrete and
particular activity of God here and now. Thus, the symbolic reality of the kingdom is
described more in prophetic terms. It is a call which challenges the people to a deeper
appreciation of their worth and the hope of future possibilities in God.
Second, the ‘kingdom of God’ for Jesus is another way of pointing out the
countless blessings of salvation. The reality of the kingdom was and continues to be
realized in and through the words and deeds of Jesus and at the same time is moving
toward definitive fulfillment. Third, the tension between the present realization of the
kingdom and its future consummation is an integral part of the dynamic unfolding of the
kingdom. According to Cook, the tension is a healthy one because it affirms the
understanding that “. . . the message of Jesus proclaims the prophetic presence of the
future kingdom of God . . . Jesus does not offer teaching about the future, but enforces
the decisiveness of the present for the future.”38
Similarly, Wright has offered some insights on the teaching of Jesus on the
kingdom in terms of a political reality, which might help specify one’s perception of
justice. Wright placed side by side the teaching of Jesus with the political movements of
first-century Palestine and compared it to the sayings found in the Aramaic Targums. In
the former, Jesus is associated with the zealot revolutionary party while the latter seems
to identify Jesus as blending both the future and present realities of the kingdom in His
message:
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God’s kingdom, to the Jew-in-the-village in the first century, meant the coming
vindication of Israel, victory over the pagans, the eventual gift of peace, justice
and prosperity. It is scarcely surprising that, when a prophet appeared announcing
that this kingdom was dawning and that Israel’s god was at last becoming king, he
found an eager audience. This was the story they were waiting to hear; or, better,
this was the proper and fitting conclusion to the story in which they were already
living.39
Duling offered some words of caution against an extreme interpretation of Jesus’
message which might seem to suggest that “. . . the kingdom of Heaven was a code word
for God’s political restoration of the Davidic kingdom with Jesus as king and his
followers as his chief counselors.”40 Thus, while not denying the reality that some of
Jesus’ message on the ‘kingdom’ might have political implications, there is the tendency
that an overly political presentation might deviate attention from Jesus’ teaching on the
love of enemies for instance in Matt. 5:44. One might suggest then some way of
understanding the kingdom of God in relation to concrete historical activity.
In the context of the argument so far, there is little room to doubt that the Jewish
hope was concrete, specific, and focused on the people as a whole. In this sense, one can
appreciate the emphasis made by the evangelists with regard to Jesus’ kingdom message.
In the words of Wright: “. . . they were not simply reading their own communities’
preaching back into an imagined ‘history’; recent studies have shown that part of what
they wanted to convey, as their message to their own communities, was the fact that in
the unique and unrepeatable career of Jesus, Israel’s history had reached its climactic
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moment.”41 The climactic moment in Jesus’ teaching on the kingdom is best captured in
the Sermon on the Mount (Matt. 5:1-7:29).
According to Raymond Brown, the Sermon on the Mount in the Gospel of
Matthew represents “. . . a harmonious masterpiece of ethical and religious teaching . . .
the Matthean Jesus teaches with exousia, i.e., divine power and authority, and by this
empowerment makes possible a new existence.”42 Similarly, Benedict T. Viviano
maintains that “The dominant themes of the sermon are the kingdom of God and justice. .
. The sermon is fairly systematic, covering the main areas of ethical and religious life as
understood in Israel.”43 Thus, the beatitudes (Matt. 5:3-12), which are central to the
sermon provide the major building blocks which hold together the values which Jesus
emphasized in preaching the kingdom of God. The beatitudes demand a deeper
observance of God’s command, not simply for the sake of the law but by penetrating the
root of these commands to see in them the means for God’s countless blessings and
justice.44
Crosby’s presentation offers some pertinent insights on the ecclesial and
economic implications in the meaning of justice advanced in Matthew. First, the
centrality of the virtue of justice in the keeping of “house-order” is explained. The
process of housekeeping, whether it is in the ecclesial, social, economic, or political life
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should consist of the right ordering of relationships at the personal, social or community,
and international levels. Thus, such a process would allow room for mutual respect and
build structures that would respect equitable distribution of the resources of the
community. Second, Crosby identifies in the sermon the principle for Christian
commitment to social justice. The beatitudes (5:3-12) describe the practices that one
ought to engage in toward promoting proper housekeeping. This includes fidelity to the
elements of salvific and economic justice, and participation through concrete actions in
the households of God in and through the community. While Crosby’s position may
appear to have outlined very general issues in the practice of social justice, the specific
issues of social engagement will have to depend on need, social context, availability of
resources, and public policy formulations.
Another major teaching of Jesus that is often quoted in the promotion of social
justice concerns is the parable of the sheep and the goats (Matt. 25:31-46). In this
apocalyptic judgment scene, the Son of Man will return as king and bring all the nations
of the world to judgment. Thus, women and men will be separated one from the other like
sheep and goats, the sheep to eternal joy and the goats to eternal punishment. The
measure for judgment would be how they treated the king (Son of Man) when he was
hungry, thirsty, a stranger, naked, sick, or in prison. But the radical nature of the demand
for justice lies in the fact that the moment of recognition or nonrecognition of the elect
and the condemned is in this practical and shocking response of the king: “Whatever you
did to the least of my brothers and sisters, you did it to me; what you did not do for one of
these least ones, you did not do for me” (Matt. 25:40, 45).
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John R. Donahue has offered an important contribution to understanding the
parable of the sheep and goats.45 Essentially, Donahue argued for the position that
recognizes both the universal and particular implications of the parable. Thus, the
Christian missionary challenge and witness to the world should transcend the social,
religious, and economic boundaries to embrace all peoples. The key issue here is that the
mandate to practice social justice has no limits and does not pay attention to the societal
barriers which sometimes serve as stumbling blocks to Christian faith commitment in the
world.
The Letter of James has been identified as a Jewish-Christian message46 and so its
message would be appropriate here. James offers one some practical principles toward
the living out of social justice ideals in community. The first of these principles is that
members of the community ought to “Be doers of the word and not hearers only,
deluding yourselves” (Jas. 1:22). The challenge here is to strike a balance between what
one hears and the deed one is able to carry out as a result of the message one has
received. The demand of James is made concrete when the true nature of religion is
specified to include: “Religion that is pure and undefiled before God and the Father is
this: to care for orphans and widows in their affliction and to keep oneself unstained by
the world” (Jas. 1:27).
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Furthermore, James challenges the community to refrain from the “sin of
partiality” (Jas. 2:1-7) particularly the manner they have made an issue of class
distinctions in the community, by favoring the rich who oppress them and neglecting the
poor who have been called to be “heirs of the kingdom.” Thus, James categorically states
a principle that has stood the test of time in fashioning the commitment of the Christian,
namely, that faith without works is useless and works without faith is dead (Jas. 2:14-26).
Notice that James declares that faith and works are intertwined. Some of the works
mentioned that are the result of genuine faith include clothing and feeding the poor
brother or sister (Jas. 2:14-17). Lastly, James offers in (5:1-6) devastating denunciations
of the impending threat to the unchecked lifestyle of the rich who continually oppress the
poor.

3.1.7.2. Social Justice in Luke’s Gospel and the Acts of the Apostles
According to Donahue
The Lucan writings constitute about one quarter of the whole NT. With the
exception of James, these writings contain the most explicit statements on wealth,
poverty, and the use of resources. . . Luke-Acts has also been that NT work most
often invoked on issues of social justice and concern for the marginal.47
The present aim is to highlight areas where concerns for those disadvantaged in the LukeActs communities are given special attention. The list of such persons includes the poor,
the sick, the handicapped, lepers, slaves, prostitutes, tax collectors, Samaritans, Gentiles,
foreigners, refugees, children, the elderly, widows, and women in general. While the

47

See Donahue, What Does the Lord Require? p. 50. Note that some of the major points advanced by
Donahue will be presented here as they prove invaluable to this research.

170
needs of such people vary greatly, they are generally considered as those whom society
neglects and despises.
The infancy narratives convey a special message to the anawim, the poor of
Yahweh. In her prayer of gratitude to God, Mary’s “Magnificat” celebrates the God who
brings down the mighty from their thrones and lifts up the lowly, fills the hungry with
good things, and sends the rich away empty (Luke 1:52f.). The birth of Jesus is first
proclaimed to those on the margin of society, “shepherds,” and Jesus is born in the most
humble circumstances in “a manger,” because there was no room for them in the inn
(Luke 2:7-14); the gifts offered at Jesus’ birth convey the offering of poor people (Luke
2:24); Simeon and Anna (a widow) who were present at his dedication in the temple are
ordinary faithful representatives of their communities (Luke 2:25-38).
The starting point for the public ministry of Jesus in Luke emphasizes the need for
proclaiming the kingdom message as “the good news to the poor” (Luke 4:17-19). The
call to discipleship in Luke is typified by Levi who “leaves everything” in order to follow
Jesus (Luke 5:28). The “poor” receive blessings while the rich and powerful receive woes
(Luke 6:20, 24-26). The parables of the Rich Fool (Luke 12: 13-21), that of the Unjust
Steward (Luke 16:1-8), and of the Rich Man and Lazarus (Luke 16:19-31) teach
particular messages about how to relate to people on the underside of society.
Furthermore, it is in Luke that the “great banquet” is to be celebrated with the
poor, the maimed, the lame, and the blind (14:13, 21). The story of Zaccheus, the “chief
tax collector,” who received God’s mercy and dedicated his wealth to the well-being of
the poor (19:8) is another masterpiece on the theme of social justice. The issue of the
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mercy of God challenges the type of justice administered here when compared to
existential justice. Thus, it would seem to suggest that existential forms of justice are only
one side of the story, and that ultimately, true justice and mercy lies with God.
There is a special place for the contribution made by women in Luke’s Gospel.
Powell maintains that in Luke one finds “. . . an affinity for parallel references to men and
women.”48 In the parables where the kingdom of God is compared to a man planting a
seed (13:18-19), there is the corollary of a woman working with leaven (13:20-21), the
annunciations to Zechariah (1:5-25) and to Mary (1:26-38), the prophecies of Simeon
(2:25-35) and Anna (2:36-38), the Sabbath healings of a woman (13:10-17) and a man
(14:1-6), the stories about a man who lost a sheep (15:3-7) and a woman who lost a coin
(15:8-10), and the references to two men in bed (17:34) and two women at the mill
(17:35), are all peculiar to Luke’s Gospel. There is also an important balancing in the list
of Jesus’ male disciples (6:12-16) with a list of women who were Jesus’ faithful
followers (8:1-3).
In the Acts of the Apostles, one is challenged by the communal lifestyle of the
early Christian community. The early community shared their goods and services
ensuring that there is no needy person in their midst (AA 2:41-47, 4:32-37). Thus,
Ananias and Sapphira by withholding the “proceeds of the land,” are guilty of deceit
before God and the community (AA 5:1-11). Though it was left up to their conscience
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and freewill to contribute to the common fund, their possessions revealed the true nature
of their commitment to God and the community.
Furthermore, one discovers in Luke’s account of the death of Judas (AA 1:18-20),
in comparison to Matt. 27:3-10, that Judas did not return the ill-gotten money, but “buys
a farm” (AA 4:32) with the “payment of his injustice” and appears to die accidentally and
the farm is deserted. Similarly, Simon tries to use money to buy power (AA 8:9-24). On a
positive note, Lydia, “the seller of purple,” gives a good example of faithful discipleship
by showing hospitality to Paul (AA 16:16-24), while the silversmiths of Ephesus feel
challenged by Paul’s preaching (AA 19:23-41).
Powell agrees with Jacques Dupont that the mission to the Gentiles is central to
the existence of the Acts of the Apostles.49 The Gentile mission which was prompted by
God rather than the rejection of the Gospel by the Jewish community raises a pertinent
implication for social justice. The “Mission to the Gentiles replaces the mission to
Israel,” especially in view of AA 10:35 with the statement that “in every nation, anyone
who fears God and does what is right is acceptable to him.” The universality of the
Gospel is affirmed without any ties to a particular ethnic grouping and would appear to
prepare the way for the resolution passed in the Council of Jerusalem on the acceptance
of non-Jews in the Christian Assembly (AA 15).
There is a strong indication in Acts that the relations between the Church and the
State appear to be in harmony from Luke’s perspective.50 Christians are presented as law-
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abiding citizens who do not threaten the peaceful existence of the social order (AA 18:1415). Paul is not seen as the real threat to the community but to the lawbreakers (AA
19:40; 25:18-19; 26: 31-32). Luke is also said to present the Roman Empire as supportive
to Christians (AA 18:12-16; 19:35-41; 23:10).

3.1.7.3. Social Justice in the Johannine Community51
Raymond E. Brown has offered the most compelling reading of the Johannine
community by tracing “the life, loves, and hates of an individual Church in New
Testament times.”52 There are two major issues that deserve one’s attention: the
relationship between the Johannine community and the outside world; and the role of
women in the Johannine community.
1.

The relationship between the Johannine community and the outside world

involved a complex web of relationships. Brown maintains that one need not rule out the
universality of the Johannine community especially in view of John 3:16-17: “For God so
loved the world that he gave his only son, so that everyone who believes in him might not
perish but might have eternal life. . .” Yet, John 3:18-21 would seem to challenge the
claim to universalism in the Johannine community. According to Brown:
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The human race is divided into non-believers and believers, into those who prefer
darkness and those who prefer light, into those who are condemned and those who
already have eternal life. Since the Johannine community identifies itself with the
believers, it is no surprise that most of those outside the community are looked
upon as more or less shadowed by darkness. No other Gospel so lends itself to a
diagnosis of community relationships in terms of opposition. Yet . . . the reader
must not forget the light which shines within the Johannine community of faith
and which is the main emphasis of the Gospel.53
Thus, Brown upholds that it is on the basis of the above thesis that the commandment of
love becomes the central tenet of the Johannine community (John 13:34; 15:12). But the
real challenge for social justice lies in the reception that was given “. . . to various shades
of non-believers and other believers”54 by the Johannine community. Brown identified
six major areas of conflict between the Johannine community and other groups generally
called nonbelievers: the world, “the Jews,” the adherents of John the Baptist, the CryptoChristians (Christian Jews within the Synagogues), the Jewish Christian churches of
inadequate faith, and the Christians of Apostolic churches.55
The point of bringing these issues here is to show the deep hostility and sense of
superiority that the Johannine community had toward other groups in the larger
community whom they considered as not reflecting their ideological positions. Thus,
some of the issues raised help one to take a critical look at the reality of fellowship both
within the Christian community and outside the community. Brown raises two critical
questions for addressing social injustice in the community. In the first place, when
someone or a group of persons are rejected in a community, is it better to break ranks
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with the entire community or to remain within it and seek to provide the needed change at
the risk of further rejection? “In subsequent Christianity there have been many times
when it was not easy to decide whether for the sake of the Gospel one should split from
the establishment or should stay and work stubbornly within it, striving for change. On
the long road which position really exhibits more courage?”56 In the second instance,
Brown challenges those who are comfortable within their parochial world and find it
difficult to let in fresh air from the outside for fear of heretical positions that might derail
their claim to orthodoxy.
When the charge of heresy is raised in Christian communities today, there is the
tendency to associate that stigma with wild - eyed radicals proposing new ideas.
In Christian history, however, some of the most significant heresies have been
conservative rather than radical-the tendency to hold on to old theological
answers when new questions have caused the main body of Christians to move on
to new answers . . . “Orthodoxy,” then, is not always the possession of those who
try to hold on to the past. One may find a truer criterion in the direction toward
which Christian thought has been tending, even if that direction suggests that past
formulations of truth have to be considered inadequate to answer new questions.57
2.

The role of women in the Johannine community is another key social

justice issue discussed by Brown.58 Brown chose to discuss the role of women in John’s
Gospel “. . . because of the perceptive corrective that the evangelist offers to some
ecclesiastical attitudes of his time - his should be a voice heard and reflected upon when
we are discussing new roles for women in the Church today.”59 Brown emphasized that
the important role played by the Samaritan woman (John 4:25-26, 29) in recognizing that
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Jesus is the Christ was significant for helping Nichodemus to have a better understanding
of the Christ. Moreover, the dialogue between Jesus and his male disciples would
indicate that the Samaritan woman had a “missionary function” (John 4:35-37). The
Samaritans come out to meet with Jesus in response to what the woman has told them
about Jesus.
Similarly, the role of a woman, Mary Magdalene (John 20:17-18), as a witness to
the resurrection of Jesus stands in contrast to the other male disciples who had gone to the
tomb earlier but did not see anyone (John 20: 2-10). Thus, Brown summarized his
findings in this way:
In researching the evidence of the Fourth Gospel, one is still surprised to see to
what extent in the Johannine community women and men were already on an
equal level in the fold of the Good Shepherd. This seems to have been a
community where in the things that really mattered in the following of Christ
there was no difference between male and female - a Pauline dream (Gal 3:28)
that was not completely realized in the Pauline communities. But even John has
left us with one curious note of incompleteness: the disciples, surprised at Jesus’
openness with a woman, still did not dare to ask him, “What do you want of a
woman?” (John 4:27). That may well be a question whose time has come in the
church of Jesus Christ.60
The thesis of this work presupposes that the role of women in both the Church and
society is central to building relationships for self-help that recognize the human dignity
of all persons.

60

Ibid., p.198.

177
3.1.7.4.

Pauline Teaching on Social Justice
John Donahue offers one a clear presentation on this theme and one hopes to

follow in that direction.61 Donahue poses the challenge before anyone who attempts to
relate the message of Paul to the social question as a paradox:
On the one hand, no NT author uses the term dikaiosyne (justice) more than Paul,
nor does any other author link it so explicitly with issues of faith. Yet the
contemporary concern for social justice has been most often based on OT
considerations (Exodus, the Prophetic concern for the poor) or on the teaching of
Jesus.62
The above dilemma is explained in view of the theological debate over “faith and good
works,” which seems to offer an individualistic perspective to Pauline theology in terms
of how the individual sinner relates to God. The practical applications of Paul’s message
on issues confronting the communities and their relations to the theological content are
not adequately digested: the charge is that Paul teaches only an “interim ethic” in view of
his imminent eschatological expectations. The question then is how to make Paul’s
ethical teaching relevant “. . . for Christians settling in for the long haul of history.”63
Donahue, following Fitzmyer, offers some resources for the faith that does justice
in Pauline theology and pastoral engagement in the context of the significance of the
“Christ event.”64 First, the Christ event is presented as the foundation of Christian faith
which demands responsibility for the world. Thus, “newness of life” is offered to the
Christian who is called to participate in the Lordship of Christ over evil.

61

See Donahue, What Does the Lord Require? pp. 54-61 for details.
Ibid., p. 54.
63
Ibid., p. 55.
64
See Donahue, pp.55-59; Joseph A Fitzmyer, “Pauline Theology,” The New Jerome Biblical
Commentary, p. 1389ff.
62

178
The Christian is to be a witness in mission of the victory over death and the
transforming power of the resurrection. To pursue the quest for justice in faith
means that the Christian walks in confidence that evil is not the Lord of life and
that even death for the sake of others cannot separate a person from the love of
God (Rom. 8:28-39).65
Second, “Justification of the sinner by God’s grace through faith results in a
personal and communal liberation that enables people to live for others rather than for
themselves.”66 Thus, the emphasis here is that on the one hand, the Christ event provides
the Christian with ‘freedom from’ sin, law, and death (Gal. 5:1). On the other hand, the
Christ event provides ‘freedom for’ the Christian to face up to their responsibilities to
each other in the community (Gal. 5:13, 16-21; 6:2; Rom. 8:21-23).
Third, “Paul’s eschatology does not warrant an ‘interim ethic,’ but rather
summons Christians to responsibility for life in the world.”67 The Christian is between
and betwixt the “already” and the “not yet.” In this atmosphere, the challenge is “to walk
in the newness of life and not let sin reign in their mortal bodies (Rom. 6:12). They
should yield themselves to God, so that they might become instruments and servants of
justice (Rom. 6:13, 18).”68
Donahue offers two major practical and pastoral directives from Paul’s message.
They include the raising of funds for the poor churches in Judea to help facilitate Paul’s
missionary work and show solidarity between the Greek churches and the Jerusalem
church (Rom. 15: 25-29; 1Cor. 16:1-4, 2Cor. 8f.). The challenge of bridging the gap
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between the rich and the poor today is a central issue of social justice which different
societies will continue to face and pursue in their different social contexts.
The second pastoral concern is “the dispute over the celebration of the Lord’s
Supper.”69 The central concern of Paul would seem to be that the Christian community
should not let the social distinctions between the different classes of people impact the
celebration of their liturgy (1Cor. 11:17-33). In this case, Paul maintains the position of
integrating the community as evidenced in Gal. 3:28 “in Christ there is neither Jew nor
Greek, slave nor free, male nor female.” As Donahue clearly puts it:
Paul’s directives here show that issues of justice and concern for the more
vulnerable members of the community enter into the most central act of Christian
community, the celebration of the Lord’s Supper. They also show Paul’s constant
concern for the weaker members of the community and for the creation of a
community in which economic and social divisions do not invalidate the faith of
the community as a whole process.70
3.1.7.5. Summary
In examining some of the history and practice of social justice in the Bible, one
discovers that the central thrust for social justice is respect for the dignity of the human
person who is created in the image and likeness of God. Thus, wherever and whenever
that dignity is marginalized, the demands of social justice come into operation to restore
and fashion the human person toward his or her God-giving dignity. Furthermore, the
mission and message of Jesus affirm the revelation of God and make ethical demands
centered on the commandment to love God and neighbor as primary to participation in
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God’s kingdom. Moreover, it was clear that the kingdom of God has social, economic,
political, and religious consequences that the followers of Christ would have to deal with
on a day-to-day basis as they encounter the present, imminent, and eschatological
dimensions of the kingdom. Having laid a solid biblical foundation for social justice, in
the next section the study will examine the philosophy of social justice.

3.2.

The Philosophy of Social Justice
In this section, the study will discuss three major issues which revolve around the

philosophy of social justice. First, one will attempt a historical understanding of the
traditional terms of “legal justice” or “general justice” and “particular justice” according
to St. Thomas Aquinas; second, one will point out the social and moral context in which
the term social justice was formally advanced in the papal social encyclical of Pius XI,
namely, Quadragesimo Anno (QA); third, one will discuss some of the major
distinguishing elements of the concept of social justice.
There are two reasons why examining the philosophy of social justice is pertinent:
to show that there is a correlation between the understanding associated with the
Thomistic philosophy of law and morals and the papal term of social justice; to identify
the component parts of social justice which make it such an important regulating
principle in society.
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3.2.1. Justice According to St. Thomas Aquinas71
The Thomistic theory of justice sets out to make a major distinction between
“general” justice or “legal” justice as the objective rule protecting social relationships
among persons in community, and “particular” justice as the subjective rule which is
further divided into two parts, namely,: “commutative,” justice and “distributive” justice.
Thus, it would seem that the “particular” kinds of justice have binding force only in as
much as they are tied to the general objective of justice. What follows is an attempt to
summarize the major arguments advanced in the Thomistic philosophy of justice.
Just before considering the issue of justice, Aquinas specified the relationship
between “right” and “justice” by indicating that it is central to the virtue of justice to help
direct the right relations of persons in the community.
Accordingly that which is right in the works of the other virtues, and to which the
intention of the virtue tends as to its proper object, depends on its relation to the
agent only, whereas the right in a work of justice, besides its relation to the agent,
is set up by its relation to others. Because a man’s work is said to be just when it
is related to some other by way of some kind of equality, for instance the payment
of the wage due for a service rendered. And so a thing is said to be just, as having
the rectitude of justice, when it is the term of an act of justice, without taking into
account the way in which it is done by the agent: whereas in the other virtues
nothing is declared to be right unless it is done in a certain way by the agent. For
71
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this reason justice has its own special proper object over and above the other
virtues, and this object is called the just, which is the same as right. Hence it is
evident that right is the object of justice.72
Similarly, Aquinas maintains that the object of the other virtues depends on an
important quality in the agent, namely, “. . . in the other virtues nothing is declared to be
right unless it is done in a certain way by the agent.”73 In this way justice relates to the
other virtues by way of equality in the relationship among persons in community and not
by an already determinate quality in the agent. Thus, the distinctive mark of justice as a
special virtue from the others lies in the fact that: “For this reason justice has its own
special proper object over and above the other virtues, and this object is called the just,
which is the same as right.”74 In reality, there are many virtues that are linked to day-today human relationships and there are several reasons why human acts may be
considered to be right and just in themselves. Therefore, “justice, as such, is independent
of these motivations. It exists whenever the norm of equality or of proportion is
effectively respected in one man’s dealings with the other.”75
Having established the proper place for justice, Aquinas then proceeded to
address the question “Of Justice,” in twelve articles. In the first article, justice is defined
as “a habit whereby a man renders to each one his due by a constant and perpetual
will.”76This definition of justice underscores its unique position as a special virtue with a
distinct objective from the other virtues. Thus, the distinction is made here between what
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Aquinas refers to as a “general” virtue of justice in relation to the “particular” virtues of
justice.
Justice directs man in his relations with other men. Now this may happen in two
ways: first as regards his relation with individuals, secondly as regards his
relations with others in general, in so far as a man who serves a community,
serves all those who are included in that community. Accordingly justice in its
proper acceptation can be directed to another in both these senses. Now it is
evident that all who are included in a community, stand in relation to that
community as parts to a whole; while a part, as such, belongs to a whole, so that
whatever is the good of a part can be directed to the good of the whole. It follows
therefore that the good of any virtue, whether such virtue direct man in relation to
himself, or in relation to certain other individual persons, is referable to the
common good, to which justice directs: so that all acts of virtue can pertain to
justice, in so far as it directs man to the common good. It is in this sense that
justice is called a general virtue. And since it belongs to the law to direct to the
common good . . . it follows that the justice which is in this way styled general, is
called legal justice, because thereby man is in harmony with the law which directs
the acts of all the virtues to the common good.77
Thus, there are two major implications arising from the understanding of “general”
justice. First, the term “general” justice applies to the essence and object of justice. It is
that which is proper to itself and which gives signification to justice in relation to the
other virtues. Hence, one can also say that from it the “special” virtue of justice flows in
connection with the other virtues. Conversely, the other virtues may be regarded as just to
the degree that they are geared toward or away from the common good, which is the goal
and end of all the virtues.
Just as charity which regards the Divine good as its proper object, is a special
virtue in respect of its essence, so too legal justice is a special virtue in respect of
its essence, in so far as it regards the common good as its proper object.78
In the second place, “general justice” refers to the extent to which the virtue of
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particular justice is subordinated in the general justice, and how the right relationship
with individuals is determined in view of the common good. Calvez and Perrin express
this point clearly when they declare:
In practice, given the relationships which exist between the whole and the parts
according to the Thomist system, the direction of conduct to the common good is
made actual in the particular dealings of men with each other, considered as
individuals. General justice regulates conduct with respect to the common good;
but this is never expressed by any specific acts, but in all particular dealings in
which justice is concerned. . . It is from the righteousness of all these dealings that
there results, in a certain sense, the righteousness of the whole, that conformity to
the common good which is general justice.79
Next, one may focus attention on the specific attributes of “particular justice” in
Aquinas. The passage where there is a clear indication of the establishment of the term
“particular justice” states:
Legal justice is not essentially the same as every virtue, and besides legal justice
which directs man immediately to the common good, there is a need for other
virtues to direct him immediately in matters relating to particular goods: and these
virtues may be relative to himself or to another individual person. Accordingly,
just as in addition to legal justice there is a need for particular virtues to direct
man in relation to himself, such as temperance and fortitude, so too besides legal
justice there is need for particular justice to direct man in his relations to other
individuals.80
Thus, while general or legal justice is the object of the virtue of justice, it is not
absolutely an end in itself but a means to an end. Justice is able to regulate relations
between individual persons in mediate manner by pointing them toward the common
good. Hence,
Legal justice does indeed direct man sufficiently in his relations towards others.
As regards the common good it does so immediately, but as to the good of the
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individual, it does so mediately. Wherefore there is need for particular justice to
direct a man immediately to the good of another individual.81
The question may be raised whether in assigning such a role to particular justice one does
end up making it a self-sufficient entity. In other words, since particular justice assumes
the position of individual personal relationships, could it be said that general justice is
brought about merely as a result of particular justice?
According to St. Thomas, the common good does not result simply from
particular goods or from an accumulation of these goods. Therefore, one is not just
dealing with a quantitative phenomenon but rather with realities that are mutually
supportive of the end of the other.
The common good of the realm and the particular good of the individual differ not
only in respect of many and the few, but also under a formal aspect. For the aspect
of the common good differs from the aspect of the individual good, even as the
aspect of the whole differs from that of the part.82
Thus, it is pertinent to realize that general justice and particular justice are essentially two
sides of the same coin. The practice of particular justice is based on the standard set by
general justice through which it is mediated in the particular human relationships.
Particular justice is directed to the private individual, who is compared to the
community as a part to the whole. Now a twofold order may be considered in
relation to a part. In the first place, there is the order of one part to another, to
which corresponds the order of one private individual to another. This order is
directed by commutative justice, which is concerned about the mutual dealings
between two persons. In the second place, there is the order of the whole towards
the parts, to which corresponds the order of that which belongs to the community
in relation to each single person. This order is directed by distributive justice,
which distributes common goods proportionately. Hence there are two species of
justice, distributive and commutative.83

81

Ibid.
Ibid.
83
IIa IIae, q. 61, art. 1.
82

186
Thus, the subject of the acts of the virtue of justice could be either an individual member
of society or one who holds social power in the community and acts as such to enable
persons toward the realization of the common good. Commutative justice and distributive
justice as “subjective parts” of particular justice appear to be distinct from general justice.
However, this is not completely true since general justice is the first determinant of
justice which cuts across all types of social relationships between the whole and the parts
and the parts amongst themselves. What has happened is that “all the requirements of
general justice are resolved in practice into rights and duties, either of individual towards
individual, or of the wielder of social power to the subjects of that power, but the
determination of all these rights and duties is subordinated to general justice.”84
Having stated the major points that reflect the concept of justice in Aquinas
especially the interrelationship between general justice or legal justice and particular
justice and the parts of particular justice, namely, commutative justice and distributive
justice, one wonders why Pius XI did not speak of general or legal justice and a particular
justice but preferred to use the term “social justice” to formulate his social, economic,
and moral philosophy. Perhaps, history will provide the best answer to this puzzle.

3.2.2. The History of the Term Social Justice85
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The major historical development that ensued as a result of the meaning of justice
articulated by St. Thomas Aquinas was the confusion that existed among the different
schools that sought to expound the positions of traditional Thomism.86 The first school
recognized the inherent distinctions between “general or legal justice” and “particular
justice” by creating room for the understanding which appeared to reduce all justice to
the obligations of commutative justice. The State was seen as being capable, as a result of
justice, to impose obligations upon the citizens who are obliged in virtue of justice to
perform certain duties. But this was conceived as an extension of distributive justice.
Their attempt was to entrench “legal justice” to embrace the practical roles of both
commutative and distributive justice which would be a far cry from what Aquinas had
intended. Thus, it would seem that the difficulty of some traditional Thomists to be
relevant in the same categories put forward by St. Thomas Aquinas to formulate an
objective norm that would take into consideration the “whole” community and its
common good was its greatest undoing.
The second school of Thomism spearheaded by the work of A. Tapparelli in Italy
began from 1880 onwards to formulate the concept of social justice in relation to the right
of persons. They hoped to offer some precise interpretation that would be faithful to
Aquinas by providing an objective norm capable of holding together social relations in
community.87 The views of this school of thought spread to France where scholars like
Antoine, Albert de Mun and La Tour du Pin became strong proponents of the social
justice agenda. Antoine for instance offered an important understanding of social justice
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which freed it from the subjective obligations of commutative and distributive justice. In
his Cours d’ Economie Sociale there appears to be some indication of an objective social
justice, that is related to the meaning attached to “general or legal justice” in Aquinas.
Antoine is quoted as saying that social justice is only legal justice: “that justice which has
for its object the social good and the common good to all.”88
In Germany, Pesch is considered to have formulated the phrase soziale
Gerechtigkeit after 1905 when most of the German writers leading up to Oswald von
Nell-Breuning, who was a major collaborator of Pius XI in the drafting of QA, promoted
the understanding of the term social justice as synonymous to legal justice.89 In so doing,
they were being faithful to the traditional Thomistic concepts of justice under another
nomenclature. In the next section, one will reveal that while the term social justice was
already in use, it was in the papal social encyclical QA that a normative definition and
understanding of social justice was offered. Ferree points out the fact that: “The only
reasonable place to study either notion (Catholic Action or social justice) is in the work
of Pius XI and in works inspired by his teaching; for it is only here that the words are
surely used with a definite and precise signification.”90

88

Ibid., p. 147.
See Leo W. Shields, who, after an elaborate history of the term of social justice, affirms on the one hand
that “our conclusion must be that the commonest opinion is the right one and that social justice as a
scientific term must be a new name for legal justice” pp. 45-46. On the other hand, he observed rightly that
social justice as formulated in the papal encyclicals is not limited to a scientific use, it embraces doctrinal
and moral values which challenge individualistic and totalitarian thoughts: “The Catholic message of social
justice is written in sharp relief against this background of individualist thought in all its forms - romantic,
rationalistic, humanitarian, and totalitarian. It is the key to the reintegration of social life that must be
inspired by Christian faith and charity and supported by grace.” p. 71.
90
William Ferree, The Act of Social Justice (Dayton, Ohio: Marianist Publications, 1951), p. 95.
89

189
3.2.3. Social Justice and Society in Quadragesimo Anno
Pius XI used the term social justice in relation to social charity as governing
principles of society in QA in several major contexts. What follows is an attempt to
highlight these major areas and to discuss some of their implications.
3.2.3.1. Social Justice and the Distribution of Wealth
The context where social justice first appears in QA is when the pope examined
the relationship between capital and labor. More precisely, the subject matter under
review was that of the “Guiding Principle of Just Distribution.” This was the place where
the pope introduced a prelude to the principle of social justice by stating that: “This
principle must be constantly borne in mind if we would not wander from the path of
truth.”91 Then, social justice as the guiding principle of distribution is offered.
Now, not every kind of distribution of wealth and property among men is such
that it can satisfactorily, still less adequately, attain the end intended by God.
Wealth, therefore, which is constantly being augmented by social and economic
progress, must be so distributed among the various individuals and classes of
society that the common good of all, of which Leo XIII spoke, be thereby
promoted. In other words, the good of the whole community must be safeguarded.
By these principles of social justice one class is forbidden to exclude the other
from a share in the profits. This law is violated by an irresponsible wealthy class
who, in their good fortune, deem it a just state of things that they should receive
everything and the laborer nothing. It is violated also by the property-less class,
when, strongly aroused because justice is ignored and too prone to vindicate
improperly the one right well known to them, they demand for themselves all the
fruits of production. They are wrong in thus attacking and seeking the abolition of
ownership and all profits deriving from sources other than labor, whatever be
their nature or significance in human society, for the sole reason that they were
not obtained by toil. In this connection it must be noted that the appeal made by
some to the words of the Apostle: “If any man will not work, neither let him eat”
is as inept as it is unfounded. The Apostle is here passing judgment on those who
refuse to work though they could and ought to do so: he admonishes us to use
diligently our time and our powers of body and mind, and not to become
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burdensome to others as long as we are able to provide for ourselves. In no sense
does he teach that labor is the sole title which gives a right to a living or to
profits.92
Each class, then, must receive its due share, and the distribution of created goods
must be brought into conformity with the demands of the common good and
social justice. For every sincere observer realizes that the vast differences between
the few who hold excessive wealth and the many who live in destitution constitute
a grave evil in modern society.93
From this initial presentation of the guiding role of social justice in the “just distribution”
of the resources of the earth among persons in community, emerges an important
implication that specifies the role of social justice toward promoting the common
economic good of persons in community. Perhaps, one needs to provide some detailed
explanation on the subject and so it is worthwhile considering it as a separate matter in
the next section.

3.2.3.2. Social Justice and the Common Good
The connection between social justice and the common good provided here
appears to be somewhat limited to the socio-economic sphere. While there is a clear
indication that the goal and end of social justice is the common good, the type of good
that is commonly desired in this context is specific, namely “Wealth, therefore, which is
constantly being augmented by social and economic progress, must be so distributed
among the various individuals and classes of society.”94 Similarly, the persons who are to
share in these virtues appear to be those who belong to the socio-economic world of

92

QA Par. 57, pp. 55-56
QA Par. 58, p. 56.
94
Op. cit.
93

191
capital and labor. Hence, those who go contrary to the principle of social justice are: “the
wealthy class who . . . receive everything and the laborer nothing; the property-less class
(who) . . . demand for themselves all the fruits of production.”95 Thus, the role of the
virtue of social justice in this circumstance is to ensure and enhance the just distribution
of economic goods in order that the bridge between the economically wealthy and
economically poor would be narrowed. In so doing, the economic conditions which
threaten the life of some persons in society might be nonexistent.
The pope offered also the condition in which the principle of social justice might
be wrongly utilized. Social justice does not mean, for instance, that all goods in society
are to be equally distributed among the members without recognizing the just
contribution of the different members and their peculiar circumstance. Neither does social
justice deny individual members of their personal right to own property. Thus, social
justice would have to allow some degree of inequality in society, while at the same time
working towards the “harmonization” of the respective rights of capital and labor.
Lastly, the pope offers a classic interpretation of the second letter of St. Paul to
the Thessalonians, 3:10: “If any one was unwilling to work, neither should that one eat.”
There are two pertinent issues worthy of note: first, to state the saying of St. Paul as “He
who does not work shall not eat,” is to wrongly apply the biblical text. In this case, one
will be saying that only those who work and earn a living by their labors are entitled to
subsistence. But it is clear that, in reality, if one were to apply this saying completely then
what will become of very young people, sick people, the elderly, the physically and
mentally challenged, and of course the jobless who are able to and ought to work but
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cannot find a job? Moreover, it is part of our humanity as ordained by God that one is
capable of working only during a certain period of their life. Thus, in order to do away
with these intractable difficulties the pope stated his position unequivocally; the appeal to
St. Paul “is as inept as it is unfounded.” Second, the pope states the true thought of St.
Paul by saying that the Apostle did not teach the doctrine that “labor is the sole title
which gives a right to a living or to profits.” Rather, what St. Paul wants Christians to
know is this: “He who is too lazy to work does not deserve, in other words, is not worthy
to have daily bread. Whoever is capable of supporting himself shall not live at another
person’s expense. Whoever received abilities and powers from God shall not permit them
to rust, but shall employ them usefully.”96 Thus, the concrete application of St. Paul’s
injunction would depend on one’s situation in life which is multifaceted. It is also a clear
case of an interpretation which appeals to both the letter and spirit of the law.
3.2.3.3. Social Justice and Wages
The other major instance where social justice appears in QA is in connection with
the wage system. Notice that the issue of wages is another key socio-economic
component. Having stated the need for an equitable appraisal of human labor, the pope
advances three pertinent conditions. First, the human person who is ready and willing to
work deserves to receive a “living family wage” according to the demands of social
justice.
In the first place, the wage paid to the workingman should be sufficient for the
support of himself and of his family . . . If in the present state of society this is not
always feasible, social justice demands that reforms be introduced without delay
which will guarantee every adult workingman just such a wage. In this connection
we might utter a word of praise for various systems devised and attempted in
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practice, by which an increased wage is paid in view of increased family burdens,
and a special provision is made for special needs.97
The second condition is that there should and ought to be purposeful dialogue
between the employer and the employee. In so doing, the true nature of the business
including benefits and burdens are fraternally discussed. Thus, decisions that are taken as
a result of such a dialogical process are more beneficial to both parties: “The guiding
spirit in this crucial decision should be one of mutual understanding and Christian
harmony between employers and workers.”98
The third condition deals with the “requirements of the common good.” The
intrinsic connection between social justice and the common good is again brought to
one’s attention. Thus, social justice does not only demand and guarantee a living family
wage but it also demands a wage policy that respects, enables and ensures the proper
working conditions of the working members of the society.
Finally, the wage level should be arrived at with the public economic welfare in
mind. . . All are aware that a scale of wages too low, no less than a scale
excessively high, causes unemployment. Now unemployment, particularly if
widespread and of long duration, as we have been forced to experience it during
our pontificate, is a dreadful scourge; it causes misery and temptation to the
laborer, ruins the prosperity of nations, and endangers public order, peace and
tranquility the world over. To lower or raise wages unduly, with a view to private
profit, and with no consideration for the common good, is contrary to social
justice. This latter requires that by combining effort and good will to the extent
possible, wages be so determined as to offer to the greatest number opportunities
of employment and of securing for themselves suitable means of livelihood.99
The concern expressed by the pope on the relationship between wage fluctuation and
unemployment is noteworthy. The pope states cautiously that a one-sided application of
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an economic purchasing power or cost theory of wages might result in unemployment.
Thus, the emphasis on the public economic good is the logical result of a good
understanding of the common good and social justice.

3.2.3.4. Social Justice as the Guiding Principle of Socio-economic Life
The pope had indicated that in order to effectively carry out the agenda set forth
in QA, two conditions were indispensable: the reform of institutions and the correction of
morals.100 The reform of institutions was carried out chiefly through the principle of
subsidiarity which was discussed in chapter two. In the course of this work, one will offer
the relationship between social justice and subsidiarity. However, the focus of this paper
now is how the pope sets out to bring about the correction of morals by advancing new
guiding principles.
The serious challenge to human solidarity that the pope notices is the free
competition that individualism has accepted as the guiding principle for the economy. In
order to curtail the aspirations of “rugged competition” the pope advanced new guiding
principles for economic life: social justice and social charity.
It is therefore very necessary that economic affairs be once more subjected to and
governed by a true and effective guiding principle. Still less can this function be
exercised by the economic supremacy which within recent times has taken the
place of free competition: for this is a headstrong and vehement power, which, if
it is to prove beneficial to mankind, needs to be curbed and governed by itself.
More lofty and noble principles must therefore be sought in order to regulate this
supremacy firmly and honestly: to wit, social justice and social charity.
To that end all the institutions of public and social life must be imbued with the
spirit of justice, and this justice must above all be truly operative. It must build up
a juridical and social order able to pervade all economic activity. [Society charity]
should be, as it were, the soul of this order. It is the duty of the State to safeguard
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effectively and to vindicate promptly this order, a task it will perform the more
readily if it frees itself from those burdens which, as we stated above, are not
properly its own.101
The question might be asked today: why was it necessary for the Church to set a
guiding principle for economic life? Nell-Breuning, more than any other commentator on
QA has provided the significance of a “principle” that is worthy of note. According to
him, the Latin word principium provides the key for understanding the concept of a
guiding principle. Since principium recognizes the “autonomy or self-sufficiency of the
principles proper to each department of culture. . . It means that the various cultural
spheres stand, so to speak, on their own feet, are based on their own intrinsic nature, and
follow the laws emanating from this foundation.”102 In essence, “economic science and
moral science have each their own intrinsic principles.”103 Furthermore, Nell-Bruening
indicated that the clearest use of principium that has stood the test of time was by the
Vatican Council to explain the relation between faith and reason as both possessing their
own intrinsic proper principles without jeopardizing the role of the other.104 Thus, the
different spheres of culture ought not to oppose one another but should mutually support
them in building the common good of society.
By advancing social justice and social charity as the new guiding principles of
economic life, the pope brought about a restoration of the socio-economic lifestyle of
society. There are two critical comments that are necessary at this stage: first, it should be
pointed out that while social justice and social charity serve as guiding principles to
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socio-economic life, these principles may not be used interchangeably to mean economic
justice; second, social justice and social charity are not meant to replace the important
roles played by distributive justice and commutative justice in society. In the next point,
one will elaborate further on the dual comments offered here, especially how they fit into
the larger scheme of the common good of society.

3.2.3.5. Social Justice, Capitalism, Commutative Justice and the Common Good
The pope examined the many changes that had taken place in economic life since
Leo XIII. Thus, with the understanding that social justice is geared toward the common
good, a pertinent distinction is made between capitalism as a system and the unfortunate
consequences which result from its wrongful application.
Leo XIII’s whole endeavor was to adjust this economic system to the norms of
right order. It is clear then that the system as such is not to be condemned. Surely
it is not vicious of its very nature; but it violates right order whenever capital so
employs the working or wage-earning classes as to divert business and economic
activity entirely to its own arbitrary will and advantage without any regard to the
human dignity of the workers, the social character of economic life, social justice,
and the common good.105
Therefore, the arbitrary use of capital is described as negating the right order of the social
economy. Leo XIII had declared very correctly that capital and labor are intertwined:
“Capital cannot do without labor, nor labor without capital.”106 The pope warned that the
lack of balance between capital and labor leads to domination instead of free competition
in three ways: “First, there is the struggle for dictatorship in the economic sphere itself;
then, the fierce battle to acquire control of the State, so that its resources and authority
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may be abused in the economic struggles. Finally, the clash between States
themselves.”107 This situation has led to different forms of “unfortunate consequences”
which the pope believed lead to imperialism and human alienation. Nell-Breuning
captures this point succinctly:
The utter lack of conscientious scruples in this respect the pope characterizes by
applying to international capital the Latin proverb: ubi bene, ibi patria, ‘where a
man’s fortune is, there is his country.’ In other words, a disposition of purest
egotism completely lacking every interest in, and responsibility for, the fate of
one’s native land.108
Similarly, the connection between social justice and the common good is
advanced without sacrificing in the process the important role played by commutative
justice in the socio-economic life of the society toward promoting the common good of
all members.
The mutual relations between capital and labor must be regulated according to the
laws of strict justice, called commutative justice, supported however by Christian
charity. Free competition, and especially economic domination, must be kept
within definite and proper bounds, and must be brought under effective control of
the public authority, in matters pertaining to the latter’s competence. The public
institutions of the nations should be such as to make all human society conform to
the requirements of the common good, that is, the norm of social justice. If this is
done, that very important part of social life, the economic system, will of
necessity be restored to sanity and right order.109
Oswald von Nell-Breuning has offered an interpretation that reflects the letter and spirit
of the right relationship between commutative justice and social justice in relation to
wages which should serve as a general principle since every case of commutative justice
should posses this intrinsic relationship to social justice.
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According to Quadragesimo Anno the demand for a family wage is justified. In an
economic system in which vast numbers of the population are forced to live on
income from wages, this demand is absolute, as a demand of social justice. The
public order in such a community contradicts social justice until conditions have
been changed so that a family wage can be paid, not only to those workers who
have a family, and must support these families solely from their wage income, but
to every adult worker. As a demand of commutative justice, however, it is
conditional; as soon as the demands of social justice have been fulfilled, and work
has actually attained the value to which it is entitled according to economic
conditions, it automatically becomes the employer’s duty to pay family wages.110
In summary, it is pertinent to state that social justice is at the service of the
common good. This means that the goal and end of social justice is the common good. It
is the common good that is the measure of social justice. That is why it is possible to
argue for restrictions on commutative and distributive justice in the name of the common
good. Having commented on the different but unifying conditions for promoting social
justice and social charity as the guiding principles of socio-economic life that are geared
toward the common good, it is necessary in the next section to ascertain what QA
upholds as the right relationship which exists between social justice and social charity.

3.2.3.6. Social Justice and Social Charity
In QA Pius XI recognized social justice as the universal standard of all social
relationships which leads them to the common good. However, the pope also considered
the place of charity, that supernatural love which has as its foundation the infinite love of
God for his people and would appear to have the last say over any socio-economic and
political union expressed in justice alone. Having recognized social justice as the
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objective norm of all human social relationships, how can it be said at the same time that
social charity has primacy over social justice?
In order to answer the above question, one will first trace the context in which
Pius XI sought to make a distinction between the exercise and practice of charity on the
one hand, and social charity as a virtue and norm of socio-economic organization. On the
other hand, the pope made it clear that the works of charity alone could not adequately
address the societal ills brought about by social distinctions in society, so the pope made
this passionate appeal to the wealthy class who were satisfied with their charitable
gestures:
This state of things was quite satisfactory to the wealthy, who looked upon it as
the consequence of inevitable and natural economic laws, and who, therefore,
were content to abandon to charity alone the full care of relieving the unfortunate,
as though it were the task of charity to make amends for the open violation of
justice, a violation not merely tolerated, but sanctioned by legislators.111
Thus, the goal of the pope was to determine properly the roles of social charity and social
justice in the socio-economic process. Both Calvez and Perrin declared that “Charity is
the fundamental standard for the whole of social life, while justice is the objective
universal standard for all the relationships which arise there. It follows that the
connections between the two must be described in a manner which takes away nothing
from either of them.”112 This is precisely what the pope did when he specified the role of
charity in dealing with the institutional framework of justice in this way.
Now, in effecting this reform, charity “which is the bond of perfection,” must play
a leading part. How completely deceived are those inconsiderate reformers, who,
zealous only for commutative justice, proudly disdain the help of charity. Charity
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cannot take the place of justice unfairly withheld, but, even though a state of
things be pictured in which every man receives at last all that is his due, a wide
field will nevertheless remain open for charity. For, justice alone, even though
most faithfully observed, can remove indeed the cause of social strife, but can
never bring about a union of hearts and minds. Yet this union, binding men
together, is the main principle of stability in all institutions, no matter how perfect
they may seem, which aim at establishing social peace and promoting mutual aid.
In its absence, as repeated experience proves, the wisest regulations come to
nothing . . . 113
Perhaps, some analysis of the above papal statement will help one answer the question of
the relationship between social charity and social justice alluded to earlier. From the
onset, the pope said that while acts of charity are necessary and should be encouraged,
there are some conditions when the duty of charity ought to become the requirement of
justice. Nell-Breuning’s pragmatic comments are relevant here when he said that the
pope was in essence declaring that: “justice first, charity always.”114 This means that: “To
withhold from a man what is legally his, and, instead of it, to donate to him out of openhanded benevolence something else, usually inferior, is self-contradictory.”115 In other
words, the intentions to do justice and to engage in charitable deeds are not opposed to
each other. The opposition lies in the direct withdrawal of what is due the person as a
matter of justice, but not as a social gesture. Thus, the pope declares that “charity cannot
take the place of justice unfairly withheld.”116
Next, the pope affirms the proper place of charity, noting in the process that there
is a universal primacy of the law of charity which is different from particular charitable
acts. The primacy of the law of charity over justice is not meant to place charity and
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justice in an oppositional relationship. Rather, it is meant to place charity on a higher
level transforming the work of justice. Charity does not take away anything from the
specific requirements of justice but fashions it to completion. But one does not in any
way imply that the norm of justice is insufficient or incomplete. The real question lies
with the practical applications of justice by persons in community which ought to and
should be connected to charity because as the pope says: “justice alone, even though most
faithfully observed, can remove indeed the cause of social strife, but can never bring
about a union of hearts and minds.”117 Calvez and Perrin captured this fact clearly when
they said that:
Charity goes beyond justice, but not beyond the sphere of social relations, which
is governed as much by justice as by charity. It inspires actions more disinterested
than any which look only to the remedying of the consequences of injustice. Quite
apart from this, men ought to set no limit to the services they will do for each
other. Charity incites men to do more for each other than justice demands. The
Church demands no less, when it speaks of charity. Nor are the requirements of
social justice in any way diminished: on the contrary, they are heightened,
transformed from within, raised to the dignity of being “commandments” of
charity.118
Since social justice and charity were advanced by Pope Pius XI to provide the guidance
to individuals and groups in society, in order to help bring about reorganization of the
social order, it is proper to briefly examine next the relationship between social justice,
solidarity and the principle which was at the heart of the reform of institutions, namely,
the principle of subsidiarity.
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3.2.3.7. Social Justice and Subsidiarity
The two guiding principles of socio-economic life (social justice and social
charity) offered by Pius XI were meant to help fashion a society that is neither
individualistic nor collectivistic in nature. Thus, they were to help build an organic
society that recognizes the contributions of the individual and the various occupational,
social, economic and political groups or organs of the social body. In this way, the
relationship between the parts and the whole is essentially that of promoting cooperation,
social pluralism and the philosophy which Pesch called solidarism.
In QA, Pius XI described the new social order119 he was advocating as embracing
among other things “solidarism,” “pluralism,” and “organic” society. The emphasis here
was to promote unity in diversity by encouraging autonomous persons and organs of
society to forge cooperative ventures of self-help. The principle of subsidiarity ensures
that the lesser organs or groups within the society are given their particular and proper
responsibility, and that this shared responsibility by various social groups, is geared
toward the personal dignity and common good of all members.
Thus, one could affirm that both social justice and subsidiarity are in solidarity in
bringing about harmonious socio-economic activities toward the common good without
engaging in collectivist tendencies in the process. Some of these tendencies include
rugged competition in economic and political life and the ever-growing size of
government. While healthy competition is recognized by QA as necessary for any proper
socio-economic growth,120 unlimited competition which seeks to reduce human beings to
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economic objects is considered an aberration. Moreover, the situation where citizens turn
to the government for an answer to every aspect of their socio-economic life, largely
brought about by uncontrolled free competition, simply and smoothly ushers in the
totalitarian State by dominating individual creativity and liberty.
Consequently, subsidiarity serves as a check and balance in the social order. In
this regard, QA was able to distinguish between “state” control and “social” control as
part of the process of harmonization in society to help restore the disbanded organic
structure.
. . . As we called it, things have come to such a pass that the highly developed
social life, which once flourished in a variety of prosperous and interdependent
institutions, has been damaged and all but ruined, leaving virtually only
individuals and the State, with no little harm to the latter. But the State, deprived
of a supporting social structure, and now encumbered with all the burdens once
borne by the disbanded associations, is in consequence overwhelmed and
submerged by endless affairs and responsibilities.121
Furthermore, it is evident that the subsidiary nature of social activity is grounded
in the self-responsible and self-determining nature of the human person which was
discussed at great length in chapter two. Suffice it now to say that persons in society seek
to cooperate in social activity that is complementary and life-giving. They seek ways that
would mutually support them toward the common good and not activities that would
annihilate them. Hence, the springing forth of civil society organizations is at the heart of
social justice. The question of civil society will form the major subject for the fourth
chapter of this work. But it is pertinent to note that the pursuit of social justice rightly
understood will embrace what Messner described as a “socially integrated democracy,”
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which sets the ethical framework for socio-economic life ordered by the principles of
solidarity, social justice and subsidiarity in this way:
A social system in which freedom and order, individual interest and general
interest, individual and community, are so correlated that the individual can make
profit only if he is also promoting the general interest, and the community can
benefit only so long as it respects and promotes the freedom of the individual. In
such a correlation lies the essence of the social order.122
3.2.4. Summary
This section examined the theoretical framework for understanding social justice
as a regulating principle in the socio-economic life of society. We discovered that social
justice, as a scientific term, is synonymous to legal justice. Thus, the formal formulation
of social justice by Pius XI in QA was to expand the scientific conception to embrace
doctrinal and moral values which challenge individualistic and totalitarian thinking. Here
lies the worth of social justice as a guiding principle of just distribution in society. We
noted that the promotion of the virtue of social justice in community must be geared
toward the common good as its goal and end. Lastly, we examined the component parts
of social justice as the necessary building blocks toward the common good. In the next
section, one will examine the significance of a social justice worldview in a multiethnic
and pluralistic social context.

3.3.

Social Justice in a Multiethnic and Pluralistic Society
The next question one will discuss is how to apply the theoretical framework for

social justice in a pluralistic social context with many diverse ethnic, cultural, religious,
and political affiliations. What follows is an attempt to highlight some of the key issues
that may form the agenda for a social justice vision that is sensitive to the benefits and
burdens of a pluralistic society.
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3.3.1. Building Community through Social Justice
The general thesis of this dissertation is how one is able to structure interlocking
groups in society, so as to engage in social and moral reconstruction with a view to
maximize liberty and still pursue a common good ordered toward the achievement of
social charity and justice. We have indicated so far, particularly in chapter two, that the
presence of some principles of cohesion is indispensable toward the attainment of our set
objective, namely the building of community through social justice. It was also evident
from the discussion thus far that when the different parts of society work harmoniously
for the common good of the members, there is relative peace and tranquility in the State.
Hence, we also discussed how social relations between individuals and the larger
institutions in society relate with each other in terms of governance by appealing to
subsidiarity to help support the different levels of mediating structures in society,
beginning from the grassroots and spreading out to the multiple dimensions of society.
Thus, the most basic structure which gives some stability and order to the social
body in society is the common sense of the laws and values of a people, which are
grounded in the day-to-day interrelationships in terms of their beliefs, market
arrangements, family setup, politics, and generally accepted social practices. The norms
by which a society governs itself, therefore, may be codified or unwritten. In different
circumstances, such norms have some degree of binding force, though the codified norms
such as the constitution of a State always receive much attention as the rule of law. To the
extent that most people live by the acceptable norms of society and see them as useful
and true, social order is maintained. However, to the extent that social norms are grossly
violated, there exists generally social disorder. Thus, there needs to be a healthy
interaction between social order and cultural values because culture is developed over
long periods of struggle, exchange and interchange. Consequently, when the culture of a
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people is disconnected, the building process might be overwhelming because naïve and
unconstructive arrangements which fail to recognize the cultural make-up are bound to
collapse. T. S. Eliot made this point clearly when he said that when culture erodes “you
must start painfully again, and you cannot put on a new culture ready made. You must
wait for the grass to grow to feed the sheep to give wool out of which your new coat will
be made.”123 In chapter four, this work will show that the task of rebuilding a multiethnic
and plural society such as Nigeria is more daunting and that some of the arrangements
made so far by the successive governments in Nigeria reveal a gross underestimation of
the enormous task involved in building a vibrant community. The study will propose how
healthy partnership with civil society, decentralization of some major institutions and
dedication on the part of the State might promote a society where citizens can have a fair
say on how their culture and social order might interact for the common good of all
members.
Another key issue that is central to the building of community is moral
responsibility of the citizens. While to some degree morality springs out of the cultural
experience of a community, it is not limited to human individual choices, lifestyles,
values, and interpretations. Morality, as one has investigated, is also revealed and is
grounded in nature and the Creator of the Universe whom we call God. In essence, the
divine law envisions a moral order that promotes the common good and respects all
human life and is able to serve as corrective to the moral order of society. The attempt to
build a prosperous socio-economic and political community without moral standards may
be likened to building a house without a solid foundation. It will be shown in chapter four
that in a society like Nigeria, the lack of moral transparency by both the leaders and some
of the citizens who encourage this type of behavior has more often led to the demand for
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big government and less opportunities for personal responsibility of the citizens in terms
of civil society participation toward self-government. The challenge then is how to
develop social policy that is sensitive to human culture and at the same time transcendent
of nature? T. William Boxx raised this question in similar fashion when he said that:
“Our human nature is such that cultural arrangements cannot be subject to limitless
reconstructions which might, for example, present a false dichotomy between the
individual and society or which would tend to blur the distinctions or which would
diminish the validity of moral life.”124 Thus, we propose to offer an essential tool that
would not shy away from the many social, political, ethnic, and economic claims and
counter-claims that exist in a pluralistic society such as the one under consideration. In
the next section, we will discuss the concept of altruism as central to building a
community that respects the personal interest of individuals and the common interest of
society since they ought not to oppose each other in a healthy socio-political setup that is
morally grounded.

3.3.2. Altruism and the Common Good
Andrew Reeve has offered a concise understanding of altruism that connotes both
particular and universal human relationships in community that I intend to adopt as a
working definition. It is worth quoting in detail.
Benefiting other persons or interest-bearers. The common contrast with
selfishness reveals some variations in the understanding of altruism, which may
refer to a disposition, to an intention, or to behavior. Hence an altruistic person
might intend to benefit others, but fail to do so when executing that intention.
Altruism is sometimes understood as giving more consideration to others than
oneself, and sometimes as giving equal consideration to oneself and others. Since
124
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there are commonly more ‘others’ than the decision-maker, the distinction usually
lacks practical importance, but it may be significant in two-person cases. In
discussions informed by game theory, a contrast is drawn between reciprocal
altruism and universal altruism. Reciprocal altruists display that behavior towards
those from whom they received it, or from whom they expect to receive it.
Universal altruism, often seen as the central ethical prescription of Christianity, is
unconditional. In socio-biological applications, it can be shown that the survival
chances of individuals and groups depend not only on the incidence of selfishness
and altruism, but also on the type of altruism in question.125
The above understanding takes into consideration three attitudes that individuals and
groups are encouraged to cultivate in order that selfishness may be curtailed and thus
enhance their survival in the community. These are: giving more consideration to others
than oneself in a way that might be reciprocal; giving equal consideration to oneself and
others; and the unconditional ethical self-giving of oneself to others. How then might one
combine self-interest and the interest of others in order to build one’s community for the
common good of all?
Patrick Riordan126 has addressed the above question at some length and I will
borrow his analysis to a certain extent. According to Riordan, the desire and quest for an
alternative way of dealing with the challenge that self-interest poses several questions to
human solidarity127 has led to much discussion about altruism as the desired alternative.
Indeed, Riordan poses several questions that altruism is supposed to confront and
wonders why any one might embark on such a task in the face of the pope’s prescription
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about the need for human solidarity.
Why should anyone take responsibility for others, and bear extra costs and
burdens which benefit them, not herself? Why should I have to pay to support
people who do nothing for me? Translate this prescription into the debates on
contemporary problems: world hunger, the destruction of the rainforests, the
environment, the North-South divide, unemployment, and the burden of debt. Can
the pope seriously expect all involved to take responsibility for everyone else?
Hasn’t each person enough to do to look out for herself, and hasn’t each State
enough to do in safeguarding its own interests?128
Thus, Riordan believes that the challenge of the common good is to “perform both
descriptive and prescriptive functions, and that it can be of use in the thinking of social
participants and in the analysis of scientific observers.”129 This is the context in which he
addresses the concept of altruism as a moral philosophy that may be an essential
component of the common good. However, Riordan departs from an understanding of
altruism that is caught up in the “disjunction egoism-altruism,” on two grounds. First, it
does not provide an adequate model for explaining the role of the altruist agent and the
beneficiary as involved in a communal project but rather as involved in a separate one.130
Second, there is the risk of reducing the language of the common good to a fantasy world
where one is encouraged to suppress self-interest while the interest of others becomes the
determinant force for the common good. In such a situation, there could be the danger of
irrelevance by some organs in society like the Churches who present themselves as
champions of the common good that respects the interest of others, but self-interest
appears to be at the core of the social fabric of both private and public discourse. Thus,
Riordan warns that:
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Rather than contributing to social and cultural cohesion, pursuit of a solution in
terms of altruism may lead to further disintegration of the social fabric. The
danger is that institutions in society like churches and educational bodies will be
asked to train people in altruism, when the message communicated by the market,
including competition for university places and jobs, is that self-interest is the
only rational stance. Teachers and preachers would increasingly find themselves
on the margins and outside the mainstream of serious business of society.131
In order to avert this danger, the need for a proper understanding of altruism that is
devoid of the “disjunction egoism-altruism,” is posited. Thus, our task is to offer a
language of the common good that takes into consideration the self-interest of individuals
and at the same time the interest of others in society. According to Riordan this means
that:
The political rhetoric which is required not only to make sense of people’s
willingness to cooperate but also to offer persuasive arguments to encourage
greater efforts in common ventures . . . However, cooperation, common ventures,
whether on the small scale or on the large scale in politics and society, require
shared convictions on the interests at stake . . . We need a language for talking
about our common interests, and a way of evaluating them. A vocabulary for
speaking of the good and of the good life is the appropriate alternative to the
language of interest, whether of self or another.132
Developing a language of shared interests and values in a pluralistic and multiethnic
society would involve among other things developing a culture of human cooperation at
different levels of society. In the next section, we will discuss some of the different levels
of encounter where exchange or inter-change of values might take place as one examines
the relationship between social justice and solidarity.
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3.3.3. Social Justice, Social Groups and Solidarity
The task of developing and maintaining a language of human cooperation among
social groups is a difficult one but not impossible. There are several necessary levels of
communication and interaction that may promote the recognition of shared values and
interests in a community. In some circumstances, there might even be some clash of
beliefs and cultures as a necessary state of purification in order to discover the necessary
adjustment needed toward building a more socially cohesive community. John Gardner133
has identified some of the critical stages for building a responsible community which will
prove helpful in this research. According to Gardner the traditional community is bound
to undergo some necessary adjustments in order to be responsive to the contemporary
society.
The traditional community was homogeneous. Today most of us live with
heterogeneity, and it will inevitably affect the design of our communities. Some
of the homogeneity of traditional communities was based on exclusionary
practices we cannot accept today. The traditional community experienced
relatively little change from one year to the next. The vital contemporary
community will not only survive change but, when necessary, seek it. The
traditional community commonly demanded a high degree of conformity.
Because of the nature of our world, the best of our contemporary communities
today are pluralistic and adaptive, fostering individual freedom and responsibility
within a framework of group obligation. The traditional community was often
unwelcoming to strangers, and all too ready to reduce its communication with the
external world. Hard realities require that present-day communities be in
continuous and effective touch with the outside world, and our values require that
they be inclusive.134
Thus, it is obvious that the traditional community will have to continually undergo a
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process of rebuilding and reformulating its shared values, beliefs and cultural practices.
Some of the most cherished values will be passed on to the next generation with renewed
vigor and meaning. Other beliefs and cultural practices will become obsolete and
irrelevant, losing their meaning in view of new realities. In the midst of these challenges,
the role of the extended family system and the levels of support it provided or did not
provide for the social structuring of the community would play a vital role in reshaping
new models of social groups.
Another important stage of community rebuilding is the identification by Gardner
of the “ingredients of community.”135 First, the type of community envisaged by Gardner
which we support is “. . . a set of attributes that may appear in diverse settings - a school,
a congregation, a town, a suburb, a work place, a neighborhood.”136 We will expand our
understanding of community for the sake of relevance to include a clan, a mono-tribal
village, a multi-tribal village, a mono-religious town, or a multi-religious town. These
categorizations will become helpful in chapter four when we deal with the Nigerian
social structure.
Gardner proposes that “wholeness incorporating diversity” is necessary to
promote and maintain the different and constantly interacting system of multiple cultures.
The goal of social justice would be to ensure that the common good of all is upheld
within the law by recognizing and accepting the individuality of the different social
groups, while at the same time allowing some room for the social fabric of society to be
governable and relatively peaceful.
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The play of conflicting interests in a framework of shared purposes is the drama
of a free society. It is a robust exercise and a noisy one, not for the fainthearted or
the tidy-minded. Diversity is not simply “good” in that it implies breadth of
tolerance and sympathy. A community of diverse elements has greater capacity to
adapt and renew itself in a swiftly changing world.137
Thus, a philosophy of pluralism is the key to maintaining the balance between diversity
and wholeness. Such a philosophy will make allowance for open dissent and critical
comments without sacrificing one’s identity in the process. This would mean allowing
minority groups to present their vision within the setting of larger groups. Here, concrete
grassroots arrangements for groups to dialogue with one another are fundamental to
community rebuilding. The emergence of a new crop of leaders both in government and
within civil society that will engage in broad based initiatives rather than engage in
divisiveness by exploiting diversity cannot be overemphasized.
Furthermore, Gardner opines that there is the need for “a reasonable base of
shared values,” to help build a responsible community. To expect that members of the
community agree on everything is a direct violation of the diversity required. Therefore,
the community ought to promote its cherished values by not only talking about them but,
most especially, by living and practicing them. The community where respect, rights,
equality, freedom of speech, education, are taught and promoted will embrace them. But
the community which constantly lives in fear of armed bandits, bribery, corruption,
nepotism, tribalism and violence will find it difficult to build a healthy community. The
role of social justice is to encourage that we teach the truth by living it. Let the diverse
social groups recognize and put together their shared values be they religious, cultural or
political as long as they promote the common good of all in community.
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Next, the need for caring, trust, and teamwork is encouraged as necessary steps
toward responsible community building. We examined in chapter one how an African
community engaged in the process of self-government,138 and was able to provide for
themselves the essentials of life as dictated by the circumstances of lived experience.
Today, some of these duties and responsibilities have been taken over by local, State, and
Federal governments. But there are still some functions that remain which government
alone cannot adequately provide. These include building trust, care of the community and
teamwork. This study will elaborate on this point in detail in chapter four but it is
pertinent to say that there ought to be several levels of participation: the role of subgroups
and minorities; judicial means of resolving conflicts; participation in shared tasks; and
education for civic leadership especially by the younger generation. The next section will
examine the relationship between social justice, civil society and development as integral
to promoting a responsive pluralistic society.

3.3.4. Social Justice, Civil Society and Development
The goal of the analysis is to examine how communities will ensure that some of
their shared values, beliefs, and cultural practices will be respected by the government of
their choosing and not by some oligarchy or unrepresentative group of despots. To ensure
effective participation of the majority of the people, one will have to look at the role of
civil society groups as trusted partners in the process of governance. Thus, recognizing
smaller organizations at the grassroots level such as Churches, ethnic and tribal group
associations, labor unions, traditional councils, local school systems, and market
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associations, where intimate relationships are central to authentic human existence, is
crucial to upholding social justice, law and order and promoting participation and social
development.
Wogaman has suggested that it is essential to have these “mediating structures”
because they help to link people with one another, link people with sources of meaning,
and link people with power centers.139 Such a linkage is important because it is not
enough to look at the humanizing role of these mediating structures. It is necessary for
these structures to understand how governments work so that they may be able to guide
against manipulation by government for its ends. In the case of Church organizations, for
instance, one agrees with Wogaman that “The Churches’ best contributions as mediating
institutions are nurturing interpersonal relationships, transmitting traditions, and
providing avenues of access to power, not implementing the State’s purpose.”140 Thus,
there is no need to draw an absolute dichotomy between the Church and the State because
they are both aspects of the one society. However, they need to both uphold and maintain
their respective roles even though, in some cases, cooperative ventures might become
inevitable and necessary.
The role of organized labor in the form of unions and workers’ associations that
are free from government control also supports the civic responsibility and participation
of the citizens. That is why one needs to pay attention to the position of Tom Kahn who
opined that for most people in some communities and societies, “unions are schools of
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democracy.”
They are the place where workers, many of them with relatively little formal
schooling, learn how to raise their hands, be recognized, get up, say something,
and sit down. They learn how to organize and run a meeting; and they learn about
parliamentary procedure, which is important as a formalization of the rules of
where your rights stop and someone else’s begin. That is, parliamentary
procedure teaches us that the other person has rights, too: no one has the right to
talk all night without giving others a chance to speak, and a speaker cannot be
hooted off the platform or out of the hall by those who disagree. . . Trade union
democracy is imperfect, like other forms of democracy, but it is the only place
many people ever have a chance to learn about democracy at all.141
Thus, from trade union democracy emerges a very decentralized structure of governance
where local leadership is selected by the people and for the people to act as their
representatives. The local leadership organize themselves at ward, State, regional and
national levels. In so doing, trade unions respect the principle of subsidiarity by acting as
support to their members in order that they may help themselves. Moreover, local leaders
are not sidelined by those at the State or national levels but mutually work together for
the common good of the members.
Another key mediating structure that promotes civil society is the Family.142 The
family is the oldest institution known to human beings. While there may be variations in
family setup due to cultural, social, environmental, and religious influences, human
values of respect and honor for the integrity of the human person as an individual being
with social obligations appear to be universal. Thus, the extent to which families are
nurtured in communities determines to a larger degree the type of society one is
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developing. The role of the family as an instrument of social justice needs to be
emphasized and developed in the civil society by all the partners working together for the
common good of all.
In Africa, the theme: “The Church as Family,” has been one concrete way of
promoting the role of the family in society. Having identified the different ways in which
the model of Church as family is relevant to its social context, the bishops offered critical
comments that show the centrality of the family in relation to social justice.
The family is indeed the first school of justice. By the Creator’s will it is the basic
cell of society within which the young take their first steps in the exercise of
social justice, solidarity and fraternity. Nothing can take the place of this natural
environment where so many young Africans have learned the rules of life in
society, respect for other people and social responsibility. Alas, the profound
social and cultural changes we are experiencing have shaken the very structure of
the family which is finding it more and more difficult to carry out its role as it is
plagued by a whole arsenal of false human values. . . We must do all in our power
to ensure that the next generation on our continent will be able to enjoy the
protection, security and love of a family. If each child is able to grow up within a
healthy family, a great step will have been taken along the road to education for
justice.143
3.3.5. Summary
This chapter has discussed the concept of social justice as a regulating principle of
society from a theological perspective. In so doing, one took into consideration the
philosophical, social, cultural, economic, and political influences in society. Based on the
biblical analysis of social justice, it was clear that the pursuit of justice is at the heart of
the message and mission of the Gospel. In this connection, one is able to re-echo the
affirmation made by the 1971 Synod of Catholic bishops in their document Justice in the
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World (JW), while reflecting on the meaning of justice which has become the yardstick
for action in socio-political life and relations between Church and State.
Action on behalf of justice and participation in the transformation of the world
fully appear to us as a constitutive dimension of the preaching of the Gospel, or,
in other words, of the Church’s mission for the redemption of the human race and
its liberation from every oppressive situation.144
The above statement has and continues to greatly influence social responsibility based on
Gospel values to promote the common good of members of the society. Having examined
some of the ways in which social justice relates to development and civil society, one
does not in any way claim to have exhausted the many other aspects of civil society.
Chapter four will address more concrete proposals for cooperation in public policy issues
among members of the civil society with particular reference to the Nigerian social
context.
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CHAPTER FOUR
Catholic Social Thought and Civil Society in Nigeria:
Prospects and Challenges

Introduction
This chapter will examine how the principles of Catholic social thought may
support the existing fragile civil society in Nigeria. More specifically, the principles of
human dignity, subsidiarity, social justice, solidarity, and the common good already
articulated in chapters one to three would form the major building blocks for analysis and
application to the Nigerian social context. The task is twofold.
First, the chapter will engage in a critical and analytical history of the Nigerian
social context since the amalgamation of 1914 to the present. In so doing, one will look at
past mistakes and major efforts toward nationhood within a federal structure by various
military regimes and civilian governments since Nigeria’s independence in 1960 as well
as present challenges and threats to nationhood. The paper will comment on the issue of
value systems in Nigeria and show how these have influenced policy decisions in
education, health care, politics, economics, governance and ethical and religious issues.
The study will evaluate these policies and offer suggestions for sustainable development.
Second, this chapter will examine the Nigerian civil society with a view to
building healthy partnership between the State and non-governmental sector. In
particular, one needs to look at the threat to civil society by examining systemic issues of
uncivil society and offer better ways to build a more responsive pluralistic and open
society. The chapter will propose an alternative vision for the Nigerian State in the light
of some key principles of Catholic Social Thought already discussed. Specifically, one
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will show the correlation between the principle of subsidiarity and the pursuit of a federal
governmental structure that respects the complex relationship which exists between the
local and central administrative units as constitutive parts of the whole. The aim is to
promote grassroots participation and proper citizenship education. One is aware of the
multi-religious nature of Nigeria and does not in any way advocate a State religion for
Nigeria, but one does bring a Christian perspective to the table as a useful tool in the
effort to build a pluralistic and viable society.

4.1.

A Critical and Analytical History of the Nigerian State: 1914 to the Present1
The analysis of the historical development of the Nigerian State starts from 1914

and revolves around four major issues: the social context of the Nigerian State; the State
and Citizenship in Nigeria; the Political and Administrative Structures in Nigeria, and the
state of Labor and Capital in Nigeria.
The year 1914 is significant in Nigeria because it is the official birthday of the
nation.
January 1, 1914, the day when Lord Lugard effected the amalgamation of the
Protectorate of Northern Nigeria Colony and Protectorate of Southern Nigeria
which were previously administered as separate though related territories, is
generally regarded as the birth date of the Nigerian State. Before it –indeed,
before the advent of colonial conquest and rule – there was no Nigeria, and the
likelihood that a State like it could have evolved was quite remote. What existed
in the period before the establishment of colonial rule was a motley of diverse
groups whose histories and interactions, interlaced as they were by external
1

The historical analysis of Nigeria was informed largely by the following important works. Eghosa E.
Osaghae, Crippled Giant: Nigerian Since Independence (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University
Press, 1998), pp.1-30; Rotimi T. Suberu, Federalism and Ethnic Conflict in Nigeria (Washington, DC:
United States Institute of Peace Press, 2001), pp.19-46; Paul E. Lovejoy, “Historical Setting,” Nigeria: A
Country Study, (ed.), Helen Chapin Metz (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, 1992), pp. 3-83. In these
works, some of the structural classifications that have shaped the historical developments in Nigeria are
evaluated as the basis for Nigerian politics.

221
influences – principally trade with Europeans and with the Arab world – had
nevertheless crystallized in three clearly discernible regional formations by the
end of the nineteenth century.2
Thus, it is pertinent to trace the consequences of the emergence of Nigeria and to show
how some of the structural imbalances that existed at its birth have continued to manifest
as birthmark scars. Hence, some understanding of the structural setup of the major
regional groupings is inevitable in the attempt to put into perspective the events that led
to the amalgamation of Nigeria and the challenges thereafter.
In Northern Nigeria the Islamic influence was widespread due largely to
prolonged trade relations established along the trans-Saharan route and migrations which
brought the Hausa States, the Kanem Bornu Empire and the Fulanis mainly to North
Africa, the Mediterranean, and the larger section of the Islamic world together. Another
major influence of Islamic push in the North was the event of 1804 during which the
Fulanis launched a jihad in order to bring the peoples of the Middle Belt region under a
theocratic and centralized system of rule by the Sokoto Caliphate. The Islamic incursion,
while it proved successful in the far north of Nigeria, met fierce opposition around the
Benue and Plateau regions where groups like the Tiv, Idoma, and the Ngas and Berom
refused to embrace the Islamic religion. However, the Islamic surge brought its
challenges. According to Osaghea, this Islamic incursion had two major consequences “. .
. which received reinforcement and elaboration under colonial rule and shaped intergroup relations in Nigeria in the post-independence period.”3 First, the Muslim groups
and their followers were presented and accepted as the major group in the North by the
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colonial power. This made non-Islamic groups virtually powerless in the face of the
numerical strength of the Muslims. Moreover, the British policy of indirect rule ensured
that “appointees of the Caliphate and Emirates were imposed as rulers on the non-Muslim
groups,”4 to enhance the political agenda of the colonial power. Second, the colonizers
accepted the Sokoto Caliphate’s political and social organization as the ideal to spread
and enforce near and far in what was emerging as Nigeria.
In the West, the Oyo and Benin kingdoms were formidable and provided the
political, social and religious climate that would shape this region of Nigeria. The major
tribal groups that formed the Oyo kingdom were the Yorubas, made up of several subgroups linked to a common ancestry traced to the legendary Oduduwa (the creator of the
earth and ancestor of the Yoruba kings). The Benin kingdom consisted of different ethnic
communities like the Edo speaking people made up of the Urhobo, Isoko and some Igbos
with no common ancestry, who were forged into the kingdom. Both the Oyo and Benin
Kingdoms witnessed several communal wars in the late 19th century that gradually led to
their decline and, consequently, the emergence of new regional powers and political
arrangements. According to Osaghae the reorganization of political loyalties in the
Western region was orchestrated by the Northern political figures in alliance with the
Colonialists for both economic and religious interests.
The wars and crises in the West were instigated and fuelled by the meddling of
Fulani jihadists whose sphere of influence spread to Oyo and other northernmost
parts of the West, and European traders and colonialists who, particularly since
the era of the slave trade, pursued manipulative and divisionist strategies to gain
trade advantages and retain political-cum-military control in the region.5
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Finally, in the Eastern region there were many ethnic groups like the Igbo, Ijaw,
Efik, Annang, Kalabari and others who organized their village settlements in a noncentralized fashion. The largest group was the Igbo speaking people who occupied most
of the land in the eastern region. While upholding the identity of the sub group, the Igbos
were united by Arochukwu, an Igbo clan of mixed Igbo and Ibibio origins who had
entered into various alliances and treaties with Igbo clans. These groups had some
political and religious power in many of the areas of their jurisdiction. Thus, some
scholars have wrongly argued that these societies were “stateless”6 because they had no
centralized government, while, in fact, they were organized around local tribal rule in an
autonomous manner, which maintained some degree of independence and limited power
structure within the ethnic group.
Thus, the emergence of the Nigerian State was the creation of the British colonial
power that brought their political might as an empire to bear on the independent citystates in the West-African region. They were able, through collaboration with local
chiefs, to effect in-direct rule and to fashion a nation that would serve its needs and,
hopefully, the needs of those who would live in the State. Following the amalgamation
and the evolution of the Nigerian federation, the British ruled Nigeria as a unitary State
under the guidance of the Macpherson constitution of 1951 as a quasi-federal unit.
Through a piecemeal and combined process of trade monopoly, military
superiority, ‘divide and rule’ and outright conquest, the various groups were
brought together under the aegis of colonial authority. The nature of this bringing
together requires elaboration because of the far-reaching implications it had for
state and nation-building. British acquisition of territory in Nigeria had three
6
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different strands which roughly approximated to the regional formations
described above: the colony of Lagos and hinterland (Western) protectorate; the
oil rivers and later Niger Delta protectorate (Eastern); and the Northern
protectorate.7
Rotimi Suberu8 has shown how the colonial federal legacy that sought to bring
harmony within Nigeria’s major ethnic groups was flawed by a system of centralization
of power that encouraged corruption and political fragmentation on ethnic grounds. He
proposed a decentralized system that would bring about constitutional reform in Nigerian
federal character that would face the challenges posed by the ethno-political complexity
of the State.
The Lyttelton Constitution of 1954 formally established Nigeria as a three-region
federation. Thus, the constitution provided the framework for Nigeria’s three large, but
unequal, regional groups that control the internal and administrative arrangements of the
nation, while the central government held on to external affairs and inter-regional
matters. According to Suberu, one can trace three interrelated factors that brought about a
substantial change to the federal form of government adopted in Nigeria in 1954.
1.
2.
3.

7

The staggering diversity and sheer strength of ethno-linguistic forces in
the federation.
The differential regional impact of colonial administration, modernization,
and mobilization.
The enormous attraction that federalist guarantees of sub-national
autonomy had for the emergent, regionally based Nigerian successor
elites.9
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Thus, the combined force of the above mentioned factors supported by British power
produced Nigeria as “one of the most ethnically diverse countries in the world” and
probably the one most deeply divided amongst all the countries created during the
European occupation of Africa.10 Thus, “within Nigeria’s borders were to be found, some
380 linguistic modes of communication, as many as twenty distinct geographical regions,
and such divergent forms of political organization as clan communities, villages,
republics, city-states, chiefdoms, kingdoms, and a Caliphate.”11
Furthermore, the political stratification of the nation on ethnic affiliations
prepared the ground on which the nation may be placed in perpetual tension as each
ethnic group sought power to protect its turf. Suberu captured this situation more clearly:
The most politically salient feature of Nigeria’s ethnic diversity, however, was the
distribution of ethnic groups into a relatively centralized ethnic structure, with the
Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba, and Igbo formations predominating. As the rivalries
among these three groups crystallized into bitter political struggles during the late
colonial era (under the combined impact of economic competition and electoral
mobilization), it became increasingly clear to all interested observers that only by
some form of highly decentralized political arrangements could the major groups
be accommodated within a single country. Nigeria’s federalism, therefore,
developed as an institutional response both to the federal character of the society
(with its sharp territorial ethno-linguistic divisions), and to the explosive
demographic configuration of the ethnic structure, which pitted three major
nationalities in fierce competition with one another.12
But one may equally make a case for some positive role by the British colonial
power to establish a federal government in Nigeria, which they hoped would serve as a
uniting factor for a nation whose people are deeply multi-national, multi-religious,
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multicultural, multiethnic, multi-regional, and multi-structural. Thus, the argument was
made that the British served “. . . as a force for both integration and differentiation in
Nigeria.”13 According to Suberu, one needs to examine three major British colonial
policies in order to make a balanced assessment of their role in Nigeria.
The first policy was that of indirect rule, which administered the Nigerian people
through their existing political and social institutions. In Northern Nigeria, particularly,
the emirates wielded much power and used this to enforce the system of taxation that was
welcomed by the colonial power and which ensured submission by the subjects. In so
doing, the position of the emirs was assured and re-enforced. In some parts of the country
where such hierarchical system of traditional governance was lacking, the indirect rule
that operated gave prominence to tribal political institutions. Accordingly, the policy of
indirect rule in Nigeria served “to reinforce the most conservative features of local
political institutions, perpetuate communal consciousness, and scuttle the forces that had
been pushing toward inter-ethnic integration or assimilation in the pre-colonial era.”14
The second colonial policy adopted by the British was to isolate the emirs of
Northern Nigeria from engaging in the process of modernization that was taking place
and having effective change in most of the North central region known as the “Middle
Belt” of Nigeria. Thus, there was some treaty between the British and Fulani emirs to
maintain and uphold the system of indirect rule as long as the British remained in power.
Christian missionaries were prevented from carrying out their activities in Northern
Nigeria, and any form of contact with Southern Nigeria was viewed with disdain because
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of the imagined threat to the theocratic position of the emirs. Suberu made this case
concretely:
Thus, despite the amalgamation of 1914, direct official political intercourse
between northerners and southerners did not take place until 1946, when the
former were invited to participate for the first time in the advisory central
legislative council in Lagos. This insularity ultimately engendered a combustible
North-South duality. The most poignant expression of this dichotomy was the
huge historical Southern head start over the North in virtually every aspect of
modernization, including education, per capita income, urbanization, wage
employment, commerce, and industrialization.15
Thus, the uneven development between northern and southern Nigeria, coupled with the
quest for political and economic security, especially by the Hausa-Fulani in the North,
and the fear of domination by the south on the north, were at the roots of much of the
political instability in Nigeria during the fifties and sixties; this continues to plague
Nigerian politics and society today.
The third British colonial policy was that of administrative regionalism.16
In 1939, the plan to divide Nigeria into three regional groups was carried out. The regions
were Northern, Eastern, and Western provinces which eventually became administrative
regions under the Richards Constitution of 1946, and were regarded by the British as the
“natural” regions of the emerging Nigerian federation. How “natural” these regions were
could be traced to the Benue and Niger Rivers which coincided with the main trade
routes through which the British entered Nigeria via Lagos in 1856, and which also
became the major stronghold of each of the major ethnic groups. Thus, one can decipher
that the ‘natural’ regions were determined by the extent to which they served British
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interests, at least via their policy of indirect rule. The British turned down most of the
agitations by minority groups for self rule, in order to move away from the oppressive
rule by the majority tribe in a region. The British remained unperturbed with their
commitment to the three-fold regional structure in Nigeria. Thus, the creation of new
regions for the minority groups was to take effect only as a last resort.17 Suberu argues
that the British were prepared to listen to agitations put forward by ethnic minority
groups only if it meant shifting the proposed date for Nigeria’s independence. Since this
was too much of a concession to make, ethnic minorities were coerced into the tripartite
regional system as a basis for Nigeria’s federalism which became the bane of Nigeria’s
self rule.
Any hope for the satisfaction of ethnic minority autonomist pressures was finally
dashed at the 1958 London Constitutional Conference when the Colonial Office
explained that any proposals for immediate territorial reforms could only mean
the postponement of the agreed 1960 date for the granting of independence. Thus,
although the conference agreed on constitutional provisions for creating new
regions in the future, it inevitably endorsed the tripartite regional structure that
was to become a source of great instability after independence.18
So far, one has indicated that there were several factors which led to the creation
of Nigeria’s federalism. The British colonial policies set the tone for maintaining the
three tier regional grouping of the country following the three major ethnic majority
tribes. In so doing, the ethnic minorities were unwittingly grouped to serve both the
colonial policy and the ethnic majority tribes, and so the smaller tribes were immersed in
the larger ones, thereby losing their identity. The rise in ethnic tensions in post
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independence Nigeria is a direct consequence of the failure to recognize the identity of
minority groups and the important role that these groups of people will play in the
Nigerian federation.
Similarly, Nigeria’s nationalist leaders supported the British colonial policies and
collaborated significantly to fashion the type of constitutional self-government that
emerged in Nigeria. In hindsight, it appears that these leaders were each promoting their
regional base and only discussed the Nigerian question in so far as it served their purpose
of being at the federal level of government with the aim of advancing their regional
cause. Suberu supports this position by advancing two complementary perspectives.
As Ladipo Adamolekun and Bamindele Ayo have argued, Nigerian federalism
“resulted from a consensus decision reached between Nigeria’s nationalist leaders
and the British colonial authorities.” Beginning with the landmark Ibadan General
Constitutional Conference of 1950, the Nigerian political class collaborated with
the British to fashion the basic outlines of a constitution for a self-governing
Nigeria. At the conference, and in subsequent constitutional deliberations, the
majority of Nigeria’s leaders increasingly and persistently emphasized the need to
grant the fullest autonomy to the country’s component groups or regions. Indeed,
as Eme Awa has shown, these leaders behaved as if “original sovereignty” lay
with the regions, which could, therefore, appropriately allocate functions to the
center and reserve the residue to themselves.19
Furthermore, the agitation for regional self-government reached its peak in 1957
when each of the regions was granted their autonomy. The direct consequence of this was
the emergence of regional political parties. In Northern Nigeria, the Northern Peoples
Congress (NPC) was the overseer of that region with Abubakar Tafawa Balewa as leader
of the legislature. In Western Nigeria, the Action Group (AG) was in charge of the
regional government and its prominent leader was Obafemi Awolowo. In Eastern
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Nigeria, the National Council for Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC) was the regional
party which took charge of governance and its undisputed leader was Nnamdi Azikiwe.
Thus, each regional party sought to have a stake in the emerging Nigerian federation and
so loyalty to regional issues became a major yardstick for aspiring leaders to engage in
politics, electioneering and party coalition leading up to the formation of the first republic
when Nigeria gained its independence from Britain on October 1, 1960.

4.1.1. Nigeria’s First Republic, 1960-1966
The period in Nigeria’s history referred to as the first republic covers the five
years and three months span from October 1, 1960, to January, 1966, following its
independence. The major characteristics of the 1954 Federal Constitution and those of the
1960 Independence Constitution were merged to form the first Nigerian postindependence civilian administration. The Prime Minister was Sir Abubakar Tafawa
Balewa, and the President in 1963 when Nigeria formally became a Republic was
Nnamdi Azikiwe.
According to Suberu, the main constitutional features that provided the governing
framework during the early stages of independence gave much power to the federal
government.
The Independence Constitution gave the federal government exclusive control of
external affairs, defense, currency, mines and minerals, and the major forms of
communication and transportation. The constitution’s list of concurrent central
and regional powers included higher education, industrial and water-power
development, the judiciary, the police, and the regulation of labor, including the
medical and legal professions. Unenumerated residual powers, including
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responsibility for a wide range of expensive socioeconomic programs in health,
education, and agriculture, were left to the regions.20
Thus, the challenge of the First Republic was how to balance the power of the growing
federal government with the growth of a regional party system. The pre-independence
policy of granting governing status to the regions was now overshadowed with the
emergence of a Nigerian federation as the seat of governmental power. There were
instances when the regional autonomy and the federal autonomy conflicted in matters of
statecraft, particularly in areas of revenue allocations and development loans. In fact, “the
growing subordination of the regions to the center in economic development matters was
reinforced by the inelastic nature of regional tax revenues, especially personal income
taxes, and the downturn in international prices for regionally controlled primary
commodities.”21
There were some political developments that indicated the subordination of the
regions in favor of the federal government. In the Western region, a rift in the Action
Group party provided the opportunity for the NCNC federal coalition government to step
in after declaring a state of emergency and take control of both the legislative and
executive arms of government and to divide the Mid-Western region under new
leadership.22
Moreover, the large size of the Northern region in comparison to the other regions
ensured its dominance in political and economic activities. Since the Northern Peoples
Congress and the NCNC were in coalition at the federal level, it was inevitable that the
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population size of the NPC would come to bear on a federal structure of government.
Billy Dudley affirms “with political power shifting to the center, the real levers of power
[was] actually to be found in the North. Federal super ordination . . . in practice turned
out to be Northern dominance.”23
Similarly, the federal structure aided and abetted conflicts between majority and
minority ethnic groups between regions. The Tiv crisis of February and November 1964
was a case in point where the attempt by the Tiv to be excised from the North turned into
a blood bath that led to the death of about 326 civilians and eleven policemen.24
Badru’s perspective presents one with some understanding of the challenges that
existed prior to Nigerian’s independence and the consequences that befell the First
Republic.
The complex pattern of antagonistic relationships within the class of the
nationalist elite that fought for independence is intersected by class and ethnicity.
The majority of the nationalists who were at the forefront of the struggle for
independence were themselves representatives of hidden social classes who,
because of some traditional or religious reasons, did not partake directly in the
struggle for the control of the colonial state. In essence we have, after
independence, at least on the surface, a state structure that reflected the economic
interests of the feudal oligarchy, particularly from the North and the Lagos based
comprador elite. The defining characteristic of the neocolonial state shortly after
independence was the struggle between the feudal and the comprador elite in
terms of the sort of alliance each would form with metropolitan capital.25
In summary, it seems reasonable to suggest that the major challenge before the
first Nigerian administration was how to balance power between the central federal
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government and the regions. The government favored centralization without making
adequate provision for the regions. Henceforth, the challenge of those who serve as
representatives of the regions will be how to draw resources from the center to the
regions. This process has sometimes led to unhealthy tension among the different
regional groupings in the Country as they attempt to seek recognition from the federal
government. At times, the perception of neglect, domination, and control by one region
over the other has led to grave consequences as one discusses next the emergence of
military rule in Nigeria.

4.1.2. Federalism and Military Rule, 1966-1979
On January 15, 1966, the First Republic was overthrown in a bloody coup d’etat
organized by a group of young officers mostly from the Eastern region of Nigeria and
masterminded by Major Kaduna Nzeogwu. Since most of the regional leaders were
executed, a vacuum of political leadership was created and the general officer
commanding the Nigerian army, Major General J.T.U. Aguiyi-Ironsi,26 an Igbo by tribe,
became the first military head of State and ruled Nigeria for six months.
The promulgation of Decree Number 34 of 1966, which dismantled the federal
system of government and replaced it with a unitary system, was seen by the Northerners
as an attempt by the Igbos to control both the political and economic goods of Nigeria.
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One major consequence of a unitary structure was the abolition of regional public
services and the establishment of one public service for the nation. Since Northern
Nigeria was less developed than the South, the north felt threatened both by the decree
which repealed the “federal character principle that sought to give each area some parity
of representation,”27 and by the imbalance which followed the prosecution of those who
were involved in the January, 1966 coup d’etat. As one northern observer puts it “It was
the height of northern opposition to unitarism that the countercoup of July 1966 took
place. Most top-ranking Igbo officers, including Ironsi, lost their lives; the ‘status quo’ of
northern dominance was restored.”28
In July, 1966, a second bloody coup d’etat took place and was headed mostly by
officers from the north including Major Murtala Mohammed and Captain T.Y. Danjuma.
This coup was seen by the South as a revenge mission by the North to avenge the death
of Northern officers in the January, 1966, coup. The North saw it as an attempt to
maintain a balance of political power and to restore the true federal character of Nigeria.
On August 1, 1966, Lt. Col. Yakubu Gowon, a Christian consensus candidate from the
Ngas minority tribe in the Middle Belt region of Northern Nigeria, became the second
military head of State in the midst of growing opposition from the Eastern and Southern
parts of Nigeria.
The Gowon administration was ushered into office at the height of deep national
crises. The first major policy act by the administration was to restore the federal and
regional systems of government; this action of government would trigger the deep
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sentiments of animosity that the Eastern region perceived were directed to it by the new
administration because of the number of Igbos killed during and after the Northern led
countercoup which brought Gowon to power. At an ad hoc meeting summoned by
Gowon to discuss the issue of constitutional reform for Nigeria’s future, Colonel
Chukwuemeka Odumegwu Ojukwu, military governor of the Eastern region, insisted that
any region that wished to secede from the federation be allowed to do so. The other
regions were mostly in favor of confederate type system of government to replace the
federal government. The conference produced no tangible results and ended in a
stalemate.
In January, 1967, at a summit of military leaders in Aburi, Ghana, some attempt
was made to resolve the growing tension between the Eastern region and the federal
government. The military officers recommended the creation of a loose confederation of
regions as the mid-way between regional and federal governments. The Gowon regime,
anticipating that the growing desire by the Eastern region to secede might be realized,
directed the creation of twelve States to replace the four regions. This move by Gowon
was meant to achieve two results: a response to the call by minority groups for creation of
States; and a diffusing of tension between the East and the federal government. In reality,
neither goal was achieved; instead, the Eastern region declared the State of Biafra,
independent of Nigeria. This situation would result in the Nigerian civil war between the
federal troops and the Eastern region supported Biafran army for almost three years.
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4.1.2.1. The Nigerian Civil War, July 1967-January 1970
The announcement of the “Republic of Biafra” was made by the military governor
of the Eastern region, Col. Ojukwu on May 27, 1967. The Gowon administration
responded by declaring a state of emergency on the Nigerian federation and called
Ojukwu’s actions illegal, rebellious, and unconstitutional. But actual fighting between the
federal troops and Biafran army started on July 6, 1967. Initially, the Gowon regime
called on the police to take action with the hope that the uprising would not last long. But
foreign involvement changed it to a protracted civil war.
Stremlau (1977) reminds us that with only 10 million pounds in foreign reserve,
Ojukwu could not have waged a war for as long as he did without external
support. French supplies of arms, which averaged 300 tons per week in
September-October 1968, gave the life-line to a practically defeated Biafra.
External support also neutralized the devastating effect of the decision by the
federal government to change currency notes at the height of the war in January
1968.29
Another form of foreign support received by Biafra was by whipping up religious
sympathy. Osaghae has pointed out the systematic fashion in which the religious
propaganda was organized in this way.
The external support and sympathy obtained by Biafra was partly the result of
campaigns by relief organizations like Oxfam, the Red Cross and Caritas, which
had pro-Biafran sympathies. But it was more the result of a well organized and
effective propaganda machinery which was handled internally by the ‘Biafra
Directorate of Propaganda’ headed by Uche Chukwumerije . . . and coordinated
externally by the Geneva-based Mark Press. The war was presented as a
genocidal one waged by the Muslims of Northern Nigeria who had declared a
jihad to exterminate Igbos from the face of the earth . . . In Italy, for example, proBiafra sympathies were strong, and Ojukwu protested in letters to the pope and
prime minister over the sale of arms by ‘Catholic’ Italy to Muslim Northern
Nigeria to be used in killing the ‘Catholic’ Igbos of Eastern Nigeria.30
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The Catholic Bishops Conference of Nigeria (CBCN) in their 1968 Pastoral
Letter31 denied any connection between the civil war and the Vatican in no uncertain
terms though this document is not often quoted by those who wish to make the religious
case for the civil war in Nigeria. According to the bishops:
Patriotic Nigerian Catholics have been greatly distressed and acutely embarrassed
by the recent attitude of the Press, Radio and Television towards the Church.
Allegations, without sufficient evidence, of political and military involvement in
the civil war have been made against the Church. We protest and emphatically
deny these charges.32
The bishops proceeded to explain why there may have been the wrong perception that the
Church was somehow involved in the civil war.
We reject the suggestion that Pope Paul VI is involved in this war, directly or
indirectly, in any capacity except that of bringing peace and reconciliation. His
personal efforts for peace are well known. Equally well known is the Holy
Father’s concern for the poor and suffering. Wherever they may be, he sends help
to them through Caritas Internationalis because this is an organization dedicated
exclusively to bringing aid to victims of war, famine and disaster.33
The religious implications for the civil war should be placed in the context of the
North –South divide which polarized the nation on ethnic, social, economic and political
grounds. Thus, the perception from both parties in the conflict about each section of the
nation receiving support from their religious affiliations was obvious. The South regarded
the North as Moslem and receiving support from other Moslem Countries, while the
North saw the South as Christian and as receiving support from Christian nations.
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Perhaps, one may argue from this position that both sides were blaming each other and
trying to win a political advantage in the process.

4.1.2.2. Post-Nigerian Civil War Developments and the Gowon Regime
Pade Badru34 has discussed some of the class conflicts that were responsible for
the civil war and the role played by the Gowon administration. But it is necessary to state
from the onset that in the Nigerian situation, class and ethnic consciousness are
intertwined. The quest for political power, economic security, and social status are all tied
to one’s ethnic affiliation or geographical location. Okwudiba Nnoli has captured this
unfortunate state of affairs.
In-group out-group boundaries emerged with (ethnicity) and, in time, become
marked, more distinct than before, and jealously guarded by the various ethnic
groups. Acceptance and rejection on linguistic-cultural grounds characterize
social relations. These are expressed inevitably through interethnic discrimination
in jobs, housing, and admission into educational institutions, marriages, business
transaction or the distribution of social welfare services. The factor of
exclusiveness is usually accompanied by nepotism and corruption.35
Thus, Badru argued that the economic class distinction that existed between the Northern
Hausa-Fulani merchants and nobles and the Igbos in the East and the Yorubas in the
West was a major factor in the civil war that engulfed Nigeria. Since the Northern
commercial class was supported by the ruling British colonial administration, a new class
of local administrators was emerging that would implement the policies of the colonial
power. The new elite group would emerge as the main actors during Nigeria’s first
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Republic, and their failure to engage in responsible stewardship would plunge Nigeria
into a bloody civil war.
In response to the question: “Whose war was it?” Badru said: “The answer is
simple; it was the elites’ war of greed fought over the private distribution of petrodollars.”36 How did the elite manipulate the war to their advantage? According to Badru
the contest was between the civilian administrators appointed to serve in the Gowon
military regime and the civil servants, who ushered in new state bureaucrats that would
determine the economic power base of Nigeria.
The council of civil commissioners that was set up during the early phase of the
war by Gowon played an important role in the prosecution of the war. . . By
consolidating the power of the civil commissioners, General Gowon had
displaced the economic power of state bureaucrats and senior civil servants. The
civil servants, in particular, played a significant role during the first fifteen
months of the crisis. As the war progressed, the civil servants were replaced by
another set of social actors who had strong connections to international capital.37
The result was that the war became a money making venture for those who were at the
corridors of power. The civilian administrators engaged in mismanagement of the foreign
capital that was meant to help the war torn nation develop by diverting these funds to
personal enrichment. Some of the corrupt military officers were involved in the sharing
of war booty and the collection of pay checks of dead soldiers in their command. The
elite class that benefited from the war, both in the military and the civil service,
succeeded in entrenching corruption as a way of life in the Nigerian political system that
would have far reaching implications beyond the civil war and the Gowon administration.
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Another major crisis that the Gowon regime had to deal with was the effect of the
civil war on the production of crude oil. Since the war had adversely affected oil
production, there was some drop in revenue and the war was sponsored on foreign loans.
But the real crisis was with the senior civil administrators and military officers who
became major beneficiaries of the oil cartel. By this time, it was evident that the Gowon
regime had become very corrupt, especially in view of the despicable role played by
some of the major actors in the government of the day.
In fairness, the Gowon administration embarked on a nine-point reconstruction
program that would culminate in the transition to a civilian government on October 1,
1976. Some of the laudable programs included the National Youth Service Crops
(NYSC) instituted in 1973, a community-based service program that required one year of
service of each Nigerian immediately after graduation from the university or institution of
higher learning. The interesting thing about it was that each member of the corps had to
serve in a State other than his or her home State in order to help diffuse ethnic tension
and encourage solidarity among Nigerians across ethnic, religious, cultural, and social
boundaries. The creation of the twelve states was another major accomplishment of the
regime which sought to bring the different ethnic groups together and to protect the
minority groups. Gowon defended his policy of State creation several years after he was
ousted in these words:
In May 1967, when my government created twelve states out of the existing four,
it was to restructure the federation such that no one state or group of states could
threaten the corporate existence of the country or hold the country to ransom. The
creation of states by my government was to make for justice and fairness as the
new states would now start on equal footing. There was also the fact that the
twelve states structure was established to ensure the protection of the minority
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elements in the regions dominated by the major ethnic groups. This way we
believe that the principle of self determination would be allowed to flourish.38
Gowon engaged also in the building of federal roads to link the different states,
reconstruction of bridges and factories to provide jobs and enhance the social mobility of
the citizens across the nation.
But in 1975, the Gowon regime was overthrown in a bloodless coup which
brought General Muratala Mohammed to power. According to Badru, the class struggle
by the elite reached the apex of personal greed by Nigerian government officials.
The fall of General Gowon reflects the contradictions and intra-class struggles
between the comprador elements and the rising national bourgeoisie. The
economic dominance of the national bourgeoisie was affirmed during the brief
rule of the slain populist soldier, General Murtala Mohammed.39
The civil war in Nigeria shook the fragile political ground on which the country
was built. Apart from the political fragmentation, it heightened ethnic tensions and
created a wide gulf between Northerners and Southerners that had deep religious
implications. In fact, the war was presented, at one point, as a religious strife between
Christians and Muslims. During the same period, the elites who had become an integral
part of the civil service and the hope of a better future, engaged in reckless corruption
thereby placing the moral and economic fabric of the nation in jeopardy. Thus, the
various attempts made by the Gowon administration to heal the wounds of the war did
not completely do away with the feelings of deep animosity and betrayal by some parts of
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the country. The next section will discuss how subsequent governments sought to
transform the country.

4.1.2.3. The Murtala Mohammed/Olusegun Obasanjo Regime-1975-197940
The Mohammed/Obasanjo regime had two heads of states, Mohammed (July,
1975-February, 1976) and Obasanjo (February, 1976-October, 1979). They are
considered one continuous regime in the sense that Obasanjo was Mohammed’s deputy
when Mohammed was head of State. After Mohammed’s assassination in an abortive
coup in February 1976, Obasanjo became head of State and maintained the key officers
of Mohammed’s administration including its structural makeup and policies.
General Mohammed was able through the Armed Forces Ruling Council (AFRC)
to implement the Indigenisation Decree of 1975, which nationalized British interests in
BP-shell, the crude oil group of companies. He also set forth the program to move
Nigeria’s capital from Lagos to Abuja, a more central location in the country, and the
Aguda Panel was set up to under take the study. The issue of the creation of States was
also on the table, and the Irikefe panel was to study the proposals and make
recommendations to government. The regime then aimed at ridding the civil service,
public sector, and society of corruption through massive retrenchment of corrupt civil
servants. The regime set in motion a four year time table to a civilian government
transition beginning from October 1, 1975 to October 1, 1979. At the inauguration of the
members of the Constitution Drafting Committee (CDC), who were to fashion and
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determine the nature of the civilian administration, Mohammed outlined among other
things six important guidelines:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

elimination of ‘cut-throat’ political competition based on a system of
winner-takes-all;
discouragement of institutionalized opposition to the government in
power, and encouragement of consensus politics and government based on
a community of interests;
decentralization of power;
establishment of the principle of public accountability;
free and fair elections; and
depoliticisation of the census.41

The above guidelines were meant to help in the drafting of the constitution that
after several years of military rule, would usher in the second civilian administration.
The assassination of General Murtala Mohammed in an abortive coup on February 13,
1976, was widely condemned in Nigeria. His short reign as head of State was noted by
many Nigerians as worthwhile. General Obasanjo, Mohammed’s deputy, became head of
State and vowed to continue with Mohammed’s policies. Obasanjo launched an
agricultural program called ‘Operation Feed the Nation’ (OFN) to boost agricultural
productivity and diversify Nigeria’s oil economy. But this project ended up to be another
white elephant project, serving the needs of the rich and not having any impact at the
grassroots. However, the time-table of transition to civilian rule continued without any
major modification and a smooth hand over to the civilian administration of Alhaji Shehu
Shagari took place on October 1, 1979.
The military regimes wielded power and governed Nigeria by military fiat and
decrees. The military continued to centralize power through government appointees who
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were answerable to the supreme military ruling council as the final arbiter of political
power, and not the supreme court of the nation. Thus, in order to have absolute control
over the nation, the centralization policy weakened the organs of the federal structure that
made the task of the civilian government a major problem.

4.1.3. Federalism and the Second Republic, 1979-198342
Nigeria’s Second Republic was ushered in on October 1, 1979. Alhaji Shehu
Shagari was elected president after a much disputed decision by the Nigerian Federal
Electoral Commission. Since this was the second civilian administration after decades of
military rule, it was necessary to re-orient the citizens toward participatory democracy
rather than military decrees. Moreover, since the elections had caused much antagonism
among the different political parties, it was inevitable that some form of reconciliatory
measures would prove beneficial.
The Shagari government followed the recommendation of the Constitution
Drafting Committee (CDC) by promoting the ‘Federal Character Principle.’ This
principle was meant to bring about a balance of political and economic power between
the ‘North’ and ‘South’ of Nigeria. By way of definition:
The federal character principle is a variant of the consociational principle of
proportional representation or quota system where the main objective was to
ensure that the kaleidoscope of the country’s diversity was reflected in
composition of government at all levels.43
Thus, the government hoped that by applying this principle to ministerial appointments,
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government agencies, the armed forces and other public services, somehow the issue of
national unity and integration would take a positive shape. But the falsity of achieving
political stability in this manner was glaring to critical political analysts. How does one
deal justly with ethnic groups that had more States or were in the majority without at the
same time encouraging the marginalization of minority groups? The other question that
arose was the use of representation in executive bodies as a mechanism for power
sharing. While representation in executive bodies may be considered a legitimate way of
power sharing, State power sharing will have to go beyond a cosmetic dressing in the
form of appointment in executive positions. Consequently, more often than not, the
political office holders often came to office with a personal agenda that might be different
from that of the State they are representing.
Thus, the attempt to implement the ‘federal character’ principle and the
implications arising thereto during the Shagari administration permeated the different
levels of political, social and economic life of the nation. The administration became very
corrupt, substituting State power sharing with personal power sharing, and State
representation for patronage representation. The consequence was another military take
over:
On the night of December 31, 1983, the military struck once again to overthrow
the young Republic. The chaos that followed the 1983 elections provided only the
last straw for this, if justification had to be found. More powerful underlying
reasons were the massive corruption, economic mismanagement and authoritarian
tendencies that characterized the Republic. Panels instituted to probe governors
and other officials after its overthrow found evidence of widespread abuse and
embezzlement of public funds, for which they were sentenced to various jail
terms and/or asked to refund their misappropriations to the State. . .44
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Consequently, another military government was imposed on Nigeria due largely to the
failure of politicians to live up to their oath of allegiance. The next section will examine
how the return of the military in the administration of the nation fared.

4.1.4. The Return of the Military: The Buhari (1983-85); Babangida (1985-93);
Abacha (1993-98); Abubakar (1998-99) Regimes45
The return of the military to political power in Nigeria revealed a major
centralization of political and administrative power. Thus, these regimes were
characterized by sweeping institutional and structural changes, the erruption of violent
tensions due to military, sectional, minority, and religious agitations. It became clear that
the military had placed the Nigerian federal structure as a unit within and under military
command. “This subordination of the federal institutional structure to the military
organizational superstructure was not significantly reversed by the introduction of the
elaborate, but eventually aborted, program of transition to the Third Republic in January,
1986, and the subsequent election of civilian State governors in December, 1991.”46
Between December 1991, and November 1993, civilian governors ruled their
states under the military who dominated the central government. According to Suberu,
“The political vulnerability of the democratically elected State governments was clearly
dramatized in June, 1993, when the federal government shut down several State-owned
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media organizations that had criticized the military’s annulment of that month’s elections
to the Third Republic’s inaugural presidency.”47 Moreover, the decentralization
initiatives proposed and implemented by the military regimes at the local government
level were aimed at promoting “. . . a uniform national system of local government and to
further constrain the scope for autonomous intervention by the states in the affairs of the
localities.”48 Some of the sweeping local government reforms included:
1.

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

A doubling (from 10 percent in the Second Republic to 20 percent in
1992) in the proportion of the Federation Account allocated to the
localities, an increase that was implemented primarily at the expense of
the states whose allocations fell from 30 to 24 percent.
The announcement of formal provisions for the direct, as distinct from
indirect (that is, State-channeled), transfer of central statutory allocations
to the localities.
The abolition of State-controlled Local Government Ministries and
Service Commissions as part of the move to eliminate or reduce
intervention by the states in the local government system.
The establishment of an approved national scheme of service for local
government employees.
The establishment of provisions and regulations in the federal constitution
regarding the areas, structure, composition, jurisdictions, and election of
local councils.
The extension of the presidential system of government to the local
government level.
The realignment of local government boundaries with federal and State
legislative boundaries.
The devolution of increased responsibilities to the localities for primary
education, health care, and local infrastructural improvements.49

The above mentioned reforms at the local government level ensured military federalism
at the grassroots and eroded State government power sharing with the local governments,
transferring it to the center.
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Furthermore, there was a heightened level of government instability during the
military regimes that affected the political, social, economic and moral fabric of the
nation. The period between December, 1983, and May, 1999, witnessed five different
heads of States: the four already mentioned and Chief Ernest Shonekan whose leadership
lasted five months (August, 1993–November, 1993) and involved the strangest military
and civilian alliance ever witnessed in Nigeria’s political setup.
The Buhari administration came to power like all military governments with the
claim to salvage the nation from corrupt leaders and looters. However, the regime started
to block noticeably various attempts being made to ground the Nigerian federation along
confederal guidelines. In the midst of these challenges, the regime was short lived when
Babangida came to power in August, 1985. The Babaginda administration was full of
deceit, especially with regard to the transition program to democratic rule and the
subsequent cancellation of elections. Also, the Structural Adjustment Program (SAP),
initiated to boost the economy, was a major failure of this regime. The Shonekan
administration was equally grandfathered by the military, and when it became clear that
the consequences arising from the annulment of the June 12, 1993 election would not
disappear, the military, this time under Abacha, took over as head of State. Abacha was
confronted with the task of cleaning up the mess both he and Babaginda had created. The
task proved very challenging because of several calls for a Sovereign National
Conference to review the basis of Nigeria’s federation before independence. The Abacha
regime enforced military federalism to the letter and centralized the administration at his
finger tips. His sudden death in June, 1998, was unofficially declared a day of rejoicing in
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many parts of the nation. Abacha had been planning to become a civilian president
through another dubious democratic program. Abubakar, his successor, revised Abacha’s
transition program within a year and ushered in the Fourth Republic in May, 1999, with
former General Obasanjo as civilian president.

4.1.5. The Fourth Republic: Obasanjo as Civilian President, 1999 to Present
President Olusegun Obasanjo took his oath of office on May 29, 1999, having
won the presidential elections under the ticket of the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP).
There was much enthusiasm among Nigerians because Obasanjo was the first military
leader to hand over power to civilians in 1979. He was also the first Nigerian leader to be
“recycled” in what has now become a crisis of leadership. The nation expected Obasanjo,
as a former leader, to run the nation in the right direction and to bring democratic
principles of equal protection under the law, accountability, transparency and good
governance to bear on his administration.
Because Obasanjo had been imprisoned under the Abacha regime for his political
views, the nation saw him as a Statesman who was familiar with the plight of the
common person. Furthermore, Obasanjo and his party had received a national mandate of
about 62% of the nation which showed that the PDP had majority acceptance. The only
area where the PDP did not gain much support was in Obasanjo’s home area, in the
Southwest where the Alliance for Democracy (AD) had a strong ethnic base. The real test
of Obasanjo’s majority support will depend to a large extent on how he is able to turn
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around the deplorable political, economic, ethnic, social, religious and corrupt conditions
in the Nigerian State.
Since the installation of the Obasanjo administration, there have been complaints
about marginalization and ethnic tension in different parts of the country. In the North,
the challenge is for Obasanjo to respond to the allegation that he has betrayed the
political support he received when the North conceded political power to the South. This
is because several military officers from the North were dismissed or retired, creating an
imbalance in key Ministerial appointments between the North and the Southwest,
Obasanjo’s home region where he had very little support. In the oil-rich Odi community
in Bayelsa State, federal troops were ordered in to bring control to the communal
uprising. Instead, they actually invaded and destroyed human life and property of the
people. There was no credible government explanation. There were ethnic clashes
between the Jukun and Kuteb with over 200 people dead. In Kaduna, Christians and
Muslims went to war killing several hundreds over issues of Nigeria’s hosting of the
“Miss World Beauty Contest,” that had a lot of political overtones.
Similarly, the Tiv people in the Middle Belt of Nigeria had more than their own
share of invasion and destruction by federal troops who killed hundreds of people at
random and destroyed much property on the excuse that nineteen soldiers were killed by
people in the locality.50 There were clashes involving the Ijaw, Itsekiri, and Urhobo
communities of Delta State and ethnic militias of the Oodua Peoples’ Congress, the
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Bakassi Boys, the Ijaw Youth Council and the Movement for the Actualization of the
Sovereign State of Biafra.
Recently, the editor of a prominent newsmagazine51 presented a review of the
events of 2003 in Nigeria by looking at its politics, crime rate, judiciary, media, religion,
corruption, and telecommunication system. In the year 2003, Nigeria was voted by
Transparency International the second most corrupt country in the world, a position it has
held to in the last several years. In view of the above development, the following
observation was put forward in connection with the present administration:
It is a kind of paradox, President Olusegun Obasanjo has expended so much
energy and resources fighting corruption, but despite his efforts, Transparency
International, rated Nigeria second most corrupt country in the whole world in
year 2003. Nigeria has for many years maintained that position.
Peter Eigen, chairman of Transparency International, said corruption was so deeprooted in Nigeria that it would require many generations before it would be routed
from Nigeria. . . Corruption bedeviled the May election that produced the present
government. In so many states, it was widely reported that there were no elections
at all and where elections were conducted, the ruling Peoples Democratic Party,
(PDP) employed the services of soldiers and other law enforcement agencies to
rig the elections.52
Some key members of the Obasanjo administration were implicated in another panel on
corruption. The chairman of Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences
Commission (ICPC) sought the arrest of seven Nigerians including Hussaini Akwanga,
the former minister of labor and productivity. Others included Sunday Michael Afolabi
and Mahmud Shata, former minister of internal affairs and minister of state in the same
ministry, and R. O. Akerele, permanent secretary of the same ministry. There was also
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Okwesilieze Nwodo, former governor of Enugu State and former scribe of the ruling
Peoples Democratic Party, PDP, Niyi Adelagun.53
Furthermore, Wilson Egbo-Egbo, a judge with an Abuja high court, was
suspended indefinitely over his dubious role in controversial rulings and exparte motions.
More specifically, the ruling ordering Governor Chris Ngige of Anambra State to vacate
office was another major judicial rape of the precarious democratic process. Similarly,
Chris Uba, financier of the PDP organized the abduction of Ngige. The ruling party, the
federal government and the police have refused to take action on this matter.
The other political landmark in Nigeria, apart from the precarious democratic elections
and transition from one civilian administration to another, was the hosting of the
Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting, (CHOGM), in Abuja. The meeting
lasted from December 3 to 5, 2003, and was chaired by Queen Elizabeth II of England.
The relevance of Nigeria’s membership in the Commonwealth of Nations is best known
to the leaders who benefit directly rather than the ordinary Nigerian citizen whose
citizenship passport is subjected to much scrutiny in most European nations of the
Commonwealth.
The prominent judicial victory was that of Amina Lawal, 31, a single mother
condemned to death by stoning in March, 2002, by the Sharia Court in Katsina State. On
September 25, a Sharia Appeal Court turned down this sentence. This ruling ended a 19
month battle for Amina’s life which attracted local, national and international attention.
Another significant contribution being made in the Obasanjo administration is from Nasir
el-Rufia, the Minister of the Federal Capital Territory (FCT) in Abuja who is credited
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with a no nonsense approach to work. He challenged some key politicians over their
request for bribe before his confirmation for ministerial appointment. He has also brought
some sanity to the FCT by demolishing illegal structures put up by some former top
military officers and some key people in government today. His goal is to make Abuja a
less costly place to work and live in and to boost its tourism.54
Having examined some of the key issues challenging the Obasanjo administration
and going by the deplorable records before us, and an economy that crumbles by the day,
with the purchasing power of the naira at its worst, the promise of the nation is not
showing many signs of improvement for the benefit of the average citizen. The next
section will provide a summary of the key issues discussed that Nigerians will need to
address at the local, national, and international levels as the nation prepares for another
election in 2007. These issues are at the heart of the corporate existence of the nation and
should form the agenda for Nigerian civil society.

4.1.6. Summary and Critical Implications
1.

The major challenge before the nation is to determine its corporate

existence in a way that would be acceptable to the different ethnic groups that make up
Nigeria. It is clear that the amalgamation of Northern and Southern Nigeria by the British
in 1914 was a tool of colonization meant to benefit only the colonizers and not the
citizens. In the end, this cosmetic arrangement has made strange bed fellows who are
constantly at war with each other. There is an urgent need for renewed discussion and
planning toward a sovereign national council of all ethnic tribes in Nigeria with the
54
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formula of proportional representation to discuss the future of this nation before the
elections of 2007.
2.

The system of centralization of power among the three major ethnic

groups (Hausa-Fulani, Igbo and Yoruba), almost to the exclusion of all other ethnic
minorities, has led to and encouraged political stratification on ethnic grounds. Thus, the
power game among these three major ethnic groups as to who will control the political
and economic life of Nigeria at a given time, has given way to exploitation and
marginalized existence of minority ethnic groups. The rise in ethnic tensions is the direct
consequence of this power play which has encouraged every ethnic group to protect its
own base, since representatives do not represent all Nigerians, only those of their ethnic
affiliation. No wonder citizens have come to think first of ethnicity before realizing they
are Nigerians.
3.

The basis for Nigeria’s federation needs re-examination and re-evaluation.

Since independence in 1960 the regional formulations gave way to the creation of States.
But the request for the creation of more States has become a political tool which the
military has exploited so very well in the past and, perhaps, may exploit in the future. The
time has come for proper boundary adjustments and assessment on the issue of creation
of States. Closely related is the politicization of Local government reform in the nation.
The arbitrary natures in which Local governments are governed deserve some review.
4.

The role of the armed forces in the government of Nigeria is very

ambiguous. The military succeeded in replacing Nigeria’s federalism with military
federalism that continues to derail the efforts to democratic rule. This situation, if left un-
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checked, will continue for many decades. At the present time, former military officers
wish to rule and re-rule in Nigeria by using their ill-gotten wealth, to their political
advantage for election purposes. So far, the democratic presidential candidates have been
predominantly former military officers. The 2007 elections and beyond will most likely
produce similar candidates. The travesty of democratic rule is clear, since it has merely
been a change of dress code from the military “Khaki” to the civilian “Agbada.”
5.

The issue of corruption in Nigeria is largely due to the greed of political

office holders who exploit the poverty of the majority of the people. Kwame Gyekye has
written on the issue of “Political Corruption” by showing its devastating effects on
African countries.
Postcolonial Africa is undeniably among the worse victims of political corruption.
For it cannot be denied that the most outstanding and resilient problem that has
beset and blighted the politics of the new nations (or, nation-states) of
postcolonial Africa is political corruption. It most probably constitutes the most
serious source of the financial hemorrhage suffered by a developing nation in
Africa, constantly gnawing at its developing efforts; it is undoubtedly the most
common cause of the military overthrow of civilian governments in Africa, with
the consequent disruption of the democratic political process: thus, it is the
greatest and most serious disease of governments in Africa.55
In Nigeria, government property is nobody’s property, so it is up for grabs, beginning
with the office holders. Most go into politics with the intent of looting public funds and
enriching themselves. Government contracts are inflated so that they can get their
percentages up front, and the contractors are left to figure out what to do with the project.
In many cases, they are not completed, but no one is held accountable in the process
because the government officials have already been well-paid. Government officials do
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not obey traffic regulations; government drivers are at their worst when they carry their
officers who encourage them not to follow the approved speed limits in the name of
doing an important job for government. Governors, Ministers and other top government
officials use the army and police to intimidate the masses as they drive on the road. The
very people, who voted them to power, will usually have to move off the roads for them
to pass with their entourage and body guards, always at alarming speeds. The corruption
among the police and army on road blocks is unprecedented in the history of law
enforcement. Those who are meant to protect the masses continually extort money and
other goods from the common people, openly, and in most cases, with the approval of
their supervisors. This study shows that the military have become even more corrupt in
Nigeria and can no longer be trusted to take over a democratic government for the
purpose of purifying it.
6.

The religious issues in Nigeria have been largely politicized through the

involvement of government. While the Christian religion views the separation between
Church and State as necessary to the peaceful co-existence of both, the Islamic religion
considers the unity of Church and State essential for their existence. Given this problem
the Nigeria nation has been faced with many religious riots, especially between
Christians and Moslems in the face of growing mistrust, marginalization, inhuman laws,
and the call, in some cases, for a state religion. The recent tensions over the
implementation of Islamic Law, known as Sharia, in some parts of Northern Nigeria have
raised both national and international outcry. It is a clear indication that the threat of
unchecked religious zeal can destabilize the nation. Moreover, politicians take advantage
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of such opportunities to score cheap political points, and in the process fuel the religious
sentiments therein. Nigeria is a secular nation that promises to respect the right of each
Nigerian to practice their religion without coercion and does not support any State
religion. The role which the government continues to play by appointing pilgrimage
boards members in every State, and, subsequently, using government funds to support
both Christian and Muslim pilgrims is a major failure of government policy. Religious
groups should be allowed to conduct and run pilgrimages for their worshippers without
government intervention. This intrusion of government is precisely because pilgrimages
have become money-making ventures for the privileged and a way of rewarding political
party loyalists.
7.

Decentralization and the balance of power between the Federal, State, and

Local governments are necessary. The three tier system of government is meant to
provide opportunities for development at different levels where the citizens reside. The
goal is that each tier will address the issues that are closer to its jurisdiction of
governance. The challenge in Nigeria has been how to determine the balance of power
between these levels of government, a balance that will promote an equitable level of
productivity. While government projects at the federal and state levels seem to draw
some degree of supervision and support; projects at the local government level appear to
be less and less supervised. This tendency has led to lopsided development and migration
from local government areas to the state and federal capitals for white collar jobs. Thus,
the local areas are mainly rural by nature while the State develops into township
settlements. Nigerians need to channel their energies toward encouraging an even
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development in the nation. By so doing, citizens will benefit from government policies
wherever they reside. This will discourage the clamor for being near the center of power
in order to benefit from government programs.
8.

The condition of the education system in Nigeria is as deplorable as are

the other agencies. The largely government sponsored system of education is highly
centralized and that is its bane. The State run schools, at the primary, secondary, and
higher levels, depend largely on government funding for existence. This situation has led
to manipulation of the education sector to the taste of different governments over the
years. With centralized examination boards, admission policy into Universities, teacher’s
salary, selection of University Chancellors and pro-chancellors, and mobile academic
calendars, the nation’s educational system is very unstable. In spite of great strides made
in academia by Nigerians, the conditions under which students and teachers study are
very sub-standard. Thus, the illiteracy rate is growing more and more with the majority of
the people now largely illiterate. This position may explain why the gullible public is
easily manipulated by political office holders who belong to the elite class. Greater and
purpose driven autonomy for Nigerian Universities and other institutions of learning is
necessary for expanding the educational system. Promoting civic education at the
grassroots level is an essential policy issue for developing Nigerian civil society. This
policy issue would address two needs: the alarming illiteracy rate and the need to build
citizens that will cherish the land of their birth and promote the growth of a viable civil
society.
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9.

The failure of Leadership is the most disturbing political challenge

threatening the Nigerian State. Since Nigeria’s independence in 1960, the country has not
enjoyed any stable leadership, due largely to military involvement in politics. This
situation has enshrined a hybrid of military and democratic rule that continues to derail
the nation for personal and selfish gains. Essentially, the Nigerian citizen has been
socialized to accept as normal this military/democratic hybrid and to almost perpetually
“vote” it into political power through the mockery of what appears to be an election and
to continue the vicious cycle of misrule in the Country. A possible way of departing from
this entrenched system of misrule is to embark on a constitutional reform that will make
the elections administrative body truly independent from government control.
Having examined the history of Nigeria with a critical lens, one discovers the
enormous task before the citizens of Nigeria. This task demands support from different
structures that could bring both theoretical and practical approaches that will elevate the
existing civil society into one of peaceful coexistence. The next section will offer the
practical approaches to relate the Christian social philosophy, advanced in the last three
chapters of this work. The goal is to change the situation one has discussed to one where
social justice will be promoted; to build a solid civil society and to support self
determination by local populations. These principles, if adopted, would provide effective
representation of local identities and build a government responsive to local needs.
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4.2.

Toward A Social Justice Oriented Civil Society: Subsidiarity and
Federalism56 in Nigeria
This study has discovered that a federal political system offers some opportunities

for different political arrangements because it makes room for governance and the
exercise of authority at different levels of government. Thus, there is some degree of
government power at the local, state, and national levels. Apart from these entities, some
power resides with social, economic, political, and civil groups that are constituent parts
of the entire nation.
This study uncovered also that a federal political system may possess the
theoretical framework for power sharing and governance at the local, state and federal
levels of government without having, at the same time, the necessary capacity to
accommodate for the cultural, ethnic, religious, and social differences, as is the case in
the Nigerian political setup. Thus, in practice, one would embrace a federal type system
of government with several adaptations which will make it possible to accommodate the
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multiplicity of differences within a particular historical and political setting.
The goal in this section is to show that the principles of subsidiarity and
federalism provide the framework to accommodate different socio-political realities in a
pluralistic and complex nation such as Nigeria. This paper hopes to achieve this goal in
three ways: first, it will show the correlation between subsidiarity and federalism as an
integral component to building a viable civil society in Nigeria; second, it will show that
the different levels of government (local, state and federal) need to continually work with
civil society organizations and the need for both of them to serve as checks and balances
to each other; third, the case for social justice as a necessary component in the process of
achieving the common good of all will become evident.

4.2.1. The Correlation Between Subsidiarity and Federalism in a Pluralistic Society
Roland L. Watts describes a federation as a political system that has both some
degree of shared rule and common institutions while at the same time making room for
some degree of autonomous rule of the constituency. In essence, the state or nation makes
provision for diversity within the political structure. Thus, federal systems may take
different forms such as “quasi-federations,” “federations,” and “confederacies.”57 The
state in a federal system provides for some regional autonomy for the units that are so
designated without sacrificing its central hold. The different regions or federations might
have ethnic, cultural, religious, and social peculiarities, but the need to maintain some
degree of autonomy in the regions or units remains paramount.
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In addition, Carl Schmitt makes a pertinent distinction between a unitary state and
a federal one that is worthy of note. The territorial state might be governed in two ways.
On the one hand, the territorial power remains at the center and monopolizes control
while allowing some of the units to be dependent on the center. On the other hand, both
the center and the units depend on shared power which is distributed between the whole
and the parts. The first is a unitary state, while the second is a federal one.58
Thus, the central question is whether the power that exists at the regional or local
level is dependent upon devolution from the federal central government or that such
power is entrenched in the regions themselves. In some federal systems, some degree of
sovereignty exists in the regions. But it may also be the case that this sovereignty exists
only through devolution from the central government. In such a case, the political
legitimacy and mandate to exercise authority lies with the central government. However,
if regional autonomy and sovereignty exist independently of recognition and affirmation
from the central government, then the regions would have a legitimate mandate to govern
and exercise political authority.
There are two fundamental perspectives that one has established. First, the nationstate is an aggregate whole, made up of different units within the society. Second, the
question of whether the nation-state is always a legitimate aggregate whole is an openended one. Is the nation-state an authentic entity representing its sub-national parts? In
theory, the aggregate whole exists as a manifestation of its constituent parts. Its existence
should depend on continual affirmation and recognition from the parts. If it is not-then
why is it? Federations are typically established because of a perceived need to share
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governance and institutions at some level and would likely not exist if there were no
perceived need for some degree of unity. This paper will argue that in order for the
Nigerian federation to continue to exist, there needs to be the continual perception of
some necessary degree of unity. Such unity will give legitimacy to the existence of a
federal national government that respects the sub-national parts as authentic, autonomous
aggregates of the political society. The principle of subsidiarity provides the building
blocks to best realize this type of political community.
Pope Pius XI captured well the vision of society being discussed here and defined
the precise meaning of subsidiarity.
. . . One should not withdraw from the individual and commit to the community
what they can accomplish by their own enterprise and industry. So, too, it is an
injustice and at the same time a grave evil and a disturbance of right order to
transfer to the larger and higher collectivity functions which can be performed and
provided for by lesser and subordinate bodies. Inasmuch as every social activity
should, by its very nature, prove a help to members of the body social, it should
never destroy or absorb them.59
In general, human societies are composed of constituent parts. Nation-states also have
sub-units which are parts of the whole. According to Ferran Requjo, the fundamental
purpose of plural federalism is that it should reflect different types of arrangements,
which correspond to the functions to be regulated by the character of the federated
units.60 Subsidiarity supports the view that federal national governments exercise political
authority in a manner that respects the characteristics of both the federal and constituent
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units. Thus, Thomas Hueglin posits that, for Althusius, politics involved a “consociation”
whereby a polity is a federally constructed edifice of consociations.61 The consociations
are the relationships and associations that are gradually fashioned at the family, kinship,
civil association and private association levels. Those who take part in these associations
within a federation function in both the social and territorial levels in the political
sphere.62 Alain de Benoist opined that Althusius viewed society as organic and holistic,
made up of different groups, not individuals, who could not fully develop without being
autonomous, and viewed society from below, gradually reaching the top.63
Thus, the society is organized by the people who belong to these associations and
relationships. The different levels of society are aggregate wholes of these relationships.
Indeed, the consociations between next of kin are the most recognizable. Thus, some
consociations are natural in character like the family, community, ethnic group or to
some degree even a nation of peoples. Some consociations are not natural like civil
associations. However, both natural and civil groups can enter into partnerships of
cooperation for the common good of the society. In the case of Nigeria, subsidiarity will
ensure that all the different ethnic communities are proportionately represented and that
the majority ethnic groups do not absorb the minority ones as is the case in some parts of
the country. Moreover, for the sake of the common good, civil associations based on
mutual trust and respect would be formed across ethnic and social lines. While there have
been some efforts in this direction in the formation of political parties in Nigeria, the
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parochial nature of some of the political party associations needs to be expanded. In this
way, the autonomy of the natural groups or associations is not taken away but enlarged to
embrace a plural social context. Thus, citizens are empowered through the practice of
federalism and subsidiarity to accommodate their differences and enter into agreements at
both the local and national levels that best serve their interests and promote the common
good of all people. The next section will discuss the issue of human rights in Nigeria
which is another major challenge to building a viable civil society, and how subsidiarity
might promote civil discourse and social justice in the nation.

4.2.2. The Building Blocks of Subsidiarity and the Promotion of Human Rights in
Nigerian Civil Society
The task at hand is to highlight the major building blocks of subsidiarity that will
promote human rights in a pluralistic society such as Nigeria. While it is helpful to trace
the history of human rights practice as a global ethic, such a study has been carried out by
other scholars.64 This paper has previously established the metaphysical basis for
subsidiarity on four grounds in chapter one65 that are intrinsic for discussing the issue of
human rights, and analyzed the essential properties of subsidiarity in chapter two.66
The first foundation is that all human beings at the core of their being, enjoy the
capacity and freedom to choose how to go about attaining their ultimate end; hence,
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humans are able to claim inalienable rights in society. No society can interfere on this
deeper level of their existence. This means that though humans are in the State, it is
impossible for the State to totally assimilate them. The worth of the individual person is
both ontologically and morally prior to the State or any other social grouping. Since
subsidiarity upholds that the human person toward whose growth the principle is aimed is
naturally social, it means that human dignity requires relationship with others in various
ways from the family, social and political groups. This does not suggest in any way that
the individual can be reduced to a single unit of the social whole, but it does mean that
human self fulfillment is better realized in community with other people. Thus, the
challenge that such an understanding presents in the Nigerian social context is the
recognition that individual rights and social rights are not opposed to each other. In fact,
. . . association with others makes it possible for the person to become more
authentically human, and her relationship with others cannot be separated from
full expression and realization of her inherent and primary value. One could say
that the existence and end of the community (and this can mean a “community” as
intimate as a single friendship) is to help the individual flourish, to help create the
conditions for her to reach her ultimate fulfillment.67
By so doing, subsidiarity expands the model of fulfillment through human relationships
to different levels of assistance among social groups. Just as the individual realizes his
fulfillment in community with others, so also do the smaller associations at the family,
market, ethnic, and religious group levels, all part of the community effort for selfactualization. Thus, majority tribal groups are called to help the minority groups with the
necessary conditions for them to realize their own dignity and not to overrun them as is
the case from the critical analysis of Nigeria’s social context.
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The second foundation for supporting the promotion of human rights in Nigeria is
the recognition that the different human associations, in so far as they maintain and
uphold the rule of law, fairness and mutual respect, should be able to fit organically for
the common good of all in the society. Thus, the different associations are meant to both
serve their individual groups and at the same time support the smaller ones. In this way,
the inter-connectivity between the social groups builds up the organic whole of the
Nigerian society. The challenge has been that each social group in Nigeria (but most
especially the larger ones) have operated on a winner takes all approach, that has made
social groups isolated entities without major social links beyond the boundaries of their
social group. Subsidiarity makes it necessary that some degree of social interaction exists
between the groups just as it is necessary for the individual to be authentic in community.
So also, the individual social group becomes fully relevant in relation to the organic
whole of the community without sacrificing its autonomy. That is why programs which
encourage social interaction of the different ethnic groups such as the National Youth
Service Corps, introduced by the Gowon administration after the civil war, needs more
funding and effective leadership to help build better partnerships of cooperation across
ethnic, religious, and social barriers.
The third foundation is that human self-fulfillment requires some level of freedom
to operate. Humans as thinking beings should be able to direct themselves to their end,
struggling in their diversity toward a common ground. This means that human beings are
capable of deciding, through their own initiatives and the circumstances of their historical
experience, the direction that their lives ought to take. The capacity to choose between
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right and wrong is at the heart of how human freedom is to be exercised in the direction
of the principle of subsidiary function.
Thus, respecting the dignity of the human person and the integrity of the groups
that constitute his or her personhood (and that themselves have a certain integrity)
requires that all forms of society be oriented toward the freedom of “lower” forms
of association, and ultimately toward the freedom of the individual. In short,
subsidiarity takes the freedom necessary to human dignity and extends it to a
regard for freedom at all levels of social organization.
This freedom, however, is not simply a negative notion of restraint from
interference; it also encompasses an affirmative dimension. It means freedom to
act in such a way as to participate fully in the goods of an authentically human
life. Thus, since freedom is understood as the ability to reach one’s complete
flourishing, to realize the capacities of a being of inherent dignity, it can also be
served by an intervention that creates the necessary conditions for the individual
to lead a life of purpose and fulfillment.68
Some concrete examples in the Nigerian context might prove helpful. Each year many
college graduates qualify in different educational and technical fields but only very few
find jobs that relate to their areas of specialization. In order that their creativity and
capacity to realize their human dignity be maintained, some form of assistance is
necessary to support people seeking job placement so that they may not engage in
destructive social acts against the common good of the society. In fact, one can argue that
the increase in armed robbery, political thuggery, and insecurity is a direct consequence
of the inability of a large number of people to receive gainful employment from both the
public and private sectors. The area of job creation is one where subsidiarity would
permit measured intervention by government or other higher associations in order that
they might create the right set of conditions for stimulating the economy and providing
jobs for the unemployed. In particular, both the “performance society” and “area society”
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would learn to work hand in hand. In Nigeria, the important role played by ethnic and
social development associations could be enhanced to provide job opportunities. Perhaps,
it is worth observing that the Obasanjo administration has put in place a reform strategy
to address issues of poverty, unemployment, and development of the non-oil sector, and
building partnerships for development. This initiative is called the National Economic
Empowerment and Development Strategy (NEEDS). The next section will address the
role of voluntary grassroots associations as agents of social change in Nigeria.

4.2.3. The Role of Self-Help Grassroots Associations as Agents of Social and
Ethical Developments in Nigeria: Preconditions, Formation, and Limits69
John H. Hamer, writing on voluntary associations in sub-Saharan Africa, made a
critical observation that is shared by this study.
Increasingly it has become evident that programs planned and executed from the
top down seldom result in significant change at the local level. When, however,
people participate in the planning and creation of local level norms in voluntary
associations, they take responsibility for inaugurating change.70
This is precisely why this study supports the position that, in order to bring about social
and ethical transformation in Nigeria, there is great need to help the many existing ethnic,
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social, gender development, religious, economic, cultural, human rights, grassroots,
voluntary associations in the villages, towns, and urban centers to be able to help
themselves and to participate in fashioning the type of civil society which would support
the nation’s citizens. In order to achieve such a goal, one has argued that the subsidiarity
principle is indispensable in providing both the theoretical and practical platforms for
organizing the relationships existing between the parts and the whole in the community.
In general, associations have been described as “shared interest groups established
independently of ascribed membership in kinship or territorially based groups.”71 Hoebel
is of the view that “such groups form an exclusive membership in the larger society, are
formally structured, and produce a sense of cohesiveness among the members.”72
Webster considered such groups as “arising out of a natural grouping together of men
(women) of the same age who have similar duties and interests in life.”73 Schurtz, found
the “origin of such groups in the antagonism between generations, leading to
classification on the basis of age.”74 The different perspectives about what constitutes
voluntary associations reveal the complex nature of the issue being considered.
Thus, Hamer argued that the key to understanding the conditions necessary for the
formation of voluntary associations involves three issues, namely, culture, social control,
and authority.75 First, Hamer and other scholars argue that the presence of multiple
cultures within a society presents the situation where efforts are made by the people to
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interact at different levels within the community.
Cultural homogeneity and a limited number of social rules are insufficient for the
formation of associations. Rather, it is cultural heterogeneity and increasing
complexity of existence that necessitate cross-cutting memberships for linking
diverse groupings in opposition to members of the opposite sex, differing age
groups, or outsiders in general.76
The Nigerian situation is akin to the type described above in some respects where some
cultural practices have prevented in some cases both the growth of the individual and that
of the community. The question of women’s rights in the family vis-à-vis right to family
inheritance; ethnic conflicts based on long standing myths and fears; the problem of
illiteracy are but some of the issues that have formed and should continue to be addressed
by self-help associations.
Second, the issue of social control as described by Hamer in terms of “a code of
conduct sanctioned by gossip, ridicule, fear of avoidance, and other forms of diffuse
sanctions,”77 does not make much sense in the kind of civil society one is advocating with
subsidiarity as the glue holding the community together. Instead, one would argue that
any form of code of conduct proposed in these associations should respect the mutual
rights of the members and needs to uphold the rule of law as agreed upon by the
constitution rightly and fairly interpreted. Hence, any form of social control that seeks to
bypass such due process is counter-productive and a negation of subsidiarity which
supports the inalienable rights of the human person.
Third, on the issue of authority within self-help associations in the community,
one agrees in part with Hamer that:
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achieved rather than ascribed positions are critical for the establishment of
authority. Society leaders acquire their positions not on the basis of kinship rank
or seniority, but on the ability to communicate with the spirit world, demonstrated
acquisition of wealth, exercise of influence, and/or exceptional circumspection
and neutrality in decision making. The influence of such leaders must extend
beyond their particular descent group to the whole community.78
The issues one disagrees with concerning authority as described above include “the
ability to communicate with the spirit world, demonstrated acquisition of wealth” and to
some degree the “exercise of influence.” This is because one major issue that has become
a plague to the Nigerian society is the un-checked nature of the power of wealth
acquisition in the nation. People who have acquired wealth in dubious ways have several
praise singers and appear in the public arena as people of great influence until the source
of their wealth becomes public knowledge. The Obasanjo administration should be given
some credit for establishing the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission, which has
been very proactive in detecting dubious wealth acquisitions by some un patriotic
Nigerians.
Apart from the three positions one has discussed above as necessary preconditions for effective self-help associations, there are other concrete issues worth
examining in view of the historical circumstance of the Nigerian State one has
extensively discussed.
Adebayo Adedeji, in his critique of the Nigerian political structure, proposed a
“People-centered development vision,” that will support the governance structures in
existence at the grassroots in the nation.
Popular participation is the fons et origo of a people-centered development vision
that embraces the transformation agenda and is likely to achieve Africa’s second
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liberation – its freedom from poverty, hunger, disease, ignorance and
environmental degradation; and its emergence as a self-reliant and dynamic
political economy, fully integrated and no longer marginalized, but rather
participating actively in the community of nations. Popular participation, being at
the heart of a people-centered development paradigm, looks up to justice,
sustainability and inclusiveness as the defining principles of authentic
development. Development – be it political, economic or social – becomes a
people’s movement rather than a foreign-funded initiative. Government’s primary
role is as an enabling one: to provide people with the opportunity and
environment for self-development.79
Significantly, Adedeji acknowledged that two principles of Catholic social
teachings are essential to realizing the vision of a people-centered development, namely
subsidiarity and solidarity.80 Adedeji proceeded to show how the existing communitybased associations in Nigeria have been the major glue holding the people together in the
face of government failure and reckless mismanagement of the resources at their
disposal. Two independent researches were conducted by the “African Center for
Development and Strategic Studies” and the “Research Group on Local Institutions”
[LISDP], all based at the Obafemi Awolowo University in 1993. The following Local
government areas and States were covered by both researches: Afijio, Oyo State; Dekina,
Kogi State; Ethiope East, Delta State; Ijebu-Ode, Ogun State; Mbaitoli, Imo State;
Ohaozara, Abia State; and Wurno, Sokoto State. Others included, Borno, Imo, Ogun,
Kaduna, Benue, Ekiti and Osun States. In total, 12 States representing one-third of the
States in different parts of Nigeria were covered.81
The research by LISDP discussed above made the following observations.
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The principal finding of all the researchers in all the local government areas in all
the states covered is that the country’s saving grace are the long-neglected
traditional modes of social organization and civil society organizations. It is they
that have successfully saved villages and towns from total collapse and have
enabled the people to cope and survive. These modes of social organization
consist of institutions centered around [on] traditional rulers, trade and
professional guilds, age grade associations, town/village unions, community
development associations, women’s groups and associations, as well as religious
and social organizations. There is no doubt that Nigerian communities are
currently governed by these indigenous institutions.82
According to the observations made by the researchers above, sentiments which one
shares deeply, the hope of a bright future in Nigeria lies in community-based self-help
associations. That is why this study has made the case for government to support these
associations as major partners in the building of Nigerian civil society. In so doing, one
does not suggest in any way that government take over the running of these associations,
for that will be a violation of subsidiarity. But government can help organize these
institutions and support the community projects which otherwise will be impossible for
the associations to do for themselves. The National Orientation Agency which is
responsible for promoting this type of grassroots networking is presently grossly underfunded, which is an indication of the lack of commitment by government to enter into
these types of partnerships with community self-help associations.
Since there exist different types of community-based associations in Nigeria with
divergent experiences and need, one cannot offer a general formula for the governance of
these institutions. In fact, such a measure will be a violation of subsidiarity in terms of
centralization. Thus, the proposals one is advancing will better be carried out through a
process of dialogue, mutual trust, shared interests, and shared burdens, all with the goal
82
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of promoting the common good of the community as already indicated in previous
chapters of the study.
Thus, one has drawn from a variety of proposals made by scholars from the Nigerian
experience83 to put forward the following guidelines as the necessary pre-conditions,
conditions, and limits in the strengthening and formation of self-help community-based
associations that respect the principle of subsidiarity, promote social justice, bring about
solidarity and promote the common good.

4.2.3.1. Proposed Guidelines for the Strengthening and Formation of CommunityBased Self-Help Associations in Nigeria
The proposed guidelines one is offering below are meant to cover a wide variety
of issues with which community-based associations ought to deal. There may be other
additions that are specific in nature depending on particular need, socio-cultural heritage,
goals, etc. However, one considers these guidelines indispensable in promoting a
prosperous ethical and social justice oriented civil society that respects subsidiarity and
promotes the common good of the community:
1.
83
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2.

To promote the role of district heads and traditional council of chiefs.

3.

To build on existing ethnic or tribal unions.

4.

To maintain village and town unions as centers of community
development.

5.

To expand the existing local credit unions.

6.

To elect transparent leaders and to maintain a transparent electoral
process.

7.

To practice accountability and self-reliance.

8.

To promote formal and informal means of communication.

9.

To promote the participation of women for concrete activities toward
achieving specific objectives including seeking leadership roles in the
community.

10.

To promote both legal and social justice.

11.

To exercise an open administration.

12.

To practice consensus agreement as a means for collective-choice
arrangements.

13.

To encourage conflict resolution.

14.

To respond to the benefits and burdens of the extended family system.

15.

To be open to a balanced monitoring system.

16.

To put forward realistic and attainable goals.

17.

To practice and promote decision-making from the bottom rather than the
top.

18.

To form inter-ethnic, inter-communal, and inter-religious partnerships of
cooperation.

19.

To be open to limited and targeted intervention by a higher body as a last
resort to promote the common good of the whole community.
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20.

To challenge over-centralization, anarchy, and corruption.

Having discussed the role of self-help community-based associations which
should be supported by the different organs of government without interfering in their
internal makeup, one will in the next section examine specifically the role of the Church
in Nigeria.

4.2.4. The Principle of Subsidiarity and the Catholic Church in Nigeria:
Perspectives and Practice
This study has maintained that utilizing subsidiarity as a stabilizing principle is
central to ethical and social transformation of Nigerian civil society. The study also
upheld that, since subsidiarity was formally defined in the context of Catholic social
teaching by Pius XI, the principle ought to be applied both for society and in the Church.
In chapter two of this study, some perspectives on the application of subsidiarity to the
Church were advanced.84
Our aim is to show that in the task of building an authentic civil society in Nigeria
that will respect the human dignity of all, promote social justice, and uphold the rule of
law that is geared toward promoting the common good, the Church should be a major
partner in this process. As such, the subsidiarity principle that one has advocated as the
hinge of the society is necessarily applicable to the Church as a part in society. Indeed,
the Church has the support structures to help people to help themselves at the grassroots.
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Thus, one will review and offer a critique of some of the documents the Catholic Bishops
Conferences of Nigeria (CBCN) have issued over the years on faith and social life, and
ascertain their use of the principle of subsidiarity. It is pertinent to state that the laity in
Nigeria has contributed immensely to building the Church and one does not wish to
down-play this role by any means. In fact, some scholars have documented the
contribution of the laity in Nigeria85 this is not our task here. Suffice it to say that the
participation of the laity in small Christian communities as the centers where
evangelization and social life come together has contributed immensely to the growth of
the Church in Nigeria. At these centers, these self-help, community-based religious
associations exist formally and informally under different circumstances. Thus, it is our
position that these faith-based associations at the grassroots be supported through direct
partnership with government, eliminating the many bureaucratic channels that consume
time and are too expensive to manage without getting directly to the people at the
grassroots.

4.2.4.1. The Catholic Bishops Conference of Nigeria (CBCN) on Issues of
Faith and Social Life, 1960-200386 vis-à-vis Subsidiarity
The fundamental goal of this study at this stage is to ascertain whether the CBCN
utilized subsidiarity as a central tool of Catholic social teaching while articulating their
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positions on different issues of faith and social life in Nigeria. The study will review and
offer a critique of some of these documents and make suggestions for the future.
The first indication of some use of subsidiarity does appear in the statements
made by the bishops at the time of Nigeria’s independence from British colonial rule on
October 1, 1960 entitled: “The Catholic Church in an Independent Nigeria.”87 Since this
was the first major pronouncement by the bishops in an independent Nigeria, their
optimism for the future of the nation was very high as one takes a closer look at the
document they put forward. At this time, it is significant to note, the majority of the
bishops were missionaries working in Nigeria prior to independence (sixteen out of the
nineteen existing bishops were missionaries and three Nigerians). It would be fair to say
that the document under review was produced by those who were not completely
immersed in the struggle for independence and those who may be wrongly perceived as
an extension of the colonial administration. But in general, they produced a beautiful
document, guided by some of the major papal social encyclicals.
The bishops, while discussing the important role of the State, maintained that the
government exists for the people: hence institutions such as the family and private
property derive from the natural law to help foster human ends and fulfillment. Thus, “the
State may regulate such institutions in view of the common good. But it cannot eliminate
or supersede them.”88 Clearly, the bishops use here the subsidiarity principle that one has
discussed at great length in this study. The point is that the bishops understood the
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relevance of this principle for governance in Nigerian society. While discussing the social
problems of the nation, the bishops specifically called for unity in diversity:
Right from the start it is well to recognize that Nigerian unity includes a great deal
of diversity. The country is one state. But it includes many nations. Each one of
the several large groupings in our multi-national state possesses a language and
traditions that are its own; each people owns a certain group loyalty; and the
members of each ethnic group have a natural tendency to associate with one
another, even when they are away from their state of origin. . . It is perfectly
legitimate to suggest that the future development of Nigeria should respect the
different national traditions of our people. However, above the fellowship of these
particular traditions stands the greater fellowship of the state. Nigerians,
especially the country’s leaders, must primarily look to the common well-being of
all the members of the political community.89
The above mentioned position of the bishops encouraged community-based associations
that may be ethnic in character but they also encouraged the autonomous pursuits of these
groups be channeled towards the common good of the larger political community. In fact,
they challenged Catholics to be respectful of their fellow citizens and not to engage in
divisive practices: “We insist that no Catholic can with a good conscience indulge in a
policy that sets one section of the state against another – ‘tribalism’ as this attitude is
usually called.”90 Unfortunately, both the issue of Nigeria’s unity and tribalism coupled
with bad leadership has been the bane of the nation as one has clearly pointed out in the
first section of chapter four.
The emphatic mention and attempt to apply the principle of subsidiarity by the
bishops took place in their February, 1972 Pastoral Letter.91 The bishops made a
statement on the present social situation in the nation and stated two positive
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developments mixed with some degree of difficulty.
1.
2.

[a] nation which is passing through an important spiritual experience;
there is growing awareness of the intrinsic value of the human person and
of the inviolable rights of the individual human person.
[on] this positive side, too, we see the ever expanding process of a just
“socialization” assisted by government finances, through individual
human strivings in a widening range of commodity projects, and
institutionalized community services. We see the writing on the wall, too,
in an increasing number of African countries, of expanding state-control
and government take-over in matters where the Christian social principle
of subsidiarity (of social help and not state domination) should apply. The
gradual state take-over of denominational schools is but one instance of
this emerging pattern of thought. We must be prepared always to raise our
cry against any form of dictatorship before it becomes a too strong and
stifling reality.92

The discovery that the bishops in Nigeria in the early 70s attempted to apply the
subsidiarity principle was a hopeful development about the attempt one is making now to
bring this principle once more to the table, as different opinions are being suggested as to
how to better develop the nation’s civil society. The bishops proceeded from the initial
premise under review to state the social problems in the country and to make
recommendations for resolving the social crisis. Among other things, the bishops
supported rural development, social movements, workers’ unions, social justice, and
partnership between religious groups and government to bring about social change in the
nation. Specifically, they addressed issues such as unemployment, adult education, and
agriculture.93 In retrospect, one can now see the context in which the Church in Nigeria
has made much contribution in the areas of education, health care and social mobilization
of the people. The Church can still do better, especially in participating as a Non-
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governmental organization (NGO) that has the trust of the people and the human
resources to open up the villages to positive social transformation as echoed by the
bishops in their February 10, 1979 Pastoral Letter, section 43 entitled “Self – Help and
the State.”
A principle of good government in a free society is dependence on the people to
achieve their own solutions – if necessary, with government subvention and
encouragement, though without government takeover or law-making. Again, a
political astuteness which assists non-governmental sectors of the society to be
responsible for social goals can leave government free to apportion its resources
to more intractable problems. Achieving a more balanced sharing in national
wealth and resources, better urban industries on the one hand and rural farm
communities on the other [hand], will require a great infusion of government help.
The nation’s food supply and the stability of its dominant rural population are at
stake.94
Furthermore, it is important to state that the bishops had indicated their
willingness to cooperate with government as active partners in grassroots initiatives with
past regimes but did not receive a very favorable response. Most of the theoretical
projects such as MAMSER for social mobilization, reconstruction and education of the
citizens, DFRRI which stands for the Directorate for Food, Roads and Rural
Infrastructure, NDE for the National Directorate for Employment, Better Life for Rural
Women, and the People’s Bank have all collapsed due to lack of responsible
accountability and partnership with grassroots oriented non-governmental agencies such
as churches, community associations, and other people-oriented agencies. Thus, one will
re-echo the position of the bishops in their Pastoral Letter of March, 1990.
As Church, with our wide and effective rural network of facilities and structures,
we are ready to cooperate with government in promoting the objectives of these
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people-oriented schemes. We hope that our hands of collaboration will not be
rejected.95
The “Prayer against Bribery and Corruption in Nigeria,” issued by the bishops in
their Pastoral Letter at Ibadan in 1998, is a classic case of the bishops attempts to respond
to the socio-political and ethical challenges facing the nation by appealing to a higher
source. This prayer is constantly been recited in all parishes and out-station Churches at
every Eucharistic celebration nationwide. It is one instance when the people are properly
mobilized to address an intractable issue that continues to derail the nation and give her
people bad publicity both nationally and internationally. One is of the opinion that this
method of creating public awareness be utilized in discussing not only government
matters but also Church policy.
Specifically, there are two documents issued by the bishops that capture the
practical implications for the Church’s engagement in social issues based on Gospel
values. In their meeting at Abuja in February 2002, the bishops put forward one of the
more balanced positions on both the roles of government and the Church in meeting the
common good. In the sub-section 4 entitled “Action to Be Taken,” the bishops called on
the government to make these commitments.
•
•

•
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•
•
•
•
•

Government should intensify efforts at creating job opportunities for the
unemployed.
Government should not only allow but foster the creation of more political
parties so that more options are available to the public.
Insecurity in the land is not solved by the proliferation of dubious vigilante
groups. There is no civilized alternative to a well-trained, well-equipped, and
well-paid Police Force.
We call on government to conduct its business in the open, and not as if it
were a secret cult. People have the right to full knowledge of what programs
and plans are discussed in the halls of government.
The war against corruption has so far proved ineffectual, partly because many
of the principal actors in government are themselves not free from corruption.
Good intentions are not enough. An independent body should be given full
power and authority to wage an effective war against corruption at all levels
of government and business.96

On its part, the bishops pledged to make these commitments.
• We reaffirm the indispensable role of the Justice, Development, and Peace
Commissions/Committees (JDPC) at the parish, diocesan, provincial and
national levels. These Commissions/Committees are not simply another group
or society in the Church but are to oversee and take leadership responsibility
in the struggle to heal the wounds of the nation.
• In accord with the Social Teaching of the Church, we encourage Catholics to
enter the difficult world of politics. Through the Justice, Development and
Peace Commissions/Committees and the Catholic Social Forum (CSF) the
Church will provide political education formation both for candidates vying
for office and the electorate.
• Catechesis in parishes should include the Church’s teaching on the social
dimension of sin and grace, and on how Catholics should be agents of healing
and reconciliation, standing for non-violent action for justice and peace.
• The Church will continue and intensify its efforts to complement the programs
of government in providing health care, education and other social services.
• The Church commits itself to establishing centers of vocational, functional
education that will lead to gainful employment.
• Working with government we will put in place programs to combat the
HIV/AIDS pandemic. These programs will aim at creating AIDS awareness,
arresting the spread of the virus, and extending pastoral care to infected
individuals and their families.
• We remind all God’s people and the laity in particular, that they are to be salt
of the earth and light of the world. All Catholics must be seen to be part and
parcel of the healing process of the nation.
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• The Church will continue to set an example for the nation by renewed efforts
to follow the example of Jesus by preaching the good news to the poor (cf. Lk.
4:18), and looking after those who are most neglected. If a nation cannot truly
be great when it neglects the needs of its poorest members, how much more
true is that of the Church, the family of God?97
The partnership discussed above between government and the Church is one major step
forward to bringing about the type of social justice oriented civil society one has
discussed in detail in this study. The practical realization of these goals will take place
when both the government and the Church allow the subsidiarity principle to operate by
providing support to communities at the grassroots to help themselves without
interference except for the sake of promoting the common good of all the society.
The partnership approach between government and Church was again adopted by
the bishops in dealing with the issue of young girls and women taken to serve as
prostitutes in the Western world, particularly in Italy. The Church leaders affirmed:
We will collaborate with governments here and abroad, and with security officials
in freeing women who are enslaved in sex exploitation overseas and returning
them to their homes. In pursuit of this, we encourage our faithful towards
effective collaboration with existing national networks of Church societies,
NGOs, and other established organizations. We support the efforts of the Nigeria
Conference of Women Religious in spearheading this campaign.98
This type of approach to confront a major issue such as prostitution is remarkable. But
beyond this effort, one will hope that at the grassroots level, citizens will begin to address
some of the cultural practices which continually place women as second class citizens in
their families, villages, communities and the society. Here, one will recount issues such
as the right to inheritance in the family, the right to participate in family meetings and
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have an active voice, the right to education, the right to be respected in marital
commitments especially in case of polygamous marriages, the right to be respected in the
public space of politics and social engagement, and, of course, the right to play a more
active role in the Church beyond roles traditionally associated with women. The extent to
which the partnership between the government and the Church will be measured will
depend on the extent to which these issues are carried out in the families, villages, local
associations, Churches, local governments, states and the larger society.

4.2.5. Summary
This chapter began with an analytical and critical history of Nigeria showing the
social context in which the principle of subsidiary function is to operate. There were
many challenges discussed in Nigeria that militate against an effective principle of
subsidiary function. These included, among other things, over-centralization by the
Federal government structure which takes over the role of smaller communities,
militarized command structures without regard for societal makeup, and the
entrenchment of corruption as a normal way of governance. Other challenging issues
included the uncivil nature of the society, failure to positively utilize ethnic and cultural
differences, the bankruptcy of leadership, bribery, lack of accountability and much more.
The study proposed three approaches that will promote a social justice oriented
society. First, the correlation between subsidiarity and federalism in a pluralistic society
was discussed. Essentially, one advocated for the understanding of the nation-state as an
aggregate whole made up of different units which are necessary components of the
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whole. Thus, federal structures, particularly the one in Nigeria, must be seen by all the
units which make up the nation to be a true manifestation of the constituent parts. Thus,
the existence of the nation depends on the extent to which there is continuous affirmation
and recognition from the different communities that make up the country.
Second, the study upheld that fundamentally respecting and promoting the human
dignity of all persons within the Nigerian society is at the heart of how the principle of
subsidiary function is utilized properly to promote the common good. Third, the study
encouraged support for the existing village associations, ethnic unions, grassroots
community-based and religious groups as they continue to serve the people, as such
grassroots efforts have been the ground on which the masses have found comfort in the
troubled times in Nigeria. Some proposals were advanced as general guidelines for the
strengthening and formation of these community self-help associations.
Lastly, the study examined some of the statements by the Catholic Bishops
Conference of Nigeria in the promotion of a social justice oriented society. In general, the
bishops have made the case for the social gospel to the government of Nigeria over the
years. In most cases, if the government responded, it was too late. Thus, the study
renewed the call for partnership between government and the Church, especially in
reaching out to the grassroots to bring about the much needed social transformation. The
study also emphasized the need for the principle of subsidiary function to be operative
both in society and in the structures of the Church, for the common good of the Nigerian
society.

CHAPTER FIVE
Toward the Future: Some of the Concrete Issues Involved in the Applicability of the
Principle of Subsidiary Function in the Church and the Society

Introduction
This chapter will examine some of the concrete issues involved in the
applicability of subsidiarity both in the society and the Church. On the one hand, the
study will show that some of these issues will require further study since they are beyond
the scope of this work, but it is important that one raise the questions in order to provoke
some discussion at different levels of the society and the Church. On the other hand,
some of these issues will involve some degree of practical commitment and the
willingness by the people in a given society or the Church to allow this principle of
natural social philosophy to operate, without losing sight of the main goal of subsidiarity:
to help persons in community to help themselves and to promote the common good of all.
Thus, some of the issues one will advance require continued theological reflection,
pastoral insights, ecumenical dialogue, canonical review, and social commitment in
correlation with the social sciences, which must be verified by lived experience in the
Church’s social reality and the society. The study will examine five major questions.

5.1.

Subsidiarity and Structural Organization in the Church
Kaufmann has raised a fundamental question about the extent to which the

historical and social reality of the Church is at the heart of ecclesiology. According to
him, there is some confusion between the essence of the ‘social’ and the ‘sociological’
288

289
reality of the Church, which needs some clarification in order to understand discourse
about the Church’s social reality. The former, that is the social aspect, can be understood
in this way: “The social reality of the Church is the Church in action, what is visibly
happening in Rome and elsewhere in the context of what is called ‘the Catholic Church.’
It is also the context of the experience of the Church’s members and the context of
religious socialization, that is, the transmission of the faith to successive generations.”1
The Latter, that is the sociological aspect, is viewed this way: “The sociological reality of
the Church is a quite narrow reality, the sum of statements which have been formulated
about the social reality of the Church from a sociological perspective. These sociological
propositions, of course, are also a social fact and by chance they may influence the social
reality of the Church.”2 Thus, the social reality of the Church is a complex phenomenon
that takes different forms in different situations of the lived experience of Church.
Similarly, sociological propositions of the Church’s social reality are varied precisely
because of the complex nature of the Church’s social reality. Kaufmann posits that one
should not take for granted the social reality of the Church as if it were secondary to the
spiritual reality of the Church.
This devaluation of social reality, that is, of the field of lived experience, is
dangerous for the transmission of the faith in modernizing societies. For the
transmission of the faith has to be [effected] by social mechanisms which
themselves are becoming more complex, and more dependent upon the lived
experience of the Church. This experience is interpreted not only by the
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ecclesiastical authorities but also by public opinion and above all by the persons
in charge of the education of successive generations.3
The necessity to interpret the social reality of the Church through a sociological lens does
not make the sociologist an expert on Church matters; rather, it underscores the fact that
lived human experience is at the heart of any social reality including that of the Church.
Thus, the social context in which the Christian reality is experienced as Church requires
constant study, reflection, meditation, and practice. This study realizes that in the Church,
one is dealing with both a temporal and transcendent reality, hence the need for a balance
between these perspectives of Church.
Although the spiritual, sacramental, mystical reality of the Church is not
accessible to sociological analysis, the sociologist must take note of the social fact
that the Church is constituted by faith in its transcendent reality; otherwise he
lacks an adequate understanding of what he is studying.4
Thus, the transcendent nature of the Church is the life wire for its existence and relevance
in society. If the faith of the Church were to lose its core dynamic spirit, some loss of
religious identity might be manifested that would provide a major challenge to the
Church. In society, this type of challenge be it in economics, politics, or family
relationships, has been met with some degree of resolution by appealing to structural
differentiation and relative autonomy in the public square. The major challenge for the
Church seems to be to what extent will the continuous articulations of subsidiarity within
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purely hierarchical terms, without any type of functional and structural
complementarities, respond to the decentralizing tendencies of civil and political
structures today. Thus, without going into details about the modern theory of
organizations which makes one to realize the complex nature of organized social reality
today, it is necessary to propose that some attempt be made in the Church’s structural
organization to respond to the complex nature of its social reality and that of the larger
society. In view of this complexity, the reasonable approach appears to be maintaining
the balance between a more elastic organization and a rigid organization.
The principle of hierarchical organization has not been abandoned in the process,
but it has itself become more complex. The elementary principle of all formal
organization, that is, the specialization and combination of differentiated
functions, today is typically repeated at several levels of the organization, so that
there are different levels of control in the cybernetic sense. These systems try to
combine the advantages of both centralization and decentralization.5
Does the Church have something to learn from society in terms of how the nature of the
Church’s hierarchical structural organization has affected and may continue to affect the
understanding of subsidiarity proposed for the social order?6 Is the hierarchy of the
Church open to making the necessary changes in its structural organization that respects
the dignity of the people of God? These questions raise some concrete issues from a
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sociological or even theological perspective about the applicability of subsidiarity in the
Church.7
Is the Church’s hierarchical structure too simple from an organizational point to
face the complex tasks confronting the Church in pluralistic modern societies? Have the
Church’s administrative structures become much more complex than the original sense of
hierarchia ordinis from a sacramental perspective? Perhaps, this is a matter reserved for
theological, pastoral, and canonical discussions. Kaufmann puts it poignantly:
It is probable that the centralizing tendencies proper to any hierarchical
organization also operate within the Catholic Church. The violations of the
principle of subsidiarity which result from them are hidden in the case of the
Catholic Church by the idea of a sacramental hierarchy . . . one of the most
important tasks of ecclesiology is to distinguish more clearly between the
essentially hierarchical functions of the Church, which arise from its sacramental
order, and those which are only accidentally hierarchical and arise from its
administrative order.8
There are two implications arising from the above question. First, there is no
doubt that the distribution of competencies requires a central administration. The
challenge is the degree of power which a central administration should have on concrete
local issues like those between the Roman curia and regional or national bishops’
conferences for “it is quite clear that a central administration will always be more
insensitive to regional particularities.”9 But these reflections are not limited only to the
relations between Rome and Episcopal conferences, but can be applied to relations
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between the parish and the central administration in a diocese and even among individual
dioceses. The struggle for autonomy and communion in African Churches, especially
from the central administration of Rome, is a case in point.
The whole debate on inculturation, which has been the dominant theme of
theology in Africa and which the 1994 Synod of Bishops for Africa supports as
the organizational metaphor for evangelization, is finally an issue of power. Who
decides how the Church should live in the context of Africa? Who makes
decisions about marriage, liturgy, canon law, spirituality, and theology? The
Roman technocracy which interferes in the free experience of the life of the
Church in particular contexts of Africa is not qualified to do so. The pro-nuncio
whose opinion carries more weight in the Roman scheme of things than the pastor
of a diocese is not really qualified to speak for the Church [in Africa]. The
assembly effectively convoked to listen to the Word of God and to keep the
memory of Jesus, the community which welcomes the Word and proclaims and
bears testimony to him as the Savior of the world must not be confused with the
offices of congregations or secretariats in Rome nor with a pro-nuncio who does
not preside over an assembly.10
Second, the apparent tension between sacramental hierarchy and administrative
hierarchy may be resolved in one way by decentralization which makes room for the
expansion of relevant administrative roles within the Church that are not tied to the
sacraments. The attempts being made today toward lay administrative roles in the Church
is a step in the right direction, especially in the developed countries of the West. In
African Churches, clericalism is still the order of the day. Thus, the challenge in African
countries will be how to open up parish and diocesan centers for lay persons with the
qualified training to bring their competency to the table and help build the local Church.
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At this juncture, it will be helpful to emphasize two practical conclusions made by
Komonchak in an essay mentioned earlier. First, he challenged all interested in the issue
of the applicability of subsidiarity in the Church to examine the origin of the principle.
The principle was elaborated and formulated in response to the growing
centralization of state authority, which was absorbing the legitimate roles of other
communities and reducing the freedom and self-responsibility of individuals. . .
Within the Church, this problem needs to be addressed in the broad context not
only of the powerful centralizing tendencies of the last two centuries but also of
the social theory, imported from without, which legitimated them.11
The second conclusion of Komonchak emphasizes the relevance of subsidiarity in
helping to check some of the centralizing tendencies in the Church: “the persistence of
the same complaints over these fifty years suggests that some fundamental structural
problems remain in the Church. . . I do not believe that it was subsidiarity which first put
people in mind of the problems, but the problems which suggested the usefulness of the
principle.”12
Lastly, it is reasonable to say that an overly centralized view of subsidiarity is
inadequate to show how competencies should be distributed. That is why it is necessary
to analyze the problems, structures, social context, means of control, communication and
development in each particular case in order to ascertain how these contribute toward or
away from the common good. Indeed, “the expansion of the means of control was the
historical reason why it was just and necessary to formulate the principle of subsidiarity
with regard to the state. The Church has to keep in mind that the very secular means of
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control today are growing so fast that it cannot consider them indifferent to its spiritual
and social task.”13

5.2.

Subsidiarity and Some Pastoral Insights and Challenges
The previous section examined some of the complex questions involved in the

attempt to make room for the principle of subsidiary function to become operative in the
Church. This section will offer some of the pastoral insights and challenges that the
People of God in the community of the Church ought to discern in the light of the
spiritual and social mission of the Church set forth in the Second Vatican Council.14
The Second Vatican Council’s document on the Church, Lumen Gentium, in
chapter three entitled “The Church is Hierarchical,” (LG 8) discussed the leadership
structure of the Church and affirmed Jesus Christ as the eternal pastor who sends out his
apostles on a mission to preach the kingdom of God (Mt. 10: 1-42). The document makes
it clear that the Church’s hierarchy is called to a pastoral function in varying degrees
depending on their particular calling and function in the hierarchical order. The image of
the Good Shepherd, who came not to be served but to serve and lay down his life for his
sheep (Mt. 20:28; Mk. 10:45), is set before the hierarchy in their pastoral duties to the
people of God (LG 27-29). Thus, the issue of charism and institution in the Church has
become the object for controversy which is beyond this study except to say that Dulles
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has proposed the context for addressing this issue in the Christian community that is
related to subsidiarity. According to Dulles, Vatican II left two unanswered questions: “Is
the charismatic superior or inferior to the hierarchical? Is the charismatic a free and
unpredictable outpouring of the Spirit or a permanent gift associated to certain offices?”15
Dulles proposed a synthesis that will address these issues by upholding “unity in
distinctness, sacramentality, necessity of institution, and of the charismatic.”16 He upheld
the mutual dependence of charism on institution and institution on charism.
The charismatic, by offsetting the vocational hazards of the official, helps to
prevent the institution from becoming rigid, mechanical, routinized, and
domineering. Office-holders who try to quench the Spirit (cf. 1 Thess 5:19) are
subject to correction. Criticism, however, can have no place in the Church unless
it proceeds from faith, from love, and from recognition of the rights of office, and
unless it aims to build up the body of Christ in unity.17
This is precisely the role of subsidiarity in acting as a stabilizing principle in the
Church and society. In this connection, the pastoral office of Church leaders demands
that the leaders be Good Shepherds who are not “rigid, mechanical, routinized, and
domineering,” but people open to the Spirit rather than seeking to quench it. Pastoral
leadership demands that office holders in the Church be accountable to the People of God
by the manner in which they carry out their spiritual and social mission. This is the
proper context in which the Church’s articulation of subsidiarity for the social order in
society would make any sense. What is the point of calling on the political and public
office holders to practice accountability, if the same practice is not promoted in our
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parishes, diocesan offices, and among the leaders of the Church? The recent sexual abuse
of minors by some members of the clergy in the Catholic Church in the United States is a
case in point where the People of God in the Archdiocese of Boston brought to bear their
collective voices to force Cardinal Bernard Law to resign. The lesson from this action is
clear that the Laity should no longer be viewed as a passive group in the Church. To this
extent there is great need today and always to maintain some balance between the
genuine response from the Laity and the openness from Church leaders.
There is no question but that the church is not built up “from below” by the
religious needs and wishes of the people according to their taste and feelings. At
the same time, the church “from above” should not be misunderstood in the sense
that all power and all truth flow from the top. It has never been maintained that
the Spirit of truth and holiness is active only in church officials. . . The ethical
consciousness of today’s young people is concerned not only with the correct
actions of individuals within a given institution, but with justice in the social
institutions themselves. The church’s future depends on whether its institutional
structure gives witness to the teaching it proclaims. More subsidiarity within the
church might make it even more credible in the eyes of modern man (woman).18
In the Nigerian context, where corruption has eaten deep into the fabric of the nation, the
Church leaders need to be accountable at the parish, diocesan, and national levels to the
people they have taken an oath to serve. In this way, the Church will lead by example and
stand a better chance of being an efficacious sign of Christ as the “Light of the Nations,”
in this part of the world.
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5.3.

Subsidiarity and Nationalism
The other issue implicated in the operation of the principle of subsidiary function

is the question of nationalist sentiments and Church practices. Since subsidiarity
promotes the fact that decisions be made by those who are closer to the social context
where such decisions are being made, how will this impact some issues involving
cultural, ethnic, national, and regional developments? In the Nigerian context, the period
of mission territories is almost over in many dioceses. The local leadership is in charge of
the Church. Yet, there have been situations where the Vatican, in consultation with some
bishops who claim to be speaking for the people, made appointments of bishops across
ethnic and cultural lines that have created some degree of instability for the local Church.
One is aware that promoting cultural and ethnic reconciliation and understanding is a
necessary task of the Gospel. However, this type of evangelization needs to be gradual,
open, realistic, and just. The Vatican should not be viewed as forcing ethnic groups who
have not resolved long-standing tensions, both in their civic relationships and in the
Church, to start working together overnight with the hope that somehow the Holy Spirit
will pacify the deep seated ethnic tensions of so many generations. This was one of the
mistakes made by the colonial powers in Africa, and, in situations like the one described
above, it is reasonable to understand when people make an obvious connection with the
Vatican as a colonial power. In such a case, the people’s allegiance is obviously to the
land of their birth and not to the Church. The point one has made here can be applied to
related issues such as loyalty to one’s nation or Church; loyalty to the extended family
system or Church; loyalty to AIDS prevention through the use of condoms or the
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Church’s call for abstinence in the face of genocide, which may be helpful in the long
term, but in the short term, does not help address the calamity of many African countries.
The words of Kerber speak volumes:
Thus, the church’s organizational structure must be such that it allows human
beings to participate in church life. Human beings have a right to expect every
kind of help for their Christian lives from the community of believers. This help
should not be tied to conditions which are impossible to fulfill by individuals or
the entire culture. Inculturation, then, is an absolute necessity.19
Thus, the challenge that in applying subsidiarity at the Local level, these churches could
somehow become nationalist churches is unnecessary. Rather, by applying subsidiarity,
local churches are empowered and supported to act more effectively and to carry out the
mission of the church in view of local conditions.

5.4.

Subsidiarity and Sphere Sovereignty: The Ecumenical Task
The question of the relationship between subsidiarity and sphere sovereignty has

been a major concern of some scholars20 who have attempted to show the relevance and
challenges of providing an ecumenical perspective for ethical principles in the plural
public square. Chaplin has shown the interaction that exists between the Catholic vision
of subsidiarity and associational autonomy and the Reformed Dutch neo-Calvinism
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vision of ‘sphere sovereignty,’ articulated by Abraham Kuyper and Herman Dooyeweerd.
According to Chaplin:
This pluralistic Reformed conception, although not widely known outside the
Netherlands, is arguably the most substantial example of a Protestant social and
political theory in the twentieth century. . . Although rooted in quite different
theological and philosophical foundations, it shares a great deal with the Catholic
conception.21
The Reformed concept of ‘sphere sovereignty’ is a Dutch phrase “souvereiniteit in eigen
kring” which is literally translated ‘sovereignty in one’s own sphere.’22 According to
Chaplin the term received its classic formulation in the writings and speeches of
Abraham Kuyper (1837-1920). Kuyper stated in a classic statement at the Free University
of Amsterdam in 1891 while proposing a Christian approach to the problem of poverty
that: “Against both of these (referring to the state and society), we as Christians must
hold that the state and society each has its own sphere, its own sovereignty, and that the
social question cannot be resolved rightly unless we respect this duality and thus honor
state authority as clearing the way for a free society.”23 Chaplin then identified four major
parallels between the Reformed Calvinist concept of sphere sovereignty and the Catholic
social thought principle of subsidiarity.24 First, each of these concepts denounced both
individualistic and totalitarian theories. Second, they both upheld the individual as a
social being created by God to live in different communities, and not to be taken over by
others. Third, they both developed pluralist views of society, consisting of different
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groups or parts, but with a coextensive harmony. Fourth, they both viewed the state as
having the primary responsibility of protecting these communities, and challenged the
state not to override these communities and that the individuals may not be dominated by
stronger communities. These points provide some opportunity for ecumenical dialogue
between both traditions in the continual quest to discover better ways of organizing
complex societies in view of the common good.
There are some areas of differences between the two traditions being discussed.
The Reformed tradition has challenged the Catholic notion of hierarchy in relation to
subsidiarity. This is a legitimate question which has been raised within the Catholic
Church as well. This study has discussed the fact that subsidiarity is in favor of the
bottom up approach rather than the top down approach. There will always be the need,
both in the Church and society, of some type of structural arrangement. The real
challenge is to fashion a structure that promotes human self-actualization in view of the
common good. This may yet be another point for an ecumenical dialogue where the
experiences from both traditions may lead to mutual enrichment and development. In
fact, Chaplin made the connection between subsidiarity and sphere sovereignty in the
context of public law that is open to different types of structural arrangements, including
some type of limited hierarchy.
Each social relationship possesses original rights deriving from its ‘juridical
sphere sovereignty’ which may not be overridden by the state. Nonetheless, with
respect to public law, the state does indeed stand above all other communities in a
hierarchical relationship. Its sphere sovereignty is a public legal sovereignty. This
is not a general hierarchical priority, only a functional legal, and hence a limited,
one.25
25
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Both Skillen and McCarthy have criticized subsidiarity and autonomy as
inadequate tools to the task of guaranteeing a real pluralism in the temporal social order.
In our judgment, influenced as it by Herman Dooyeweerd’s contrast between
“sphere sovereignty” and the “whole-part” relation, the principle of autonomy in a
subsidiarity framework does not adequately define or safeguard the identities,
tasks, and rights of multiple societal institutions. Autonomy can provide for the
relative independence of parts within a whole, such as different government units
within a state, or different academic units within a university, or different
ecclesiastical offices within the church. It does not, however, provide an adequate
basis for distinguishing the identities and responsibilities of different spheres of
human life. A family, a school, a church, a business enterprise, a state, each has a
different identity, requiring uniquely different human roles and responsibilities
within it. These different social entities should not be viewed as parts of one
another as autonomous subunits in a larger whole.26
The criticism leveled against subsidiarity and autonomy from the perspective of
this study is based on a partial reading of the internal logic undergirding the principle.
This study has pointed out in chapter two that there are three major principles on which
subsidiarity rests. These are: autonomy, hierarchy, and intervention.27 All these three
principles act as a dynamic whole to present the authentic meaning of subsidiarity. Thus,
any reading of this principle which does not articulate all three principles is merely an
abstraction. In this sense, one can understand the confusion about the true nature of
subsidiarity in serving as a basis for differentiating temporal social institutions. Similarly,
it is a matter of debate whether institutions like the family, school, church, business, and
state, while maintaining their distinct identities, require unique roles and responsibilities
such that they could not be considered as parts of the larger social order. Thus, the claim
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that subsidiarity appears not to recognize the ontological role of institutions stems from
the same partial understanding. Indeed, if subsidiarity accepts the relative independence
of the different parts, how could it hold back their ontological status as suggested by
Skillen and McCarthy?
A truly pluralist social order seems to require recognition of the fundamental and
not merely the relative independence of the different spheres and institutions in a
differentiated society. To achieve this recognition, the ontological status of
institutions must be grasped and upheld. In our opinion, the subsidiarityautonomy framework does not do this.28
There are two traditions at work here with their specific assumptions about how
best one could approach the issues involved in a complex plural social order. The
progressive Calvinist tradition out of which has emerged the concept of “sphere
sovereignty,” while upholding the Trinitarian basis for the correlation between culture
and society, differs in the understanding associated with the state by Catholics.
For Kuyper, the state takes its place not above all other spheres, but rather next to
them. Its high and overarching position is due not to a natural hierarchy but to the
state’s peculiar character as public authority. At this point Kuyper, like Calvin,
stands at a considerable distance from Aristotle and Thomas. The state is in no
way self-sufficient; it is not the natural telos of other associations or spheres of
social life; it is not the whole of which the latter are parts.29
This study has presented the ontological basis for subsidiarity in Aquinas and the
subsequent papal social encyclicals beginning with that of Leo XIII that does not in any
way grant absolute power to the state. Rather, the basis for subsidiarity and the social
teachings comes from the Christian vision of the dignity of the human person which has
revelation as its foundation as one has discussed extensively in previous chapters. The
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ecumenical task for both traditions is to engage in what Chaplin called “communitarian
pluralism” which has two major ideas:
First, there exists a diversity of essential, divinely created, human purposes each
of which needs to be concretely pursued within a corresponding community with
a distinctive character appropriate to that purpose; second, each of these
communities must be enabled by the state (and indeed by everyone) to pursue its
particular purposes in responsible freedom and security.30
The principles of subsidiarity and sphere sovereignty rightly understood and practiced
might form the basis for genuine presentation of Christian social and ethical views that
address the issues and needs in complex pluralist societies.

5.5.

Subsidiarity and Some Canonical Implications
This section will address some of the canonical implications involved in the

applicability of subsidiarity in the Church and offer some suggestions. The study
considers some of these issues under review as deserving attention and further research
and reflection in the Church’s social reality.
The preface to the Latin edition of the 1983 Code of Canon Law has stated that
some guidelines were approved unanimously in the revision of the whole Code at the
request of the Supreme Pontiff, by a general session of the synod of bishops in October,
1967.31 Thus, guideline no. 5 which was used for the revision of the Code is central to
this study and is quoted in full below.
Careful attention is to be given to the greater application of the so-called principle
of subsidiarity within the Church. It is a principle which is rooted in a higher one
30
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because the office of bishops with its attached powers is a reality of divine law. In
virtue of this principle one may defend the appropriateness and even the necessity
of providing for the welfare especially of individual institutes through particular
laws and the recognition of a healthy autonomy for particular executive power
while legislative unity and universal and general law are observed. On the basis of
the same principle, the new Code entrusts either to particular laws or to executive
power whatever is not necessary for the unity of the discipline of the universal
Church so that appropriate provision is made for a healthy “decentralization”
while avoiding the danger of division into or the establishment of national
Churches.32
The above guiding principle recognized the need to apply subsidiarity in the Church and
upheld that the foundational basis for applicability be tied to the office and powers of
bishops which is a reality of divine law. Here, the synod of bishops acknowledged the
fact that subsidiarity is to be applied in the Church without prejudice to the hierarchical
structure of the Church.33 This study has discussed the implications arising from the
continual articulation of subsidiarity with the present hierarchical structure of the Church
and the inherent challenges. Guideline no. 5 sought to discuss the necessity for particular
laws but cautioned that there was the need for “healthy autonomy.” The study has
discussed the issue of autonomy as an integral component of subsidiarity. But unlimited
autonomy is not in the spirit of subsidiarity and that is why “intervention” is another
component. Thus, both autonomy and intervention as necessary parts of subsidiarity are
always geared toward the common good. The call by the guideline that the new Code
ensure that either “particular laws” or “executive power” be the custodian of “whatever is
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not necessary for the unity of the discipline of the universal Church,” appear vague. Is the
guideline no. 5 seeking the unity of the Church’s discipline on universal uniformity? This
may seem to be the case, since the guideline goes on to mention the need for “healthy
decentralization,” and then concludes with what seems to be its greatest fear, namely “the
danger of division into or the establishment of national Churches.” This study has
previously discussed both the issue of decentralization with regard to subsidiarity and the
relationship of subsidiarity to nationalism. The challenge posed by these issues with
regard to the applicability of subsidiarity in the Church by guideline no. 5 must have led
to the complete disappearance of subsidiarity in the 1983 Code of Canon Law.
John A. Alesandro has acknowledged that, while most of the guidelines were
helpful during the revision process of the 1917 Code, subsidiarity was completely left out
of the new Code’s judicial process.
These principles were a helpful tool for those drafting the revised law. The final
version of the canons illustrates the effectiveness of the principles in inculcating
the spirit and directives of the Council into the Code’s juridic framework. Many
of the principles had a direct influence on the revision and most, although not all,
were substantially implemented. (The most notable exceptions are the directives
concerning subsidiarity in the judicial process and the establishment of
administrative tribunals).34
Thus, in 1985 when the synod of bishops35 requested that further research be carried out
on the applicability of subsidiarity in the Church, they were attempting to revisit the
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missed opportunity that the 1983 Code had provided on discussing the nature of
subsidiarity in the Church. Thus, it would seem that the central canonical challenge for
subsidiarity in the Church is the failure of official Church pronouncement on its
applicability within the Church’s administrative and pastoral structure beyond the stand
taken by some of the social encyclicals one has discussed in great detail.
Ad Leys has studied the new Code and made some connection with subsidiarity in
terms of the role of the institutional Church as communion of the faithful.36 Essentially,
Leys attempted to respond to the question raised by Sobanski in the context of the
ecclesiological and canon law issues of today: “Considering the Christian claim to truth
and the authoritative mediation of it, can there be in the Church an autonomous freedom
and is it possible to offer that in ecclesiastical institutions?”37 Leys then raised some
further questions: “The constitutional value of the basic rights of the faithful in the
Church, the relationship between spiritual authority and Christian freedom, the tension
between the right to truth and the rights of the subject, the tension between the
community and the faithful who belong to it.”38 Leys then discussed the implications
arising from the rights of all the Christian Faithful as formulated in the Code, canons 208223. According to Leys “these are sacramentally established basic rights (c. 204 par. 1),
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which are a foundation of the legal system. They must guarantee personal freedom in the
Church.”39
Thus, in view of the Nigerian social context and the social reality of the Church in
Nigeria, the following two recommendations are made that should become part of the
much needed canonical reform that will respect local needs of the Church in Nigeria and
other African countries with subsidiarity as the guiding principle.
1.

The universal canonical age for the retirement of the clergy, fixed at

seventy-five by canons 538/3 and 401/1, needs to be reformulated to respect the
particular retirement age in different countries. The case of African countries particularly
is very unique and demands special attention. In these developing countries where
medical facilities are lacking, the conditions of service are very poor, there are little or no
retirement benefits for the secular clergy, and above all the average life expectancy age is
53 years, it is unreasonable, unrealistic, and even unnatural to expect the clergy working
in these conditions to fit the universal age of seventy-five, knowing full well that the
majority of them will die working in the most inhuman situations. The matter of
retirement age should be left in the hands of local and regional conferences of bishops.
2.

The local bishops’ conferences in Africa need to take into consideration

the challenges which the extended family system present to those who aspire to and
become secular clerics in the African context. Most of these persons are often the major
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Ibid., p. 118. The canonical details provided by Leys are beyond the scope of this study but the
conclusion provided is significant: “The principle of subsidiarity gives the particular churches, individually
but also in larger associations such as bishops’ conferences and continental synods, the task to profile
themselves more clearly as churches which are rooted in their own culture, or should be.” p. 123.
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source of well-being and support to their families in their social, health, and educational
needs. Thus, there needs to be in place an organized support system following canon
281/1 and 281/2, rather than the practice which exists in most dioceses in Nigeria,
whereby, the parish priest is left to determine what amounts to reasonable stipends for
associates in parish situations. These are not matters for which, in the spirit of
subsidiarity, local bishops require Rome’s blessing nor is it necessary.

5.6.

Summary
This study has examined five challenging issues involved in the applicability of

the principle of subsidiary function in the Church and the society. These issues include
structural organization in the Church, pastoral implications, nationalism, ecumenical
dialogue, and canonical consequences. In order to help persons in community to help
themselves and to promote the common good of all, the study proposed the applicability
of subsidiarity as a guiding principle. Thus, the need for theological research and
reflection on these issues is necessary to correlate the practical lived experience of the
Church’s social reality in concrete, historical experiences.

GENERAL CONCLUSION
Synthesis and Major Insights from the Study

Introduction
The goal of this dissertation was to study the centrality of the principle of
subsidiarity in the social and moral reconstruction of the world and in particular the
Nigerian social and historical context. The study formulated this thesis to guide the
research in terms of its scope and limits: Ever acting out of social charity, how can one
structure multicultural groups with an interlocking relationship in society, so as to engage
in social and ethical reconstruction with a view to maximize liberty and still pursue a
common good ordered toward the achievement of social justice? Having come to the end
of this study, it is appropriate to offer some synthesis of the research work and to present
some of the major insights gained from the study. The study now offers ten concluding
statements.
1.

The first insight gained from this study is on the meaning and value of the

principle of subsidiarity. Subsidiarity is a natural principle of organizing and ordering
individuals and groups to pursue common purpose and objectives in community. The
term connotes notions of support from below, aid, and help to self-help. It points to a
particular way of organizing a community so that the members can assist each other from
the grassroots in the task of standing up and pursuing their common goals. The principle
affirms that there is something inherently good about groups organizing around interests
and helping each other seek common ends. While recognizing that communities are made
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up of people with different interest groups, the principle promotes the healthy interaction
of these varying interest groups with a view toward the common good of all.
2.

The second insight of this work is that the principle of subsidiarity

articulated by Pius XI involves three core ideas which form a dynamic whole in
explaining how the principle works. These are autonomy, intervention, and hierarchy.
Autonomy stresses the limited degree of independence necessary for groups and
individuals to be able to operate in a given context. It helps persons to make free choices
without any form of external coercion. Intervention specifies the non-absolute nature of
autonomy, both for the individual and the group. Independence must be accountable to
the common good of the entire society. Mutual interaction and cooperation is intrinsically
required. Thus, when there is a clear case of violation against the common good, some
limited form of intervention is permitted by the social body. Hierarchy helps to explain
the levels of responsibility in society. Thus, authority is defined in terms of the level of
participation among the social groups that promote the individual’s values in their
associations, while at the same time upholding the social objectives of the larger society.
This understanding of authority calls for limited power sharing in view of the common
good of all, while leaving some room for putting in check any arbitrary use of such
powers. It is in the nature of subsidiarity to intervene in the case of hierarchical abuse to
act as a stabilizing principle in the social order.
3.

The third insight of this study is that the articulation of subsidiarity

provided by Pius XI in QA has universal appeal and significance in every social
arrangement of persons in community. This is because subsidiarity emphasizes the
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priority of the person in communion with others to bring about the bonum commune.
Thus, the vision of the common good sees in the human person the personal dignity
proper to one’s nature but directed essentially to others in the society. Hence, the
common good and the good of the individual do not oppose one another, but the good of
the individual whose nature is personal has a dignity proper to itself, but nonetheless is
social in character, that is, it is directed to the well-being of others. Hence, the common
good is realized through the participation and contribution of the individual to others in
society. In this way, the relationship of the individual to the social group remains an issue
for everybody in a given social context.
4.

Social justice is a multi-dimensional concept. From a theological

perspective, the biblical meaning of social justice as fidelity to the demands of a covenant
relationship challenges one to engage in some form of concrete manifestation of this
relationship. In examining some of the history and practice of social justice in the Bible,
one is able to conclude that the central thrust for social justice is respect for the dignity of
the human person who is created in the image and likeness of God. Thus, wherever and
whenever that dignity is marginalized, the demands of social justice come into operation
to restore and fashion the human person toward his or her God-given dignity.
Furthermore, the study discovered that the mission and message of Jesus affirm the
revelation of God and make ethical demands centered on the commandment to love God
and neighbor as primary to participation in God’s Kingdom. Moreover, it was clear that
the Kingdom of God has social, economic, political, cultural, and religious consequences
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that the followers of Christ would have to deal with on a day-to-day basis as they
encounter the present, imminent, and eschatological dimensions of the Kingdom.
5.

Another dimension of social justice is how to respond on the one hand to

the reality of innocent suffering of individuals and groups, and on the other hand to
explain the reality of the goodness of God in creating the world good. This issue is the
age-old problem of theodicy. From this study, it was clear that there are several complex
questions that are implicated in the issues of theodicy in the face of injustice in the world.
How does one simply explain, for instance, that some persons who find themselves in
situations of desperate poverty are paying the price for their bad actions? Human
experiences inform us that while this might be true in some cases, there are instances
when this argument is very untrue. How does one explain natural phenomena like
drought, earthquakes, tornadoes and hurricanes that bring unbearable hardship on people?
Thus, one is able to conclude that while it is true that there are some phenomena in the
world that transcend human understanding, which are attributed to some divine power,
one may and must not absolve human beings from their responsibility to be cocreators
with God. In this way, the challenge to take up the task of providing social justice in
one’s community remains very much a partnership of cooperation between persons
among themselves and between them and God. Thus, in concrete terms the practice of
social justice must be geared toward the common good of all. The demand to achieve the
common good makes it imperative to pay just wages to workers, to promote purposeful
dialogue between the employer and the employee, to set forth the right conditions that
respect, enable, and ensure the proper working situation for workers. Thus, institutional
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reform is not only required but necessary where needed to fulfill the demands of social
justice as the universal standard to all social relationships which lead them to the
common good.
6.

The practice of social justice in a pluralistic society such as Nigeria needs

some foundational structure which will provide some stability and order to the social
body. Thus, the common sense of the laws and values of the people, which are grounded
in the day-to-day interrelationships in terms of their beliefs, family, clan and ethnic
structures, cultural practices, political and economic arrangements, and generally
accepted social practices are central to the type of society one is fashioning. To the extent
that most people live by the acceptable norms of society and see them as useful and true,
social order is maintained. However, to the extent that social norms are grossly violated,
there exists generally social disorder. Thus, there needs to be in Nigeria healthy
interaction between social order and cultural values because culture is developed over
long periods of struggle, exchange and interchange. Consequently, when the culture of a
people is disconnected as is the case in Nigeria by corruption, misrule, and ethnic and
inter-ethnic conflict, the building process might be overwhelming as is the present
situation with a precarious democratic process that is bedeviled with uncertainty and lack
of direction. It is obvious that naïve and unconstructive arrangements which have failed
to recognize the cultural make-up of the nation are having a field day.
7.

The study is able to conclude that a key issue central to building of

community is moral and ethical responsibility of the citizens. While to some degree
morality springs out of the cultural experiences of the community, it is not limited to
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human individual choices, lifestyles, values, and interpretations, though all these are
implicated in the type of moral practice that exists in a nation. Morality as one has
investigated is also revealed and is grounded in nature and the Creator of the Universe
whom we call God. In essence, the divine law envisions a moral order that promotes the
common good and respects all human life and is able to serve as corrective to the moral
order of society. The attempt to build a prosperous socio-economic and political
community without moral standards in Nigeria may be likened to building a house
without a solid foundation. Hence, the study abhors the lack of moral transparency by
some of the citizens, including those in leadership positions, as a major threat to building
a social justice oriented society.
8.

The study concludes that in the attempt to build the Nigerian society to the

point when it is able to accept and celebrate its multicultural, multi-religious, and
multiethnic makeup, some of the traditional community will continually undergo a
process of rebuilding and reformulation of its shared values, beliefs and cultural
practices. Some of the most cherished values will be passed on to the next generation
with renewed vigor and meaning. Other beliefs and cultural practices will become
obsolete and irrelevant, losing their meaning in view of new realities. In the midst of
these challenges, the role of the extended family system with its benefits and burdens and
the levels of support it provided or did not provide for the social structuring of the society
would play a vital role in reshaping new models of social groups in the Nigerian society.
Essentially, a philosophy of pluralism is the key to maintaining the balance between
diversity and wholeness. Such a philosophy will make allowance for open dissent and
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critical comments without sacrificing one’s identity in the process. This would mean
allowing minority ethnic groups to present their vision within the setting of larger groups.
Here, concrete grassroots arrangements for groups to dialogue with one another are
fundamental to community rebuilding. The process might lead to the emergence of a new
crop of leaders, both in government and within civil society, that will engage in broadbased initiatives rather than engage in divisiveness by exploiting the diversity in the
nation.
9.

The study examined the history of Nigeria with a critical lens and

discovered the enormous task before the citizens in building up a social justice oriented
society. This task demands support from different structures that could bring both the
theoretical and practical approaches that will elevate the existing precarious civil society
into one of peaceful coexistence. The study concluded that it is necessary to engage four
approaches that will help support the complex nature of the Nigerian situation. First, the
correlation between subsidiarity and federalism was established as integral to the building
of a viable civil society. The study proposed that the situation where majority ethnic
groups absorb minority ones in some parts of the nation is a violation of subsidiarity and
injustice that breeds social disharmony and jeopardizes the common good. Rather,
minority groups in Nigeria must be supported and enabled with the right set of conditions
– mutual trust, mutual respect, and participation to make their choices in view of the
common good. Second, the study proposed the promotion of human rights which are
inalienable in society with the recognition that individual rights and social rights are not
opposed to each other but need to work together to build the common good. Thus,
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building trust across ethnic, religious, cultural, and social barriers is central to promoting
individual and group rights. That is why programs which encourage this type of social
interaction of the different groups should be promoted. The National Youth Service
Corps, introduced by the Gowon administration, was a novelty in this sense. Third, the
study recommended that self-help grassroots associations be supported to serve as agents
of social and ethical development. These associations exist at the village, clan, and town
levels where the majority of Nigerians reside. It is these basic structures existing in the
communities that need support to stand up. These structures affect the lives of the people
on a daily basis in the market squares, town meetings, religious gatherings, and local
development initiatives. These are the same structures where citizenship education should
be promoted. Here, the problem of good leadership which has plagued the nation could
be discussed. Also, the unchecked nature of the power of wealth acquisition demands
some attention. Fourth, the study recommended that since the Church has some level of
trust with the people and has been able to engage most of the rural areas through the
provision of schools, clinics, and churches, it may form some partnership of cooperation
with government acting as a mediating structure in communities where this type of
arrangement is considered beneficial to the social body.
10.

The study concluded that because of the limited nature of this work, it was

unable to address some of the issues involved in the applicability of the principle of
subsidiarity in the Church and society. These involve some structural organization in the
Church, particularly to answer the question whether the Church’s administrative
structures have become much more complex than the original sense of hierarchia ordinis
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from a sacramental perspective. Also, there is the issue of the extent to which the central
administration of the Church should have control on concrete local issues of national and
regional bishops’ conferences. The role of the Laity in the Church demands some
attention in view of the subsidiarity principle in terms of the common good of the
Church. Is this to be determined by the administrative body alone or ought it to be a joint
venture between responsible leaders and the Laity together acting as the people of God?
Does the applicability of subsidiarity promote nationalism or encourage local initiative
and decision making by those present in the social reality where the Church is rooted?
The study recommended the need for ecumenical dialogue to understand the relationship
existing between subsidiarity and sphere sovereignty. It also advocated for some
canonical review in the light of some local issues existing in the Nigerian and African
context.
Finally, this study began by formulating the thesis that: Ever acting out of social
charity, how can one structure multicultural groups with interlocking relationships in
society, so as to engage in social and ethical reconstruction with a view to maximize
liberty and still pursue a common good ordered toward the achievement of social justice?
The study now affirms unequivocally that the answer to this question lies in the
understanding, demands, and practices that a holistic presentation of the principle of
subsidiarity, clearly advanced here, bring to bear, in this case, on the Nigerian social
context, hence the necessity of this dissertation project.
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